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MR. COBDEN AND "THE TIMES."

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

MR. COBDEN, M.P., AND MR. DELANE,

EDITOR OF "THE TIMES;"

44614
a.v

WITH A

SUPPLEMENTARY CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

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MR. COBDEN, AND THE EDITOR OF THE "DAILY TELEGRAPH."

MANCHESTER:
ALEX. IRELAND AND CO., PALL MALL COURT.
1864.

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INTRODUCTION.

I HAVE yielded to the request that I would place the following correspondence on record in a collected and permanent form, because, among other reasons, it involves a question which will necessarily come again under public notice:—I allude to the surreptitious relations which a journal, professedly anonymous and independent, maintains with the Government. It must have been apparent to the least sagacious observer, that the great excitement in political circles, produced by this correspondence, has arisen, mainly, from the allusion, made towards the close of my first letter, to the illicit, because secret, connection which has existed between the writers and conductors of the *Times*, and the dispensers of Government patronage. This allusion, or "attack" as it is termed, is adduced as the sole reason for refusing to publish my letter by the Editor of the *Times*, who alleges that he knows the imputation to be unfounded. It will occur, naturally, to the reader, that if this denial be known to be well-founded—about which no one can be so thoroughly informed as the Editor of the *Times*—the obvious course would have been to have published my letter, then challenged me to the proof, and, on the failure of which, to have convicted me of groundless and calumnious imputations. Especially was this the duty of a journal, conscious of its innocence, after my letter, which had been refused insertion in its columns, had been everywhere read, and made the topic of general discussion. Does anyone doubt, that if a similar accusation had been levelled at the *Daily News*, whose high moral tone all must recognise, or the *Morning Star*, with its consistency of purpose, or that

intellectual organ of lofty principle, the *Nonconformist*, they would one and all have published the letter, accepted the challenge, and dared me to the proof?

A very few words will suffice for the logical justification of the allusion to the Government in my first letter, which has drawn on me the hostility of a certain portion of the press. For several years the *Times* has worn the livery (on the usual terms of service) of those who are at the source of political power and patronage. One of the most acceptable returns which it was in its power to render to its patrons has been a persistent vilification of Mr. Bright and myself until at last its attacks have culminated in the gravest and most wanton calumny, without exception, to which members of the House of Commons have been subjected in the present century. The charges have been made with a precision and a reiteration of which I was quite ignorant when I wrote the first letter in this correspondence. Indeed, I did not then know that I had been myself included in the same indictment with Mr. Bright.

It will be seen from the following pages, that immediately after the meeting at Rochdale, on the 24th November, elaborate arguments appeared in the leading columns of the *Times*, to show that we had commended to the people a scheme for "seizing on the lands of the rich to divide them gratuitously among the poor." Let it not be supposed that this was a mere wanton sally of literary banter. Whatever may be said of the morality of the *Times*, no one can doubt that the intellect which presides over that journal has a plan and purpose of its own in the articles which appear in its columns. On this occasion the purposes to be effected were twofold—to affix the taint of infamy on the first utterances upon the land question, and thus deter others from discussing it, and to strike a blow at the moral influence of the Rochdale speakers. The deliberate object in view was very soon made apparent. A week after the appearance of the articles, giving an

agrarian interpretation to our speeches, a leader appeared in the *Times* on the proposed European Congress, where the writer, contending that the smaller States of the Continent would look with favour on the proposal, because they had unscrupulous longings for their neighbours' territory, and wishing to illustrate his argument, declared that they would view the invitation to the Congress with the "satisfaction with which the poor might regard Mr. Bright's proposition for dividing among them the lands of the rich." Here, that which was a week before, an interpretation, still open to argument, was now made to assume the character of an established FACT,—something to point a moral with, and to exhibit Mr. Bright, not only in his own country, but throughout Europe, as the recognised and proverbial champion of agrarian spoliation. This was the first step. Had it received no check, the *Times* would not have had occasion to wait long for a further application of its FACT. The Wolds of Yorkshire have been lately lighted up with incendiary fires, attributed in some quarters to the discontent of the farm labourers. "Behold the fruits of your Rochdale speeches" might have been the next application of the FACT. And in case of any future acts of violence on the part of a discontented body of agriculturists, there was the FACT, manufactured to hand for itself by the *Times*, and ready for the double duty of illustrating an argument, and defaming Mr. Bright.

Now, this is a species of moral assassination, second only in degree of turpitude to that of an attempt on our life or limb, and in both cases requiring that the principals, as well as the aiders and abettors, should if possible be discovered and exposed. If I am shot at from behind a hedge, I try to find out the whereabouts of the would-be assassin. I follow him to his haunts, and trace his connexions if I can; and if I learn that he has employers who reward him for his nefarious life, I drag them all to the bar of justice. And if a death-blow be aimed at the reputation of a public man, by which it is hoped to destroy for ever his power of usefulness, I hold that not only the guilty principal, but also

his accomplices, even though they be a Government, ought, if they can be identified, to be exposed to the reprobation of the honest portion of the public.

A word for those critics who have discovered a want of moderation in my language. Not one epithet has been withdrawn, or a denunciatory phrase softened in the following pages, and I leave the impartial reader to say, whether, if I had known at the commencement of the correspondence, all that I now know, some of my expressions might not, with propriety, have been a little more emphatic. I could have commisserated the shock which I have given to the exquisite sensibilities of my censors, if I had not seen with what robust superiority to all the pangs of outraged taste they were able to peruse the slanderous imputations by which my letter was provoked. For the rest, I do not profess to have acquired that steel polish which some of our "Saturday" cynics, of the emotionless school, of "Reviewers" and "Spectators" would seem to have attained, by which they are enabled to subordinate the feelings of indignation at a foul wrong to the claims of a glittering rhetoric, or the attitudes of the posture-master.

The reader will find a brief correspondence between the Editor of the *Daily Telegraph* and myself. That journal, after refusing to print my first communication to the *Times*, espoused its quarrel, and, in defiance of the rules of fair play in journalism, criticised and condemned the letter to which it had denied publicity. It must be here remarked that the majority of the metropolitan morning journals refused to publish the letter. I cannot doubt that, before the question now raised shall be disposed of, public opinion will have unequivocally condemned the course which they pursued. Had it not been for two honourable exceptions, the London press would have exhibited itself in what our neighbours term *une conspiration de silence*. By their independent course, the *Daily News* and *Morning Star* have partially averted what, to use the mildest term, would have been a very great discredit to British journalism.

Midhurst, January 7, 1864. R. C.

CORRESPONDENCE.

MR. COBDEN'S LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF "THE TIMES."

Sir,—The following is extracted from your yesterday's leading article:—

"Then, though a small state may have something to lose by change, "it has usually more to gain; and so it comes to pass that it looks upon "any attempt to reconstruct the map, or reform the institutions of Europe, "with something of that satisfaction with which the poor might regard "*Mr. Bright's proposition for a division among them of the lands of the* "*rich*, or the Roman plebeians might hang on the lips of Gracchus when "he rose to expound to them his last plan for a new colony, with large "grants of land to every citizen who should join it."

Without communicating with Mr. Bright, I trouble you with a few words on this gross literary outrage, which concerns not him alone, but every public man. To utter a syllable to prove that the above assertion, that Mr. Bright advocated a division of the lands of the rich among the poor, is a groundless and gratuitous falsehood, would be to offer an insult to one who has done more than probably any other public man, to popularise those economical truths on which the rights of property are based. To say that it is a foul libel for which the publisher is amenable to law were beside the question, because the object of the calumny would scorn any other court of appeal than that of public opinion. But a wider question is forced on our attention by this specimen of your too habitual mode of dealing, not merely with individuals, but with the interests of society. A tone of pre-eminent unscrupulousness in the discussion of political questions, a contempt for the rights and feelings of others, and

a shameless disregard of the claims of consistency and sincerity on the part of its writers, have long been recognised as the distinguishing characteristics of the *Times*, and placed it in marked contrast with the rest of the periodical press, including the penny journals of the metropolis and the provinces. Its writers are, I believe, betrayed into this tone mainly by their reliance on the shield of an impenetrable secrecy. No gentleman would dream of saying, under the responsibility of his signature, what your writer said of Mr. Bright yesterday. I will not stop to remark on the deterioration of character which follows when a man of education and rare ability thus lowers himself—aye, even in his own eyes—to a condition of moral cowardice; for will he deny that if he were to meet Mr. Bright in the club, or the House of Commons, with the knowledge that his secret was divulged, he would cower with conscious inferiority before the man he had stabbed in the dark? This, however, is his own affair. But there is another aspect of the subject in which the public is directly interested.

In the present management of the *Times* there is an essential departure from the plan on which it was conducted twenty or thirty years ago, which distinguishes it from all other journals. They who associate in the higher political circles of the metropolis know that the chief editor and the manager of the *Times*, while still maintaining a strict *incognito* towards the public, drops the mask with very sufficient reasons in the presence of those powerful classes who are at once the dispensers of social distinction, and (on which I might have something to say) of the patronage of the Government. We all know the man whose fortune is derived from the *Times;* we know its manager; its only avowed and responsible editor—he of the semi-official correspondence with Sir Charles Napier in the Baltic—through whose hands, though he never pen a line himself, every slander in its leaders must pass—is as well known to us as the chief official at the Home Office. Now the question is forced on us, whether we who are behind the scenes are not bound, in the interests of the uninitiated public, and as the only certain mode of abating such outrages as this, to lift the veil and dispel the illusion by which the *Times* is enabled to pursue this game of secrecy to the public, and servility to the Government—a game (I purposely use the word) which secures for its connections the corrupt advantages, while denying to the public its own boasted benefits of the anonymous system.

It will be well for public men to decide, each in his own case (for myself I have no doubt on the subject), whether, in response to such

attacks as these, they will continue to treat the *Times* as an impersonal myth; or whether, on the contrary, they will, in future, summon the responsible editor, manager, or proprietor to the bar of public opinion, and hold him up by name, to the obloquy which awaits the traducer and calumniator in every other walk of political and social life.

I am, &c.,

Midhurst, December 4, 1863. RICHARD COBDEN.

The above letter, having been refused insertion in the *Times*, was forwarded to the other London morning papers, and was published in the *Daily News* and *Star*. Thereupon the Editor of the *Times* addressed to the metropolitan journals, for publication, the communication which he had sent to Mr. Cobden, accompanied with the following brief note:

"THE 'TIMES' AND MR. COBDEN.

"The Editor of the *Times* presents his compliments to the Editor of "the *Morning Star* [*Daily News*, &c.], and begs to enclose a copy of his "reply to Mr. Cobden, which Mr. Cobden probably omitted to transmit "together with his own letter to the Editor of the *Morning Star* [*Daily "News*, &c.].

"Printing-house-square, Dec. 9, 1863."

In the meantime, however, Mr. Cobden had written a rejoinder to Mr. Delane, and, as will be seen, had forwarded both letters for publication together in the *Rochdale Observer*.

THE ANSWER OF THE EDITOR OF "THE TIMES."

[COPY.]

The Times Office, Dec. 7, 1863.

The Editor of the *Times* presents his compliments to Mr. Cobden, and encloses a proof of his letter, which, though it arrived by Saturday's post, only reached the Editor's hands last evening. He could not then give it immediate consideration, but, in deference to Mr. Cobden's name, he announced that it should be published to-morrow.

On reading it, however, this morning, he thinks—and he trusts Mr. Cobden will, on re-perusal, agree with him—that Mr. Cobden has no right to expect him, upon a pretext entirely irrelevant, to publish a series of most offensive and unfounded imputations upon himself and his friends.

He must, in the first place, observe that Mr. Bright himself has made no complaint of the passage upon which Mr. Cobden has founded this attack upon the *Times*, and he might on that ground alone decline to insert a letter, which Mr. Cobden admits, is not authorised by Mr. Bright.

The facts, however, are shortly these :—Messrs. Cobden and Bright make two speeches at Rochdale, which are reported in the *Times* at unusual length, and with extraordinary promptitude. These speeches are discussed elaborately in two leading articles on successive days, and in each of them certain passages are interpreted as recommending a re-partition of the land among the poor. Messrs. Cobden and Bright are expressly challenged to disavow this interpretation if it misrepresents their meaning; but they make no reply, and apparently accept it as conveying their true intention.

The speeches, as reported, also remain before the public for upwards of a week, and the interpretation put upon them by the *Times* provokes no adverse remark. At last an article appears upon a totally different subject, in which an allusion is made in a single phrase to Mr. Bright's supposed opinions, and Mr. Cobden pounces upon this phrase, not that he may discuss the true interpretation of Mr. Bright's expressions, but that he may make a vague and most offensive attack upon the *Times* and its conductors.

The Editor declines to permit the *Times* to be made the means of disseminating imputations which he knows to be unfounded, and which are entirely irrelevant to the question at issue.

Perhaps the Editor is mistaken in supposing that Mr. Cobden desires the publication of his letter. If, however, he should think that it could conduce either to his own interest or to the injury of the *Times*, he can probably find some more appropriate organ than the *Times* itself.

On the appearance of the above in the London journals, Mr. Cobden forwarded immediately to them the following letter:—

MR. COBDEN AND THE EDITOR OF "THE TIMES."

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "DAILY NEWS," ["MORNING STAR," &c.]

Sir,—In your yesterday's paper there appears a letter which the Editor of the *Times* addressed to me, to which is appended a complaint, that I had not published it along with my letter to him. I forwarded a rejoinder to that letter to the Editor on the 9th, in which I informed him that the correspondence would be sent to the Rochdale paper for publication. You will receive a copy to-morrow, and as you have printed the letter of the Editor of the *Times*, I trust to your fairness to publish mine. With reference to an objection which has been made, on the score of etiquette, that I have invaded the impersonality of the editorial management of the *Times*, I have only a word to say: The public will respect the anonymous system, so long as it respects itself; but it will no more tolerate the literary assassin, in our day, than it would the poison bowl, or the dagger.

I cannot allow even a day to pass, without offering a remark on the astounding defence, or rather justification, which the Editor of the *Times* has ventured to put forth. Instead of offering a syllable in palliation of the charge of inciting to public plunder, levelled at Mr. Bright, he coolly tells us that he had, in two previous numbers of his journal, made the same charge against both that gentleman, and myself, that he had given us a week to clear ourselves, and, as we had neglected to do so, that he concluded his imputation to be well founded! Nothing but a long impunity could have betrayed him into such a defence. It amounts to this—"I have only to scatter abroad accusations of meditated robbery, and if anybody who may be accused by me, fail to vindicate his character, he has no right to complain, if he be ever afterwards treated as a convicted felon." But mark the arrogant assumption on which this is founded,—that everybody is bound, as he values his reputation, to be a diligent reader of the *Times*. Now that newspaper never enters my house, except by the rarest accident. It was only by the chance visit of a friend last week, that the copy reached me, containing the aspersions on Mr. Bright, which formed the text of my letter to the Editor. The latter also pleads in justification, that Mr. Bright has made no complaint. I suppose he concludes that Mr. Bright feels rather

complimented than otherwise, at having been coupled with the Gracchi, by a writer in the *Times*, in schemes of socialistic spoliation. Now, I happen to know that Mr. Bright never receives the *Times* into his house; that, like myself, he is not in the habit of seeing it except at the club, during the session; and I venture to say, that, like myself, he never read a word of those two previous attacks, which, by a display of *Times* logic, are now set up as a justification of the third. Nay more, I do not believe that Mr. Bright ever heard of even the third indictment, until he saw it in my letter. Need I add that I consider this plea in justification, to be almost the only one which could have aggravated the original offence?

Judging from what I have seen in another paper of yesterday (I have not seen the *Times* this week), it would appear that the Editor of the latter journal has published his own reply to me, with editorial comments on our correspondence, without printing, as he promised to do, my letter. If so, I venture to say it is quite unparalleled in the history of journalism; and surely it is not less short-sighted, than unfair. The subject at which I very obscurely glanced, and which alone made him shrink from publishing my letter in his journal, was not a personal matter between him and myself, but one of grave public import, on which the British public has a right to be informed. In about sixty days, at the utmost, Parliament will be in session, and it will then be in the power of those whom he maligns, and refuses a hearing, (if they should be so disposed) to make the pages of his own paper, the vehicle for a searching, detailed, and complete exposure of what, I venture to call, a flagrant public abuse, the mere allusion to which, seems to have almost deprived the *Times* of all sense of prudence, propriety, and decency.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

Midhurst, Dec 11, 1863. RICHARD COBDEN.

MR. COBDEN TO MR. DELANE.

To JOHN T. DELANE, ESQ.

Sir,—You and I have been long personally acquainted; your handwriting is known to me, and I know you to be the chief Editor of the *Times*. Under such circumstances I cannot allow you to suppress your individuality, and shield yourself under the third person of the

editorial nominative, in a correspondence affecting your personal responsibility for a scandalous aspersion on myself (as I now learn for the first time from you) as well as on Mr. Bright.

Your refusal to publish my former letter is a matter so entirely within your own province, that I have nothing to say upon it, except to congratulate myself on the recent revolution in the newspaper world, which renders your decision comparatively harmless. A few years ago the *Times* possessed almost a monopoly of publicity. Four-fifths of the daily newspaper circulation issued from its press. *Now* it constitutes, probably, one-tenth of our diurnal journalism, and my letter will be only the more generally read from having been excluded from your columns.

But your letter proceeds to offer some most singular arguments in justification of your attack on Mr. Bright. You state that your journal had previously contained two leading articles, casting the same imputation both on him and myself, that you had challenged us to disavow your interpretation of our speeches, and as we had failed to do so, you accepted our silence as an acknowledgment of the truth of your interpretation,—in other words, as proof of our guilt! Here we have, in a compendious form, an exhibition of those qualities which characterise the editorial management of the *Times*,—of that arrogant self-complacency, logical incoherence, and moral bewilderment, which a too long career of impunity and irresponsibility could alone engender.

Now that which lies at the basis of this reasoning, if such it may be termed, is an inordinate display of what I must call *Times* egotism. Notwithstanding that your journal has now but a fractional part of the daily newspaper circulation, you complacently assume that all the world are your constant readers. The *Times* never enters my house, except by rare accident. This I know to be also the case with Mr. Bright, who will, in all probability, never have seen your attack until he reads it in my letter. It is only during the Session, at the Club, that I am in the habit of seeing your paper. The chance visit of a friend last Friday placed in my hand the *Times* of the previous day, when that scandalous paragraph caught my eye which formed the text of my letter to you. I was entirely ignorant of the two former attacks, which, by a droll process of reasoning, you now invite me to accept as a justification of the third. Now, let me ask you to descend for a minute from your editorial chair, while I illustrate this logic by a hypothetical case put to Mr Delane, the barrister. Suppose that the constituents of Mr. Bright were to indict your publisher for defaming their member, and that it was proposed in a

consultation of lawyers, at which you were present, to set up as a plea of justification at the trial that the same libel had been twice previously published against both Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden,—would it fail to occur to you that, in the eyes of an honest judge and jury, this defence would be considered an aggravation of the offence?

But we will assume, for the sake of argument, that Mr. Bright and I are regular subscribers to, and diligent readers of, your newspaper. Is it seriously contended that as often as you choose to pervert the sense of our speeches, and charge us with schemes of public robbery, the *onus* lies with us to disprove the imputation, and that neglecting to do so, we have no right to complain if we are thenceforth treated as felons? Would it not occur to anyone but an Editor of the *Times* that, before we violate the Ninth Commandment, the obligation lies with us to know that we are not bringing a false accusation against our neighbour?

Now, a word upon the subject which has given rise to this correspondence. Nobody knows better than yourself, except the writer who actually penned the scandalous passage in question, that this charge of wishing to divide the land of the rich among the poor, when levelled at Mr. Bright, is nothing but the resort to a stale rhetorical trick (though the character of the libel is not on that account altered) to draw away public attention from the real issue, and thus escape from the discussion of a serious, but, for the moment, an inconvenient public topic. In order to trail a red herring across the true scent the cry of spoliation was raised. You and your writers cannot be ignorant that the laws and political institutions of this country tend to promote the agglomeration of agricultural land in a constantly lessening number of hands:—you and I know, by a joint experience, which neither of us is likely to have forgotten, how great are the obstacles which the law interposes to the free transfer of landed property in this country. Now, the policy which sustains this state of things is a public question, which is not only fairly open to discussion, but invites the earnest attention and study of public men. In this, as in every other human concern, we must bring the matter to the test of experience, and in no way can this be more effectually done than by a comparison between the condition of the great majority of the agricultural population in this and other countries. The subject of our land laws has engaged the attention of eminent statesmen, and of our highest legal authorities; but I will venture to add—and it is all I shall condescend to say in refutation of your aspersions—that if there are two persons, who beyond all others, have given pledges throughout

an ardent discussion of kindred topics during a quarter of a century, that in debating the question of the tenure and transfer of land they would observe the restraints of law, justice, and political economy, they are the men whom your journal has dared to charge with the advocacy of a scheme for robbing the landowners of their property for the benefit of the poor.

Judging from past experience, this intrusion of a gross personality will tend only to attract public notice to a matter which it was meant to put out of sight. It has been the fate of the *Times* to help forward every cause it has opposed. By its truculent, I had almost said ruffianly, attacks on every movement while in the weakness of infancy, it has roused to increased efforts the energies of those it has assailed; while, at the same time, it has awakened the attention of a languid public, and attracted the sympathy of fair and manly minds. It is thus that such public measures as the abolition of the Corn Laws, the repeal of the Taxes on Knowledge, and the negotiation of the Treaty of Commerce with France, triumphed in spite of its virulent, pertinacious, and unscrupulous opposition; until, at last, I am tending to the conviction that there are three conditions only, requisite for the success of any great project of reform,—namely, a good cause, persevering advocates, and the hostility of the *Times*.

I shall forward this correspondence for publication in the *Rochdale Observer*, that it may at least be perused by the community which has the greatest interest in a controversy which concerns the reputation of Mr. Bright and myself.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Midhurst, Dec. 9, 1863. R. COBDEN.

MR. DELANE TO MR. COBDEN.

To Richard Cobden, Esq., M.P.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th inst.

It is quite true, as you say, that we have been long personally acquainted. You had no need to identify my handwriting. I have no desire to "suppress my individuality," or to deny my personal responsibility for what you are pleased to call "scandalous aspersions"

upon yourself and Mr. Bright. You have thus all that individuality which in your letter to the Editor of the *Times* you professed to desiderate, and from which you anticipated such momentous consequences. You will therefore have no difficulty in rendering me responsible to the verdict either of a court of law, or of the general body of our countrymen, and I shall cheerfully accept their decision.

You proceed to attribute to "*Times* egotism" my supposition that you had read the articles upon the report of your speech. Is it, I ask, egotistic or unreasonable to suppose that you, who had pounced so promptly upon a single phrase in an article of much inferior interest to yourself, should have read the articles which discussed your own speech? Or could I be expected to know that you, who once preferred a single copy of the *Times* "to all the books of Thucydides,"* did not admit the *Times* into your house?

* The following remarks by Mr. Cobden, at a meeting of the Manchester Athenæum on Friday, 27th December, 1850, are from the *Times* report:—"Now I am so far from being one who join with those who think that newspaper "reading is a kind of study that should be discouraged, that I think, on the contrary, "that the universal taste of the age shows that it is considered by mankind to be "about the most instructive and useful reading that they could possibly indulge in. "I take it that, as a rule, grown up men, in these busy times, read very little else but "newspapers. I think the reading of volumes is almost the exception; and the man "who habitually has between his fingers 400 or 500 newspapers in the course of the "year—that is, daily and weekly newspapers—and is engaged pretty actively in "business, or in political or public life—depend upon it, whatever he may say, or "like to have it thought to the contrary, he reads very little else, as a rule, but the "current periodical literature; and I doubt if a man with limited time could read "any thing else that would be much more useful to him. I believe it has been said "that one copy of the *Times* contains more useful information than the whole of the "historical books of Thucydides—(laughter);—and I am very much inclined to think "that to an Englishman or an American of the present day that is strictly true."—*Times*, 30th December, 1850. It will be seen that in the above observations the *Times* is cited not by Mr. Cobden but by another, whom he quotes and confirms, merely to illustrate the argument that there is more useful information and human interest in a newspaper of our own day than in a history of events which occurred in a small Greek state four centuries before the Christian era. He was speaking too of the interest which men of business—and not profound scholars or learned historians—had in newspaper reading. Mr. Delane has appropriated a little too eagerly to himself a compliment which was meant for the newspaper press generally. His paper was cited because at that time (1850), before any of the "taxes on knowledge" were repealed, the *Times* had a larger circulation than all the other daily papers together, and was therefore quoted as the type of journalism. His remarks had no reference to the opinions of the *Times*, but to the information it contained, and in this respect *Reuter* has been a great leveller since 1850.

You say that you seldom read the *Times*, and it is probably because you take your opinions of it at second-hand from its rivals that you apply to it such terms as "arrogant" and "truculent," and only hesitate over "ruffianly." I appeal from your professed ignorance, to the better informed judgment of that large majority who do read the *Times*, and who have discovered in it no such qualities.

You attribute to the *Times* a deliberate misrepresentation of your meaning and that of Mr. Bright as to the means of amending the unequal distribution of land between the rich and the poor. I repeat that certain passages in your speeches will, in my opinion, bear no other interpretation than that ascribed to them. If you merely intended to recommend measures for facilitating the conveyance of land, as your reference to our transaction at Ascot would suggest, your language was the most strangely exaggerated that was ever used to further a humble instalment of law reform. If you had read the *Times*, instead of condemning it unread, you would have known that it has always advocated the simplification of means for the transfer of land, and that its advocacy has not been altogether unsuccessful. But just as no simplification of conveyances will compel the rich to sell land or enable the poor to buy it, so no legislative measure will render the purchase of land a profitable investment for the poor.

The possession, the transfer, and the tenure of land are, however, public questions, which are best discussed, not between Mr. Cobden and Mr. Delane, but as it has always been the practice of the English press to discuss them—anonymously. That practice was not invented by me; it will not be destroyed by yourself. It has approved itself to the judgment of all, whether statesmen or publicists, who have appreciated the freedom and independence of the press, and I believe it to be essential to the interests not only of the press, but of the public.

Although, therefore, I have accepted your challenge in this instance, I shall decline to make any further contributions to the *Rochdale Observer*.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN T. DELANE.

16, Serjeants'-inn, Dec. 11, 1863.

MR. COBDEN TO MR DELANE.

To JOHN T. DELANE, ESQ.

Sir,—I have received the letter dated from your private residence, and bearing your own signature, in which you take on yourself personally the responsibility of the interpretation put by the *Times* on the speeches of Mr. Bright and myself at Rochdale—namely, that we proposed "a "division among the poor of the lands of the rich." Your letter to me says:—

"You attribute to the *Times* a deliberate misrepresentation of your "meaning, and that of Mr. Bright, as to the means of amending the "unequal distribution of the land between the rich and the poor. I "repeat that certain passages in your speeches will, in my opinion, bear "no other interpretation than that ascribed to them."

This is a grave accusation. I am told that, if proved, it would bring Mr. Bright and myself within the provisions of the Act 57th Geo. III. cap. 19, and render us liable to the penal consequences of transportation for seven years.

I will not believe that you can be so wanting in the respect due to others, as well as yourself, as to have addressed this accusation to me, unless with the belief that you have evidence to substantiate it.

I call on you to give me those "certain passages" to which you refer, and which are really now the only question at issue between you and me. That there may be no excuse or ground for delay, I accept the report which appeared in your paper as an accurate version of my speech; and to aid you in your task I have cut from the *Times* the entire passage which contains all that I said in reference to the condition of the people generally, or to the agricultural population, and the land question in particular. But let it be distinctly understood that I do not confine you to this extract, but that I give you the entire range of my speech.

Before giving the passage I will say a few words, which, although I do not in the slightest degree claim for them the character of evidence, may have interest in some quarters.

It is known that I am not in the habit of writing a word beforehand of what I speak in public. Like other speakers, practice has given me as perfect self-possession in the presence of an audience as if I were writing in my closet. Now, my ever-constant and overruling thought while addressing a public meeting, the one necessity which long experience of the arts of controversialists has impressed on my mind, is to avoid the

possibility of being misrepresented, and prevent my opponents from raising a false issue—a trick of logic as old as the time of Aristotle. If I have, as some favourable critics are pleased to think, sometimes spoken with clearness, it is more owing to this ever-present fear of misrepresentation than any other cause :—it is thus that the most noxious things in life may have their uses. When in my speech at Rochdale I came to touch upon the subject of the land, the thought instantly flashed upon me—and none but the public speaker knows with what velocity thoughts move when in the presence of 4,000 listeners—that I was dealing with a question about which there is a superstition in England, unknown elsewhere, and that the enemy would raise the cry of agrarianism against me, and hence my denunciation of agrarian outrage, which will be found in the following extract. Had I been inspired with the faculty of secondsight, and seen the Editor of the *Times* sitting bodily penning his criticism on my speech, I could not have more completely refuted and confounded in anticipation the charge now brought against me.

The following is the passage referred to :—

"It has been a fashion of late to talk of an extension of the "franchise as something not to be tolerated, because it is assumed that "the mass of the community are not fitted to take a part in government, "and people point to America and France, and other countries, and draw "comparisons between this country and other countries. Now, I hope I "shall not be considered revolutionary, because at my age I don't want "any revolutions. They won't serve me, I am sure, or anybody that "belongs to me. England may compare very favourably with most "other countries if you draw the line in society tolerably high, and if "you compare the condition of the rich and the upper classes of England, "or a considerable portion of the middle classes, with the same classes "abroad. I don't think a rich man, barring the climate, which is not "very good, could be very much happier anywhere else than in England; "but when my opponents treat this question of the franchise as one that "threatens to bring the masses of the people down from their present "state to the level of other nations, I say that I have travelled in most "civilised countries, and that the masses of my fellow-countrymen do "not compare so favourably with the masses of other countries as I "could wish. I find in other countries a greater proportion of people "owning property than there are in England. I don't know a protestant "community in the world where the masses of the people are so illiterate as "in England. These are not bad tests of the condition of a people. It

" is no use your talking of your army and navy, your exports and your " imports—it is no use telling me you have a small portion of your people " exceedingly well off. I want to bring the test to a comparison of the " majority of the people with a majority of the people in other countries. " Now, I say with regard to some things in foreign countries we don't " compare favourably. The condition of the English peasantry has no " parallel on the face of the earth. (Hear.) You have no other " peasantry but that of England which is entirely divorced from the " land. There is no other country in the world where you will not find " men holding the plough and turning up the furrow upon their own " freehold. *I don't want any agrarian outrages by which we should " change all this;* but this I find, and it is quite consistent with human " nature, that wherever I go the condition of the people is generally " pretty good, in comparison with the power they have to take care of " themselves; and if you have a class entirely destitute of political " power, while in another country they possess it, they will be treated " there with more consideration, they will have greater advantages, they " will be better educated, and have a better chance of possessing pro- " perty than in a country where they are deprived of political power. " (Hear.)

You will observe in the above passage from my speech, taken from your own report, that I use the words, "I don't want any agrarian " outrages by which we should change all this;" and now we must appeal to the authority of the lexicographer. If you turn to *Webster's* (quarto) *Dictionary* you will find the word "agrarian" interpreted, on the authority of Burke, as follows:—

" Relating to lands. Denoting or pertaining to an equal division of " lands; as, the agrarian laws of Rome, which distributed the conquered " and other public lands equally among all the citizens, limiting the " quantity which each might enjoy." Again, in the same dictionary the " word "agrarianism" is given as an equal division of lands or property, " or the principles of those who favour such a division."

Thus, in repudiating the agrarian system, I repudiated, in pure and unquestionable English, according to Burke, the principles of those who favour an equal division of land; I repudiated the agrarian laws of Rome; and yet, in spite of this, you charge me and Mr. Bright with "proposing a division among the poor of the lands of "the rich," and you associate us with Gracchus in schemes of socialistic spoliation. I will leave Mr. Bright's case for the future, as you seem to prefer it, to

his own good keeping, merely observing that his remarks upon the land question were more slight and incidental than even my own, and quite as incapable of being perverted to your sense.

I must interpose a word with reference to the explanation I have given of what was passing in my mind when I spoke at Rochdale against agrarian outrage. In the House of Commons, a speaker is allowed to put his own interpretation and meaning on his disputed utterances. This is fair in *vivâ voce* discussions. But I decline to claim or accept the benefit of this practice in the present case. There is no dispute as to what I said. I accept your own version of my speech; it is a marvellous telegraphic report, and I will abide by every sentence of it in its simplest and most obvious meaning.

And now, having given you the above materials, which I do solely to leave no ground for a prolonged correspondence, I ask, whether you are prepared to adhere to the charge that I proposed at Rochdale, on the 24th ult., to divide "among the poor the lands of the rich;" and if so I call on you to cite those "certain passages" from my speech which you say "will bear no other interpretation." I must be allowed to remind you that it is now wholly a question of proof; that there is but one issue before us, and that any attempt to evade this issue by raising others, or entering on vague and irrelevant discussions, cannot be tolerated. I will repeat the assumption that you could not have made this grave charge without believing it to be founded in truth; that in alluding to "certain passages," you thought them to exist. I call on you to produce them in the specific form in which you would feel bound to establish your charges before a solemn legal tribunal, and as you are still more bound to do at that higher tribunal, the public opinion of this country, to which this correspondence will be referred.

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

Midhurst, Dec. 14, 1863. R. COBDEN.

P.S. I purposely abstained from saying a word in the body of my letter in answer to other parts of your communication, because I wished to have a distinct and categorical answer from you on the single question at issue; but, as you seem to be curious upon the subject of my alienation from your pages, I will give you a trivial historical incident. When entering on the arrangement of the details of the treaty with France, in Paris, in the spring of 1860, I found that the *Times* arrived daily at the offices of the commission, in Rue de l'Université. While every faculty

of my mind was employed on the task in hand, I found my efforts thwarted and opposed, day after day, in the columns of your journal, where the treaty was incessantly denounced, ridiculed, and misrepresented. I was of course in a position to know that the statements made in the *Times* were groundless, I knew that the writers could not know them to be true, and I believed then, as I believe now, that you were actuated by the mercenary fear (foolish enough, I dare say) that the abolition of the paper duty, which was contemplated as a part of the measures in connexion with the treaty, would be injurious to the interests of your journal. To prevent this you appeared to be ready to destroy the treaty, defeat the budget of the year, sacrifice Mr. Gladstone, or worry me to death. I was tongue-tied and could not speak, owing to my official position; and it was only through the confidence which the chambers of commerce placed in my commercial knowledge that I was enabled to defeat your unpatriotic efforts.

I was naturally led to inquire how the *Times* reached the commissioners' office, and was told that it came from home as a part of our equipment. It seemed strange enough that a government professing to desire the success of the treaty should favour a journal which was doing its best to prevent it. Resolved that so long as I was at the head of the commission the *Times* should not enter the premises, I sent a communication to the proper quarter requesting that the *Daily News* should be substituted in its stead. This was done and from that time the *Times* has never entered my house, except by accident.

MR. DELANE TO MR. COBDEN.

To Richard Cobden, Esq., M.P.

Sir,—Having done already all that in your first two letters you seemed to think essential to your purpose, having abandoned "the shield of an "impenetrable secresy," having refused to "suppress my individuality," or to "shield myself under the third person of the editorial nominative," I might very reasonably decline to do more than acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, and leave you to that remedy which you seemed to think all sufficient, if you could only confront a living man instead of an impersonal entity.

It appears to me, however, that I have been dragged into this correspondence entirely by the exaggerated intensity you have chosen to attach to the often-quoted phrase, "Mr. Bright's proposition for a division "among the poor of the lands of the rich."

The very passage to which you refer me with so much confidence conveys, in my opinion, the whole of this meaning. You seem to assume that I charged you with proposing that this division should be accomplished by violence.* But your own words were there to prove to me that such was not your meaning, and to confute me instantly if I had attempted to attach that interpretation to it. There are, however, as no one knows better than yourself, other and more effective, because more enduring, means than violence for the division of the land of the rich among the poor. We see in France, for example, the effect you described to your Rochdale audience as so desirable in England—the *amorcellement (sic)* of the land—produced by the law of succession which prevails there.

A similar measure proposed by yourself, or by Mr. Bright, and carried in a parliament elected principally by the peasantry whom you desire to enfranchise, because they would then "have a better chance of "having property," would in two or three generations not only check the accumulation of land in few hands, but would break up all existing estates, great or small, and thus largely increase the number of proprietors. In another generation, probably, the peasant himself would "turn up the furrow on his own freehold," and be no longer "divorced "from the land."

You suggest so obviously that it is by legislative measures—rendered possible by giving political power to the peasantry—you propose to "amend the unequal distribution of the land between the "rich and the poor," that no one would think of charging you with endeavouring to effect this great change by violence.

But if you did not desire to produce by other means than violence a "division among the poor of the lands of the rich," allow me to ask, with all respect, what is the meaning and object of the passage to which you have referred me? As I write I find that Mr. Cobbett is in a similar difficulty.

* "This language, so often repeated, and so calculated to excite discontent "among the poor and half-informed, *has really only one intelligible meaning*. 'Reduce "'the electoral franchise; for when you have done so you will obtain an assembly "'which will SEIZE on the estates of the proprietors of land, and DIVIDE THEM "'GRATUITOUSLY AMONG THE POOR.' . . . It may be right to reduce the franchise, "*but certainly not as a step* TO SPOLIATION."—*Times, 26th November.*

For myself, I can but repeat that "certain passages in your speech "will, in my opinion, bear no other interpretation than that ascribed to "them," and you have yourself quoted the very passages upon which I rely to justify my opinion.

I remain, Sir, your obedient servant,

16, Serjeants'-inn, Dec. 16, 1863. JOHN T. DELANE.

P.S.—In your postscript you mention what you call "a trivial "historical incident." It is of little interest to me, or to the *Times*, why or when you ceased to read it; but you must allow me to remind you that the *Times*, as the largest consumer of paper, has always recognised its own interest in the abolition of the paper duty. Your negotiation at Paris affected not the *Times*, but the papermakers, who complain, as I still think justly, that while you made such concessions to France as the undertaking to levy no export duties on coal, you omitted to stipulate that the French export duty upon the materials of paper should not be maintained. Surely it was not unbecoming a great commercial journal to remind the British negotiator of such neglect while there was yet time to amend it?

MR. COBDEN TO MR. DELANE.

Midhurst, Dec 18, 1863.

Sir,—For the first time you now disavow having imputed to Mr. Bright and myself the design of promoting by violent, illegal, or immoral means a redistribution of the land of this country. Had you contented yourself with this simple disavowal it might have passed in silence; but you have invented for us another theory, that of the equal testamentary division of land, for which you have no better foundation in anything that ever fell from us than for the former and heavier aspersion. You now ask my acquiescence in a process of reasoning by which you attempt to show the connexion between your former language and your new accusation—against which, grammar, logic, and common sense alike revolt.

I will not allow you to divert me from the real question at issue into a new discussion as to the comparative merits between the equal division of real property, as it exists in France, and a great part of the Continent, and the custom of primogeniture as it prevails here. That

is a subject fairly open to discussion in our Law Amendment Societies, or the Social Science meetings, and as it can affect the pocket of no living proprietor, it is not likely to lead to a very impassioned debate. But I must point out to you how impossible it is to reconcile your present plea, with your former language. You now profess only to impute to us the design of favouring the equal division of landed property among all the children at the death of a proprietor. But this will not correspond with your reiterated charge that we contemplated a division "among the poor of the land of the rich." What you now affect to consider to be our object is the division of the land of the rich equally among the children of the rich. I must bring the question to the test of your own language.

In your leading article of December 3, you alleged that the small states of the continent regarded a congress with the "satisfaction with "which the poor might regard Mr. Bright's proposition for dividing "among them the lands of the rich." I now infer, from your new interpretation, that I am asked to construe this as meaning only the satisfaction with which the children of rich landowners would regard a proposition for dividing among them the lands of their fathers.

Again, in your letter to me of December 7 you stated "These "speeches are discussed elaborately in two leading articles on successive "days, and in each of them certain passages are interpreted as recom- "mending a *repartition of the land among the poor*." Now, the word partition or repartition means simply a division, and not a bequest or inheritance, and yet, with our dictionaries at hand, you now ask me to interpret the "repartition of the land among the poor," as only meaning that Mr. Bright and I wished to compel rich landowners at their death to leave their estates equally among all their children. And in your letter to me of December 11 you "repeat" the assertion that "certain "passages" of our speeches "bear no other interpretation than that "ascribed to them." Now up to that date you had put no other interpretation on those speeches than that they advocated the "division of the land of the rich, among the poor." The poor we are now told to interpret to mean only the children of rich landowners!

Then, I suppose, we are expected to forget that you coupled us with Gracchus, and the agrarian system of Rome.

No; in the teeth of all these proofs in plain unmistakable English to the contrary, I should be sacrificing truth to courtesy were I to affect to concur in this new version of your language, which does not admit of two meanings. I note your recantation, but repel the attempt to raise

a fresh issue to cover your retreat under a fire of minor accusations. I will conclude this correspondence with merely remarking that the blow which was aimed at the fame of Mr. Bright and myself has missed its mark. How far the recoil of the weapon may affect the hand that levelled it, time will show.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. T. DELANE, ESQ. R. COBDEN.

P.S.—I cannot compliment your political economy. You reproach me for having made the "concession" to France of undertaking to levy no export duty on coals. Sir Robert Peel had abolished the export duty on coal, for the benefit of England, a dozen years before the French treaty, and all I engaged was that for ten years more we would not be so unwise as to create any impediment to the free exportation of coal. As for the paper duty, it is the interest of the British public to buy everything in the cheapest market. If foreigners put foolish restrictions on the export of rags, it is an additional reason why we should take their paper. This may—and I am sorry for it—for a time, but only for a time, be injurious to our own manufacture of that article, in which I believe you or your family are largely engaged. The difference between you and me in 1860 was, that I was looking to the public interest, and you were advocating the interest of a class.

MR. COBDEN TO MR. DELANE.

Midhurst, Friday Evening, Dec. 18, 1863.

Sir,—I am compelled reluctantly to resume my pen, after having sent to the post what I had hoped was my final communication. But this morning's *Daily News*, which has just reached me, contains a statement which cannot with honour be passed over, by you or myself, in silence. In that journal I have read for the first time the following passage, which purports to be an extract from a leading article in your journal of the 26th of November, commenting on the speeches of Mr. Bright and myself at the Rochdale meeting :—

"This language, so often repeated, and so calculated to excite "discontent among the poor and half-informed, *has really only one* "*intelligible meaning.* 'Reduce the electoral franchise; for when you

" ' have done so you will obtain an assembly which will SEIZE on the " ' estates of the proprietors of land, and DIVIDE THEM GRATUITOUSLY " ' AMONG THE POOR.' . . . It may be right to reduce the franchise, " *but certainly not as a step* TO SPOLIATION."

I sincerely trust there is some inaccuracy in this quotation, which is not only a libellous outrage upon two members of the House of Commons, but a dire insult to millions of honest and industrious Englishmen. If it be a correct extract from your leading articles, which I have no means of verifying at the moment of writing, it is in direct contradiction to the statement made in your last letter, that you never imputed to Mr. Bright and myself, the contemplation of any more violent means of dividing the land, than by a change in the law of succession. Assuming the words to be correctly given, you charge us distinctly with aiming at the SEIZURE of the landed property of the country, for GRATUITOUS division among the poor. You will at once perceive that unless this language be unreservedly recalled, it makes the statement in your last letter simply a mockery and an untruth.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

J. T. DELANE, ESQ. R. COBDEN.

MR. DELANE TO MR. COBDEN.

16, Serjeants'-inn, Dec. 21, 1863.

Sir,—I received your second letter, dated "Friday Evening, December 18," only last night.

The quotation you take from the *Daily News* is so far inaccurate, that it does not convey the same meaning as the whole article from which it is taken does. I enclose that article and that which appeared on the following day. I add an extract from another, which has been published since; and having now given you all the means necessary for obtaining that redress, which purported to be the object of your first letter, I beg to retire from the personal part of this controversy.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

RICHARD COBDEN, ESQ., M.P. JOHN T. DELANE.

In the above letter Mr. Delane asserts that the quotation given from the *Daily News*, "does not convey the same meaning as the whole

"article from which it is taken." The entire article is therefore appended, with the quoted passage marked in italics; and it will be seen, on perusal, that not only is there not a word to mitigate the force or meaning of the quotation, but that the entire reasoning leads up to the quoted passage, which is at once the conclusion of the argument, and of the article.

"The general expression of feeling at public meetings during the "present autumn has been one of content and satisfaction. We were, "therefore, curious to know what our professional grumblers, the Timons "of the political stage, would have to allege against the prevalent "sentiment of the country. That Messrs. Cobden and Bright, often "believed by foreign nations to be the real representatives of English "opinion, would agree in this or in any other respect with the great mass "of their fellow-countrymen we did not believe; but we were rather at "a loss to know what point would be selected for animadversion, and we "suspect that the same difficulty was not wholly absent from the minds "of our stern and remorseless censors. Nevertheless, we have not "escaped unquestioned, and, though the indictment be rather a lengthy "one, its results may be summed up in a few words. Mr. Cobden and "Mr. Bright do not appear to agree with Lord Russell in the opinion "that the great mass of the people of this country sympathize with the "Northern States of America, and they even think it worth while to "argue against that intervention which our whole policy, since the "breaking out of the civil war, has been steadily directed to avoid. We "also, are against intervention, but scarcely for the reason given by Mr. "Cobden. He has, indeed, a robust faith, capable of removing moun- "tains. The North must succeed, for they are in the right; Russia must "fail, because she is in the wrong. It follows, of course, that any action "of ours in favour of the South would be fruitless, and in favour of "Poland would be superfluous. He that is right will succeed, he that "is wrong will fail; or, as Mr. Cobden expresses it, 'in this world the "'virtues and the forces go together, and the vices and the weaknesses "'are inseparable.' This discovery is calculated to save a great deal of "trouble in estimating the past, and predicting the future. It is often "not very easy to tell who is in the right and who is in the wrong, but "it is always easy enough to discover who is victorious and who is "defeated. Strength and weakness are more easily detected than right "and wrong, and we therefore gain a new light by which to read history. "'Show me strength, and I will show you justice,' says Mr. Cobden;

" 'show me weakness, and I will show you iniquity. Good always
" 'triumphs in this world, and vice always fails; therefore the victor
" 'cannot be wrong, nor the vanquished right.'

" The second offence which this country has committed is its neglect
" to lower the electoral franchise. 'Much yet remains to be done to
" 'improve by legislation the condition of the great body of the people,
" 'and that legislation will,' we are told, 'only be obtained when the
" 'great mass of the English people obtain the franchise.' What, then,
" are those evils which legislation can cure? 'The condition of the
" 'English peasantry,' says Mr. Cobden, 'has no parallel on the face of
" 'the earth. You have no peasantry but that of England which is
" 'entirely divorced from the land. Our colonies are more free,
" 'Italy is more free, Germany more free, than we. We don't maintain
" 'our relative position in advance of other countries.' 'I ask,' says
" Mr. Bright, 'whether it is an unchangeable decree of the Most High
" 'that more than one half the population of this country should live in
" 'houses of not more than five pounds' yearly value, and that their
" 'children should grow up, in comparison with those of the wealthier
" 'classes, to a great extent uncared for and untaught? If we were
" 'fairly represented, the agricultural labourer throughout the United
" 'Kingdom would be redeemed from that poverty and serfdom, which up
" 'to this time have been his lot. The system which brings vast tracts
" 'of land into the possession of one man is a curse to the country, and
" 'dooms the agricultural labourer to perpetual poverty and degradation.'

" Let us examine these statements,—not the exaggerated picture
" that is drawn of the position of the lower classes, but the assertion
" that it is in the power of legislation to cure or even to alleviate the
" poverty and misery, be their amount what it may, which exist among
" us. The laws are administered equally to all, and Courts have been
" established accessible to the poorest. Provision is made for maintaining
" those poor persons who are unable to maintain themselves, a provision
" which will be sought for in vain in any other country. The English
" working man is delivered from the burden of the conscription, which
" the peasantry of almost every other country have to bear. The law
" is eminently favourable to co-operative association. A very considerable
" portion of the revenue is raised by taxes to which the poor do not
" contribute, and there is no tax to which the poor do contribute to
" which the rich do not contribute also. There is no law which has
" even a tendency to exclude the poor from the possession of land. What,

" then, can legislation do to obviate the evils of poverty which it has not " done already? We used to connect the names of Bright and Cobden " with the doctrines of political economy; but what doctrine of political " economy is better established than that laws can only sweep away " impediments to the acquisition of wealth, but are utterly powerless to " confer it? There are three qualities necessary to raise a working man " in England to comfort or competence—industry, economy, and pru- " dence. No laws can compensate for the want of these qualities, and " to teach the working classes that the privations they endure are the " fault of their Government, instead of their own, is to conceal from them " the only road to improvement. The amount of the duty on spirits " points out one cause of poverty, and imprudent marriages are another. " But these things no law can remedy. To obtain land is difficult, not " only to a working man, but to all persons in these small islands, where " wealth is boundless, but the surface is limited. We never heard that " a man was impoverished because, for want of an investment in land, " he was obliged to keep his money in the Funds, or on mortgage. The " poor man cannot expect, any more than the rich, to obtain land without " paying for it; and if, owing to the limited supply, he is unable to buy " it, he has the principal and interest which must have been sunk in the " purchase. It is ridiculous to suppose that any class are injured because " they are unable to obtain a particular kind of investment, especially " if that investment be, as land in England undoubtedly is, the least " remunerative of any. What Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright should show " is, not that it is difficult for the poor man to obtain land, but that the " law places any obstacle in the way of his obtaining wealth. The power " of converting that wealth, when obtained, into land is quite a sub- " sidiary question. We need not stop to argue—for we shall not persuade " Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright, and nobody else, that we know of, requires " persuading—that if England were a land of peasant proprietors the " increase of capital employed in agriculture would, from the ruder hus- " bandry that would be employed, and the smaller quantity of stock " that would be kept, be less rapid than at present, and consequently " that the fund to which the poor look for subsistence would be smaller, " and the share of each working man less.

" *This language, so often repeated, and so calculated to excite* " *discontent among the poor and half-informed, has really only one* " *intelligible meaning—'Reduce the electoral franchise, for when you have* " *' done so you will obtain an Assembly which will seize on the estates of*

" ' *the proprietors of land and divide them gratuitously among the poor.*
" If this be not the true interpretation of these appeals to legislation,
" Messrs. Cobden and Bright should lose no time in disavowing it, and
" in pointing out some means of dividing land among the poor by law other
" than by the confiscation of the property of its proprietors. If they do
" mean this, they have not done much towards forwarding the success of
" the cause of which they are the advocates. *It may be right to reduce*
" *the franchise, but certainly not as a step to spoliation.*"

CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE "DAILY TELEGRAPH."

In consequence of the refusal of the *Times* to insert the first letter addressed to it, Mr. Cobden forwarded a copy to each of the London morning papers, accompanied with a brief circular note to the editor asking him to give it publicity. This was, in the first instance, refused in every case, with the exception of the *Daily News* and the *Star*. From the *Daily Telegraph* the following communication was received :—

MR THORNTON HUNT TO MR. COBDEN.

Daily Telegraph, 135, Fleet-street and Peterborough Court,
London, E.C., Dec. 8, 1863. (Night.)

My dear Sir,—The editor of the *Daily Telegraph* desires me to say how gladly he would have printed your letter at once, but for a single difficulty. He heartily sympathises with your desire to vindicate Mr. Bright against what you characterise as a "gross literary outrage," and nothing that you say on that subject would have checked his impulse to send your letter to the printer. It was not until he came to the *personal* allusions,—the passages which enter into the private relations of individuals, and the implication of corrupt and venal motives, that he hesitated. But there, not even the force of your own name could relieve his sense of responsibility, or prevent his feeling that he could not suffer the columns of the *Daily Telegraph* to renew a species of warfare which formerly enfeebled as much as it exasperated genuine political controversy.

Should you be able to reconsider that portion of your letter, leaving your animadversions on the public conduct of Mr. Bright's assailant in all their eloquent strength, he would be most happy to be the means of laying your appeal before the country.

Of course, I say this on the presumption that your communication will not have appeared elsewhere.

Believe me to be, my dear Sir,
Faithfully and sincerely yours,
THORNTON HUNT.

RICHARD COBDEN, Esq., M.P.

The above letter would have required no answer, had the *Daily Telegraph* preserved a fair neutrality and silence on the controversy which was going on between the editor of the *Times*, and Mr. Cobden. But on the 11th that journal contained a long editorial leader, (which was copied into the *Times*) commenting unfavourably on Mr. Cobden's letter to the *Times*, (which the *Telegraph* had refused to print) and quoting the above letter from Mr. Hunt, which had been treated as private by Mr. Cobden. He thereupon addressed the following letter to the editor :—

TO THE EDITOR OF THE "DAILY TELEGRAPH."

Sir,—A few days ago I received a communication from you, which, from its bearing a signature, I treated as private; in which you explained the reason for declining to give publicity to a letter which had been refused insertion in the *Times*. The reason assigned was that a part of the letter contained allusions of a personal character. I have done more rough political work, with fewer personal collisions, than perhaps any other public man; and I must confess to having been a little amused at being lectured by juveniles on affairs personal! But I considered the matter to be so completely within your own province, that I acquiesced in silence. To my great astonishment, however, your yesterday's paper contains a long leading article, in which not only is your note to me produced, but you criticise my letter, applying to it some uncomplimentary epithets—at the same time that you refuse to publish it! I confidently ask you to allow me the poor boon of being heard after being condemned.

The ground on which you refused the insertion of my letter was, that the latter part of it was personal. Have you really allowed yourself to be persuaded that that was the reason why the *Times* refused it? Nothing would have pleased that paper more than to have caught me at a personality. You can hardly be unaware that what deterred the *Times* from printing my letter was the allusion I made to an improper, because secret, connection which existed between the conductors of that journal, and the dispensers of government patronage. I repeat that the sole objection to this connection is its secresy. The *Times* has advocated the system of anonymous journalism on the ground of its necessity for preserving the independence of the writer towards the public on one hand, and the governing powers on the other. I have not a word to say against this principle, if it be honestly observed towards both parties. But my charge was, and is, that the *Times* has broken its compact with the public by dropping the

mask in the presence of those who are the dispensers of the patronage of the State. Does the Editor of the *Daily Telegraph* deny the impeachment? Recollect, I do not ask him to affirm it, or to publish it on anonymous, or other insufficient authority. I assert it on my own responsibility. Is he then justified to interpose between the *Times* and the country, and prevent, as far as he can, the knowledge of my statement from reaching the public, on the plea that it is a personal matter? The question concerns the government on one side, and the leading London journal on the other. Does not that affect the public? Is the disposal of government patronage—the appointment to posts which the public pay—a private or personal question? Recollect, I repeat, that the entire controversy between us is—whether or not the subject should be shrouded in secresy. It is not the question of anonymous writing that is in debate. *That* is only the red herring drawn across the true scent. We all write anonymously, more or less. The only objection is to the masked literary assassin. Nor is it a question whether writers for the press have a right to their share of public appointments; nobody denies it. I do not even say that the stream of patronage ought not to flow to the *Times* office; I only contend that it should not run underground.

Far from thinking that the class of whom we are speaking should be excluded from the public service, I form a very high estimate of the fitness for legislative and administrative functions, of those who write for the political instruction of the people. And it is on this account that, while I deny to no one the right of an honest *incognito*, I regret that the prevalent, and perhaps unavoidable habit of anonymous writing in the metropolis, should entomb, for all practical political purposes, so much of our best intellect, and rob society of the full development of that individuality, which, more than all besides, is essential to the progress and elevation of our species. In the provinces, the anonymous system has, practically, up to a very recent period, never been in operation; because, there, every man's occupation was more or less known to his neighbours. And, if space permitted, I could trace the salutary effect of this on the political progress of the last generation; for it would be easy to adduce the names of half a score of men, the conductors of journals in Leeds, Edinburgh, Liverpool, Manchester, Norwich, &c., &c., to whose able, honest, and energetic efforts, as leaders of public opinion in their several localities, more than probably any other traceable cause, the nation is indebted for its successful resistance

to that reactionary spirit, which, from the end of the last century, down to 1820, ran its course of tyrannical repression, and filled all but the stoutest hearts with despair. These men have all passed away, but they should not be forgotten. And if, when my friend Dr. Smiles, himself a distinguished member of the fraternity, shall have completed his biographies of our great discoverers, and improvers in physical science, he should give us a volume of the lives of those pioneers of political progress, it will be seen that their triumphs are traceable to something more than an investment of capital in presses and type, with an impersonal editorial staff,—that they were in each case due to the open and avowed writing, and the personal example of the individual man, who was living in clear daylight, under the full gaze of his neighbours, whom he was not only stimulating, but leading in the path of duty, and by whom he was in turn cheered and sustained. I might also, if space allowed, refer to the advantages which open and avowed journalism, might afford to the electoral body, in the choice of representatives to Parliament. Those members of the House of Commons, connected with the public press, who have been elected during my experience, and who, with the exception of the first-named, were connected with provincial journals,—Messrs. Miall, Baines, Macguire, Fagan, Lucas, and others,—whatever may be the differences of opinion as to their views, will be acknowledged by all who have sat with them, as having been, in every case, among the foremost of their party, for political intelligence and honour.

I have said enough to show that I take a more exalted view than most men, of the mission of those who instruct the public through the newspaper press, and that, while asserting their title to the most honourable posts, I am assailing only a system by which they are huddled clandestinely into inferior employments, as the result of a secret and illicit intercourse with the government of the day. And I revert to the question—has not the country a right to be informed, on my responsibility, that this illicit intercourse has been carried on between the *Times* and the government; and is the *Daily Telegraph* justified in intercepting from the public, so far as lies in its power, all knowledge of the fact, on the plea that it is a personal matter? After all, how vain must be the attempt at concealment. For half the year at least, during the session of Parliament, the power of publicity is not with the conductors of any particular newspaper, but with those representatives of the people who can command the ear of the House and country.

And, now, I am going to say a word in conclusion, which will put

your manliness and magnanimity to the test. With a lofty pretension to superior wisdom and justice in this matter, with large professions of respect for myself, which, to say the least, were very much out of place, and with great solicitude for my political reputation, which may be left to take care of itself, the conduct of the *Daily Telegraph* has, I consider, been more indefensible on the ground of fairplay, than that of any other daily paper which has come under my notice. It is I believe the only one which has commented on my letter without printing it. The observation has been somewhere made that the *Daily Telegraph* aims at becoming a penny *Times*. On this occasion they are "as like as two peas." But from such a visitation may the Fates defend us! England could not endure two *Times*', any more than America could support two *New York Heralds*. Napoleon is said to have declared that if he had had two Vandammes in his army, he must have hung one of them. I will not say that if we had a couple of *Times*', we should hang one of their editors, but might there not be some danger of our hanging ourselves?

I am, sir, &c.,

RD. COBDEN.

Midhurst, 12th December, 1863.

The above was returned to Mr. Cobden, with the following letter from Mr. Hunt:—

MR. THORNTON HUNT TO MR. COBDEN.

Daily Telegraph, 135, Fleet-street and Peterborough Court, London, E.C., December 14, 1863.

My dear Sir,—The editor of the *Daily Telegraph* regrets very much that he is obliged to return you the letter, which you have addressed to our journal, unpublished. Independently of the personal esteem for yourself, which is great and perfectly sincere, he could have no objection to print the communication, if he looked upon it solely as a matter of "interest;" but he is compelled to decline it by the sense of consistency, and by a conscientious regard to what is right. The reasons which I

stated before, apply to this new letter with redoubled force. It is open to the same objection with the other, that it enters into personal and private matters; and I might now repeat every word I wrote before, as to the manner in which that style of discussion frustrates every legitimate aim of political controversy. But to that class of objections is added another. The letter which you addressed to our own office, is, in one essential portion, identical with that which you sent to the *Times*; you are, therefore, asking us to do exactly what we have already declined to do, the difference in the form of address, not removing, nor even disguising the identity; so that acquiescence in this instance, would stultify our former decision, and we cannot consent to do that.

To entice us into a departure from our resolve, you hold out a special temptation; and, though we resist the force of that seductive bait, we do not deny it. You feather your shaft aimed at a contemporary, with strictures on our own paper. Let me assure you, that, but for the other passages to which I refer, those which reflect on ourselves, would have had no influence in excluding your letter. As sincere friends we may regret the course which you have taken; but we do not gainsay the public interest inevitably attaching to your signature, and we should sustain no injury whatever by admitting a controversy direct with Richard Cobden. Our "magnanimity," therefore, is tested rather by foregoing your communication, than by availing ourselves of it.

On another point I am sure reflection will correct your present view. It is an obvious mistake to suppose that we arrogate any right to debar you from "publicity." That is not at all the point at issue between us. Your own position is such, that any attempt to restrict any appeal you may please to make, would be absurd. But, as I have said, we hold that while you have been incited by a generous impulse which commends our hearty sympathy, you have deviated into a form of controversy, which is damaging to the press, destroys its influence, and is thus injurious to the interests of the country; and in a matter necessarily within our own discretion, we declined to let our own columns be used for purposes which we condemn.

Do not, my dear Sir, regard it as a form, when I again assure you that we entertain towards yourself personally feelings of the strongest esteem.

Believe me to be, dear Sir,
Most faithfully yours,
THORNTON HUNT.

MR. COBDEN TO MR. THORNTON HUNT.

Midhurst, 22nd Dec., 1863.

Sir,—I am not quite sure whether, in my correspondence with you, I have been in communication with the Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*. Your letters seem to be made available either as vehicles for professions of personal friendship and respect to me, or as materials for very unfair leading articles. I prefer that our relations should be put on a more intelligible footing.

The Editor of the *Telegraph* having commented on my first letter to the *Times*, after having refused to publish it, I wrote in consequence to claim a hearing, and my letter is returned to me, accompanied by a communication from your pen, containing reiterated professions of regard and esteem, but not one word in reply to my charge of unfairness. I find I did the *Times* an injustice in putting it on a par with the *Telegraph*, for that paper has, I am told, had the decency to abstain from printing any comments of its own, on a letter which it refused to insert. It very naturally preferred to transfer to its columns a leader prepared for them by your journal.

I should have thought, after the concluding passage in my former letter, that I might have been spared the protestations of sympathy and friendship contained in your last communication. Coupled as they are with the grossest violation of those rules of fair play, which we generally consider to be due, even to our foes, I am half disposed to suspect you to be practising on me what our neighbours term *une mauvaise plaisanterie;* for I can hardly pay myself so poor a compliment as to believe that I could have been expected to be the dupe of such honied phrases. They are simply offensive; and I will only say that if this is the way in which the *Telegraph* treats its friends, I should prefer in future to be placed in its other category. I can honour an open and consistent opponent, and live on terms of charity and even friendship with him. But for the professed friend, who writes homilies on the proprieties, and assumes the garb of exalted justice as a cloak for very opposite practice, I have the highest Christian example for entertaining neither feelings of respect nor toleration.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

THORNTON HUNT, ESQ. RICHARD COBDEN.

P.S.—Other engagements have prevented me from sending an earlier reply to your letter.

MR. THORNTON HUNT TO MR. COBDEN.

Daily Telegraph, 135, Fleet-street, and Peterborough Court, London, E.C., December 24, 1863.

Sir,—I am, of course, precluded from taking exception to the mode of communication for which you declare your preference; though I can only regret the tone which you think it necessary to adopt. Nor is it for me to deprecate the resentment which you express, though I do not feel it myself, and do not see how it can render any statement more "intelligible" to you. I shall simply attempt, once more, to set forth the grounds on which we have acted, so that you may understand them.

Your letter was returned to you, as I explained, because it embodied personal and private matters, to which we had already declined to lend our columns. Your own share in the correspondence, of which that letter had formed part, had ceased to be private; the correspondence had become, in every sense of the word, a public event; and we held ourselves perfectly free to discuss the principles involved, not in the subject matter of the personal portion, but in the conduct of the discussion, and especially in the avowed endeavour to revive the use of personalities for political controversy. To that part of your letter which combated our argument we could have no objection; and if you had castigated your manuscript by omitting the questionable passages, we would gladly have printed the rest.

In doing so, we should not have claimed credit for any "exalted justice." It is obvious that, by every consideration of our own interests, we should be disposed to meet the wish you so strongly urged. Anything bearing your well-known signature is sure to attract attention, and, if it were attended by the additional zest of a fresh issue in a contest, which had already become notorious, it would necessarily constitute some of the best materials for ordinary newspaper purposes. Politically, your cause is our cause, and, as a matter of mere interest, we should naturally prefer to be with so popular a member, rather than against him. To decline your letter, as we did, therefore, was really an exercise of self-denial; not, indeed, that the self-denial was of a very grave character, or such as to render a strict observance of what we thought our duty either difficult or painful.

It is simply because the communications of the office out of doors, in political affairs, are usually entrusted to me, that the letters to you

have been penned by myself; but I have written by the instructions of the Editor, and the views and sentiments which I have expressed are his. After what you say on the subject, I am surprised that you can feel any perplexity at the circumstance that we dissent from your opinions, and yet retain our esteem for you individually; but, since you do so, I will endeavour to put that part of the matter into plainer language. You will remember that this particular question did not originate with us,—*we* did not challenge your individual attention, or prefer any request; the initiative was your own, and if we went at all out of our way, it was from a courteous desire to let you understand our motives as being friendly. In the particular question, however, we thought that the course into which you had plunged was wholly wrong, and on that point I could not employ language too forcible. It appeared to us logically false, untenable on moral grounds, and calculated to impair the utility of the press. We believed that if a course which was wrong in principle, failed to work mischief in effect, it was because even your talent and influence must eventually prove too weak for such a result; and that therefore the line of action you had adopted could only bring detriment on yourself. Such was our conviction; but to think you wrong in this particular affair, was not to forget all that you had done in times past. To believe you seriously and sadly mistaken here did not cancel the services which you have rendered to the country; nay, it did not change anything in the character of Richard Cobden, as we understood it, and as it had been attested by years of devotion to public duties and splendid successes. That in your error,—under an hallucination, perhaps, on one topic, you should be aroused to exasperation against us, may be, and is, matter for regret; but it does not alter our estimate of your natural qualities as those are displayed in your public acts, our regard for your personal character, or our belief in your efficiency for future aid to the principles which we have most at heart.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

THORNTON HUNT.

MR. COBDEN TO MR. THORNTON HUNT.

Midhurst, Dec. 26, 1863.

Sir,—You must really pardon me for saying that there is no subject of controversy between us. I never questioned your right to exclude

my first letter (intended for the *Times*) from your pages, and therefore I require no explanation on the subject. Forgive me if I add, not in "exasperation," but with perfect calmness, that I do not require your counsel or criticism on my controversy with Mr. Delane, and that I very respectfully deprecate your habit of taking my reputation under your patronage.

My sole complaint was, that, after refusing to open your pages to my first letter, and thus allow your readers to form their own judgment, you did not observe a fair neutrality, but devoted your leading columns to the advocacy of the cause of my opponent, and to animadversions on the letter which you had refused to print. Had the *Daily Telegraph* belonged to the proprietors of the *Times*, it could not have fulfilled the character of a partisan more obsequiously than it has done on this occasion. This however is an affair of the past, and cannot be altered by explanation; and all I meant by my last letter, and all I desire now, is to let it be known that, notwithstanding the friendly protestations conveyed in your letters, I do not allow myself to be deluded as to the footing on which I stand with the *Daily Telegraph*.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

R. COBDEN.

THORNTON HUNT, ESQ.

MR. THORNTON HUNT TO MR. COBDEN.

Daily Telegraph, 135, Fleet-street, and Peterborough Court, London, E.C., Dec. 28, 1863.

Sir,—The Editor desires me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th instant, with a renewed expression of his regret that you should throughout have misconstrued the intentions of the *Daily Telegraph*.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

THORNTON HUNT.

RICHARD COBDEN, ESQ., M.P.

Alex. Ireland and Co., Printers, Pall Mall Court, Manchester.

(*Abstract of a MSS.*)

ON THE ORIGIN AND DISTRIBUTION

OF THE

REGUR OR BLACK COTTON SOILS

IN INDIAN PENINSULA.

CAPTAIN A. AYTOUN,
ROYAL (BATH BOMBAY) ARTILLERY.

"But the most impressive part of the scene was not in the traces of old volcanic eruptions, but in the evidences of the power of running water. . . . Nothing that I had seen or heard had prepared me for so stupendous a manifestation of the power of rains and rivers."—Mr. Geikie's *Notes of Travel in Auvergne*.

EDINBURGH:
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BY THOMSON AND SPEARS, 21 QUEEN STREET.
1863

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.
CLASS

Rainfall in inches during the South West Monsoon from June till October.

From a Section by Captain Aytoun.

SECTION ACROSS THE PENINSULA OF INDIA.

Exhibiting the Black Cotton Soil Plains arranged in Steps or Terraces

CONTENTS.

Introduction.—Dr. George Buist's proposed work on the Physical Geography of India. Geological survey of India has not yet broken ground in the Bombay Presidency. Structure of the Indian Peninsula in one important feature little understood. Nature has laid out the Table land of the Deccan in a succession of terraces covered with a fertile soil. Meteorology, Geology, and Hydrology have combined to produce this result. A Hydraulic engineer would lay out an inclined plane for irrigation in much the same way as Nature has laid out the Peninsula of India.

General Sketch of the Physical features having a bearing on the subject of Cotton soils.—The centre of the Table land of the Deccan is furnished with numerous subordinate ranges of hills. Those hills, trending from north to south, cross the general inclination of the country, and give rise to barriers along the courses of the rivers. Soils are accumulated in basins behind these barriers. Great denudation of the Trap rocks along the summit of the Ghauts from atmospheric causes, and consequent formation of Basaltic soils over the Peninsula. Mr Hyslop has shown that the Basalt has been poured out over the bottom of great freshwater lakes, and that the Table land has not been submerged since the period of the Basaltic effusions.

Rivers of the Peninsula.—The Taptee is the only river rising in the great Basaltic district which flows to the west. Its feeders from the northern slopes of Khandeish rise among Trap rocks rich in Zeolitic minerals, and yielding on decomposition a fertile soil. Obstacles presented to the navigation of the Godavery and Kistna rivers, owing to their great fall.

Regur, or black Cotton soil.—Dr. Carter's description of this soil, in his "Summary of the Geology of India," not wholly applicable to any particular tract. Captain Newbold's objections to ascribe its origin to the decomposition of Trap rocks. Its horizontality and elevation above the present beds of rivers, and its extension over granitic and other rocks. Explanation of its origin and distribution.

Chemical Composition of Regur.—A comparative Table of the chemical composition of Regur, the Alabama cotton soil and the Nile deposit. The Indian soil far more aluminous than the others, and containing more potash, soda, magnesia, and lime. Aspect of the cane-brake cotton district of Alabama and the plains above Khartoum similar to that of the black cotton plains of the Deccan.

Superficial extent of Regur.—Occupies all the depressed portions of the Table land of the Deccan from the Taptee river on the north through 8° of latitude to the south, with a breadth of from 3° to 7° of longitude.

Exhaustion of the Black soil.—Restoring the mineral elements which have been abstracted from the soil by a long cultivation a necessary point to be attended to. Probable degeneration of the Indian cotton plant from the gradual exhaustion of the soil. Black soil plains well adapted for steam ploughing. Application of zeolites and earthy amygdaloids recommended as a mineral manure.

Concluding Remarks.—Fallacy of Mr. Laing's view of the soil and climate of India, as regards their suitability for cotton culture, and successful competition with America. A. Mackay's opinion on the subject.

THE ORIGIN AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE BLACK COTTON SOILS OF THE INDIAN PENINSULA,

BY

CAPTAIN A. AYTOUN, R.A.

LATE BOMBAY ARTILLERY.

INTRODUCTION.

No account of the Bombay Presidency, embracing a general view of its physical features and soils, has yet been published. It was understood in India that the late Dr. George Buist had in progress, at the time of his death, a work which was to include the Physical Geography of the whole of India. Probably no one was more competent to undertake so arduous a task. For twenty years he had given his whole leisure to investigations connected with the Natural History of India; and besides having a personal knowledge of no inconsiderable portion of the Peninsula, he was familiar with all the observations which had been published on the Physical Features, Geology, and Meteorology of India. A work on this subject from his pen would have been most valuable, but his premature death occurred before the completion of his labours, and no portion of his proposed work has, so far as I am aware, appeared in print. The Geological Survey of India, so ably presided over by Professor Oldham, has not yet broken ground in the Bombay Presidency; and as a Staff of Surveyors is only now being organized, it is not likely that for some time to come any official publication on the physical features, and their connection with, and influence on, the Black

Cotton Soils of the Peninsula, will be laid before the public. The general interest in all connected with the great question of the day—the supply of the raw material to the most important of our manufactures—would, perhaps, attract attention to such a publication at the present moment; but a year or two hence India and its Cotton Soils may be forgotten; and for ten who would read the work now, not more than one would care to read it then.

That the structure of the Peninsula, in one important feature at least, is but little understood, even by those who have given some attention to the subject, may, I think, be inferred from an inspection of the beautifully executed model of India recently exhibited in the International Exhibition. The rivers Godavery, Kistna, &c., which take their rise in the Western Ghauts, and flow across the Peninsula into the Bay of Bengal, are there shown as descending, in highly inclined courses, from a table-land between 2000 and 3000 feet high, to the sea level. If the physical structure of the country had admitted of this, then, long before the present period, these rivers must have excavated deep valleys across the Peninsula; and, instead of the rich and fertile Deccan plains, the table-land would have been a desert. *But this was not what nature had in view. Her object was to make the Peninsula a great producing country, and to this end the rivers were made subservient. They were first employed as the agents in transporting and depositing the soil derived from the trappean rocks of the Western Ghauts in basin-shaped depressions along their courses.* At places where hill ranges opposed the free passage of the water, lakes were formed, and deep accumulations of soil occurred behind the barriers from the silting up of the lakes; in other places, rocky dams crossing the beds of the rivers gave rise to annual inundations and marshy land. In course of time, these barriers yielded to the action of the rivers. The lakes—or in their latter stage, probably, marshes—were drained, the beds of the rivers at the rocky dams were lowered, and the annual inundations no longer occurred.

Thus has nature laid out the Peninsula in a succession of steps or terraces, covered with a fertile soil, and gradually falling from the summit level of the Ghauts to the sea. The rivers which transported and spread out the soil now flow through the terraces; and, in order to bring back the conditions

which gave rise to the annual inundations, all that man has to do is to restore the dams. A glance at the section exhibiting the black soil plains, arranged in terraces, will better convey the idea which is here expressed. Had this distribution of the black soil been duly recognised, I scarcely think that, even at the risk of exaggeration in the scale, so important a feature would have been omitted in an otherwise highly instructive model. Nor, I may add, has this natural arrangement ever been clearly pointed out in any publication with which I am acquainted.

But, in the agricultural scheme of nature, so to speak, it is not only in the distribution of the black soils of the Peninsula that design is clearly exhibited. When the Meteorology and Geology are examined, a general harmony is strikingly manifested. A mass of trappean or volcanic rocks, covering altogether an area computed at 200,000 square miles, caps the western side of the table-land. These rocks are composed of most fertilising elements, for in no other part of the world do the trap rocks contain so much soda, potash, and other salts indispensable to vegetation, as we find in the amygdaloids of the Deccan—a fact which is disclosed by the abundance of the Zeolitic minerals embedded in them. The amygdaloidal trap is generally soft and earthy, and the basalts and greenstones are easily decomposed. Upon these rocks a rainfall of from 80 to 254 inches occurs in the months of June, July, August, and September. The masses of vapour brought up from the Indian ocean by the periodical wind termed the south-west monsoon, are driven against the precipitous faces of the Ghauts, are deflected upwards, and, being condensed in the higher and colder strata of air, are precipitated in torrents on the higher plateaux. *Thus we have the heaviest rain and the greatest waste of rock on that side of the Peninsula where the rocks yield the most fertilizing elements for the formation of soils.* It is not without a purpose, then, that nature has capped the Ghauts for six hundred miles, north and south, with trap rocks. It is not without a purpose that the vapour of the Indian ocean is precipitated in a deluge along the western side of the Peninsula. It is not without a purpose that the Rivers Kistna and Godavery and their affluents take their rise in sight of the Arabian Sea, and flow across the entire breadth of the table-land. When the whole subject is grasped we find that the geology, meteorology, and hydrology are all

working in harmony, and their operations are but parts of one design.

If a hydraulic engineer were called upon to lay out a sloping piece of land so as to adapt it for irrigation, he would proceed much in the same way as nature has done with the Peninsula. He would form terraces at different levels. At the highest level he would construct his main canal, from which branches would diverge to the several terraces. So has nature laid out the Peninsula. Her terraces are the black soil plains; her main canal is the atmosphere laden with vapour, which is poured out along the summit level of the Ghauts; her branch canals are the rivers of the Peninsula.

It is interesting to find that man has taken a lesson from nature, and on a small scale copied one of the grand operations by which the soils of the Peninsula have been accumulated. On the low undulating hills of nodular basalt, or amygdaloid in an extreme state of decomposition, the natives have thrown up stone dykes, behind which the soil rapidly accumulates during the rainy season. I have frequently observed in the southern Mahratta country a succession of terraced fields gradually falling from a higher to a lower level artificially formed in this way by damming up the soil. They represent in miniature the black soil plains of the Peninsula; and so fertile is the soil, that the finest crops of grain are produced upon them. The terraced ravines in Coorg, on the Ghaut road, between Mercara and Mysore, are another illustration of this imitation by man of one of the grand natural features of the Peninsula.

GENERAL SKETCH OF THE PHYSICAL FEATURES HAVING A BEARING ON THE SUBJECT OF COTTON SOILS.

The Peninsula of India is composed of an elevated mass of table land, with two narrow belts of low land on its western and eastern sides. The latter are termed the Malabar and Coromondel coasts. The mountains seen from the western or Bombay side, and which are commonly called the range of the Western Ghauts, are, in reality, the precipitous face of the elevated table land forming the Peninsula. In like manner the range of mountains seen inland from Madras are the eastern side. This table land has an inclination from west to east, the watershed being along the summit of the Western Ghauts. The elevation of the western side may be roughly set down at 2500 feet above the level of the sea—that of the eastern side at 600 feet. Higher plateaux rise from the table land, as at Mahableshwar, where the elevation is 4800 feet; the hilly district of Coorg, about the same height as Mahableshwar, and the plateau of the Neilgherry hills, which attains an elevation of nearly 8000 feet above the sea level. These plateaux rise immediately from the western edge of the table land of the Peninsula, and send spurs to the eastward.

The centre of the Peninsula is also furnished with numerous subordinate ranges of hills, trending sometimes from west to east, and at other times from north to south. The latter, crossing at right angles the general fall of the country, give rise to barriers in the courses of the rivers. This feature has an important bearing on the accumulation of the black cotton soils of the Peninsula; for it is behind these barriers that the rivers have deposited the soil in basins. Without their aid the rich soils washed down from the great basaltic district by the heavy rains, instead of being spread in great plains over the Deccan, would have been at once carried into the Bay of Bengal. The plateau appears to be the typical form of nearly all the elevated masses of the Peninsula. It may be seen even in the more recently-elevated land on the western coast, where the flat-

topped Laterite hills are the western side of a well-marked plateau, through gorges in which the streams from the range of Ghauts find their way to the sea.

The Plateaux along the summit of the Western Ghauts, at and above an elevation of 2000 feet, and exposed to a rainfall of from 140 inches to 254 inches during the four months of the south-west monsoon, have, as might be expected, suffered an immense denudation.* This is entirely due to atmospheric influences, for no trace of marine deposits has ever been met with on the table land. Mr. Hyslop of Nagpore has shown that the eruptions of basalt were poured out over the bottoms of fresh-water lakes, and that there is nowhere any evidence of the land having been submerged since the period of these basaltic

* Mr. Geikie's account of the denudation of the basaltic district of Auvergne may enable the reader to form an estimate of the extent of waste on the trap rocks of the Deccan, where the rainfall is enormous, and the rocks are in an extreme state of decomposition. He writes, "But the most impressive part of this scene was not in the traces of old igneous eruptions, but in the evidence of the power of running water. I had wandered long among the basaltic hills of the Hebrides, and now recognised many features of the landscape; but nothing that I had seen or read had prepared me for so stupendous a manifestation of the power of rains and rivers. No one, indeed, who has confined his observations to a country which has been above the sea only since the glacial period, can form any adequate idea of the denuding effects of water flowing over the surface of the land. Standing on the plateau of Prudelle with its remnant of a lava current, and looking down into the valley of Villar—a deep gorge excavated by a rivulet through that lava current, and partially choked up by a later coulée of lava, which the stream is now wearing away—I received a kind of new revelation, so utterly above and beyond all my previous conceptions was the impression which the landscape conveyed. . . . A first glance is enough to convince us that this basaltic cake is a mere fragment, that its eastern and southern edges have been largely cut away, and that it once extended southward across what is now the deep gorge of Villar. Since the eruption of the basalt, therefore, the whole of the gorge has been excavated. But what agent could have worked so mighty a change? We bethink us, perhaps, of the sea, and picture the breakers working their way steadily inland through the softer granite. But this supposition is untenable, for it can be shown on good grounds, that since the volcanic eruptions of this district began, the country has never been below the sea. It is with a feeling almost of reluctance that we are compelled to admit in default of any other possible explanation, that the erosion of the valley has been the work of the stream, that seems to run in a mere rut at the end of the slopes. How tardy must be the working of such an agent, and how immeasurably far into the past does the contemplation of such an operation carry us! This illustration of the power of running water, though the first, was by no means the most striking which occurred in my rambles in Auvergne. The same fact stood out with a kind of oppressive reality."

effusions. Taking the later Tertiary as the age of the eruptions, an enormous lapse of time has admitted of the smaller streams furrowing the hills and excavating valleys, while the rivers have been cutting through the rocky barriers which obstructed their passage to the ocean. Some Indian geologists have doubted the power of the existing streams and rivers to excavate the deep valleys in the hilly tracts of the Ghauts, and the rocky gorges by which the rivers now pass from one black soil plain to another. The evidence of so distinguished a geologist as Mr. Geikie on the excavation of valleys in the basaltic district of Auvergne, may help them to a solution of their difficulties. In some cases convulsions may have fissured the barriers, but in the great majority of the instances in which a river passes through a gorge, the slow action of water cutting through the barrier is sufficient to account for the draining of the lakes or marshes behind them. A sudden rush of water from a lake caused by a convulsion, would leave its mark in confused deposits which, so far as my observation has gone, are by no means common in the Peninsula of India.

THE RIVERS OF THE PENINSULA.

The Taptee is the only river rising in the basaltic district which has a westerly course, and finds its way to the Arabian Sea. The Godavery, the Kistna, and their affluents, draining an enormous basin, flow eastward into the Bay of Bengal. The Taptee*, flows in a trough of the Basaltic district, and is joined by numerous streams from the northern slope of Khandeish—a quarter abounding in amygdaloidal rocks, loaded with zeolites,

* Perhaps the most feverish districts in the Bombay Presidency are those in the vicinity of this river, and it may be that the name is derived from this circumstance, *tap* being the Hindustani word for fever. The waste lands of Khandeish were estimated by Major Wingate, the Revenue Survey Commissioner, at 8,359 square miles in 1852. A large proportion of this waste land is undoubtedly black soil, adapted for cotton cultivation, and it is scarcely a century since famine and the wars between the Mahratta princes, Scindia and Holkar, depopulated the country, and threw the land out of cultivation. A dense jungle now covers the richer soils, and so unhealthy is the region in the opinion of the natives, that they would not occupy the land if it were offered to them *gratis*. It can only be cleared and brought under cultivation by operations on a grand scale, carried out by Government or a company raised to reclaim the arable land from its present state of jungle. This was pointed out by Captain P. Dods of

and yielding, on decomposition, a very fertile black soil. The rivers Kistna and Godavery, rising in the Western Ghauts, have a fall of 1800 to 2000 feet in the course of 800 miles to the ocean. It is to this cause we must attribute the great obstacles to their successful navigation, for comparing them with the Nile in its passage through Egypt from Assouan to the Mediterranean, it will be found that the former have a fall of more than six times that of the latter. It is the upper and less navigable portions of the Nile which resemble the courses of the Godavery and the Kistna on the table land of the Deccan. In Nubia the river is precipitated over rocky barriers in a succession of rapids or cataracts, finding lower levels by sudden falls, and precisely similar obstacles present themselves to the navigation of the rivers of the Peninsula of India. Nature seems, in fact, to have intended them for the irrigation of the black soil terraces, and not for navigation.

REGUR, OR BLACK COTTON SOIL.

In a "Summary of the Geology of India," drawn up in 1857 by Dr. Carter for the Bombay Government, the author thus alludes to the Regur,* or black cotton soil. "It exists in large tracts here and there, and seems to have been chiefly derived from the disintegration of the trappean rocks; but on this point there is a difference of opinion. It is in some parts from twenty to forty feet in thickness, and is considered the best cotton

the Bombay Staff Corps, when, in 1861, Sir George Clerk sent him to found a military native colony in Khandeish. A report was spread among the Sepoy pensioners that the Government wished to tempt them into these unhealthy districts by the offer of land on most favourable terms, in order to reduce their numbers and save the pensions. So deep-rooted was the conviction that jungle fever would carry them off if they settled on the richest waste lands of Khandeish, that Captain Dods found it expedient to form the first settlement on comparatively poor soils, in a part of the country already thinly populated.

* The term *Regur* is applied by the natives in the Deccan to the black soils which cover large areas on the table land, and which, from long experience, have been ascertained to be the best suited to the cultivation of the indigenous cotton. The word is probably of Sanscrit origin, but I have been unable to ascertain satisfactorily whence it is derived. I suggest, however, the following derivation of the term—one which is not likely to have been applied without a meaning. *Reg*, in Mahratta and Hindustani, means *a line*, as in "to draw a line." In Sanscrit it means a verse, and possibly also a line. *Ar* is the Sanscrit for plough,

ground. It consists of fine black argillaceous mould, which contains in its lower parts nodules, and even beds of Kunkur and pebbly alluvium, and presents on its surface scattered angular fragments of the neighbouring rocks, particularly fragments of chert and jasper from the inter-trappean lacustrine formation, with calcedonies, fragments of quartz, geodes, agates, &c., from the trappean rocks."

This description of the black soil is not in my opinion wholly applicable to any particular tract of that soil. In some of the great basins of black soil there are no pebbles to be found, whereas in the tracts in the vicinity of the hills the pebbles or angular fragments of quartz, jasper, &c., are numerous. As I purpose to show, the black soil has been formed in isolated depressions, and cannot therefore be so uniform in its physical characters as the soil of a great river like the Nile.

All the observers quoted by Dr. Carter, with the exception of Captain Newbold, are at one as regards the trap rocks being the source from which the black soil has been derived, and if the authority of other observers on this point were required, I might add that of Dr. J. G. Malcolmson, who speaks of the black soil of the southern Mahratta country as a *rich basaltic soil*. Mr. Blandford, one of Professor Oldham's assistants, also ascribes the origin of the black soils in the Nerbudda valley to the disintegration of trap rocks.

But although the evidence of so many observers in favour of the trappean origin of the black soil may be accepted, yet I think that several of Captain Newbold's objections to this origin have not been satisfactorily answered. He points out the horizontality of large tracts and their elevation above the present beds of the rivers, and that black soil is found overlying limestones, sandstones, and granite in districts where trap rocks are either not met with, or appear in dykes only. He also meets with a difficulty in accounting for its black colour, when the trap rocks of the Deccan are observed to decompose into a red

and is the root of our word *arable*. May not the Regur be the *line of the plough*, or the ridge. In the Scotch word *rigg*, for the ridges in a ploughed field, we have a near approach to the *Reg*. It is probable that these carse-like areas of black soil formed the first arable lands of the Peninsula, and the term *Regur* may have been applied to them as the *ploughed* land, in contradistinction to the uncultivated land. It is conceivable that the Sanscrit word for verse may have been taken from the aspect of a ploughed field, with its ridges and furrows.

soil. All these difficulties will, I think, disappear, if attention be paid to the *different conditions under which the soil has been accumulated in different localities.* Tracing the mode of its occurrence and distribution from the Ghauts eastward, we find that it exists in patches at first, where the ground is undulating, as for example between Khandalla and Lanowlee, on the Poona line of rail. As we pass to a lower level, where the streams are of greater volume, the black soil occurs in larger tracts, and on gaining the valleys of any of the large rivers, as the Godavery at Copergaum, or the Kistna, when it emerges from the hilly region of the Southern Mahratta country, great plains of black soil are met with, extending sometimes twenty miles in length.

Everywhere there appears to be a connection between the present drainage of the country and the distribution of the black soil. Near the Ghauts the soil is accumulated in local depressions of the undulating ground, and during the rainy season the traveller by rail from Khandalla to Poona will observe that the country near Lanowlee is flooded or appears like a marsh. The soil in these places is black, while a red or yellowish red soil is seen where the ground rises. This gives rise to black and red soil in patches. If the beds of the streams—affluents of the larger rivers—are examined, it will be found that barriers* of rock have in former times obstructed the stream. These have acted as dams, and black soil has been accumulated by annual

* Connected with these barriers of rock in the beds of the rivers there is a word, probably of very ancient origin, to which I would direct attention.

On the Kistna there are two villages opposite each other called Gulguleh. At this point a barrier of rocks appeared to me to have formerly existed, and many years ago I suggested that the name was derived from the sound of water passing or gurgling between rocks. On my voyage up the Nile to the first cataract in 1862, the name Silsilis, which is applied to the rocky barrier through which the Nile has at a former period forced its way, attracted my attention, as here again I referred the repetition of the syllable to the imitation of the sound of water. Although the Arabs attempt to explain the origin of the name by asserting that a chain (for which Silsilis is the Arabic) was formerly stretched across the Nile at this point, yet Sir Gardiner Wilkinson very justly rejects this explanation, and points out that long before the Arabs appeared in Egypt the name *Silsili* was applied to it by the Greeks, and that a still older name for it was the Coptic *Golgl.* Here we have in the Coptic a near approach to the Gulguleh on the Kistna, but it did not occur to me that Silsili and Gulguleh could be traced one into the other, from local differences of pronunciation, until I referred to Canon Stanley's "Palestine" for an account of *Gilgal.* The modern village *Jiljilleh* is supposed to mark the site of Jericho.

inundations. The smaller tracts of black soil have thus been formed.

Passing to the larger rivers, we find them traversing black soil plains, until they reach a range of hills or undulating ground Here the black soil ceases, and the rivers find their way through gaps or gorges to other black soil plains, at a lower level to the eastward. As these gorges through which the rivers pass have been excavated by the action of the water, the conditions which previously existed must have given rise to lakes or marshes, and this accounts for the great horizontality of these large tracts, while the lowering of the beds by erosion meets the difficulty, advanced by Captain Newbold, in supposing that the present rivers have been the agents in transporting and depositing the black soil. Even after the rivers have passed through the trappean district and entered that of the sandstone, limestone, and granite of the peninsula, the structure of the country is still the same in regard to barrier hills and basins of black soil. The waste of rocks by denudation is only great in the basaltic tracts where heavy rain falls during the south-west monsoon, and is scarcely appreciable in the centre of the Peninsula, where the rainfall is only a few inches. It is owing to this meteorological fact that the basaltic soil is spread over the Peninsula far beyond the limits of the great basaltic district.*

But besides the soil which has been *transported* by streams

Now as some of the Arabs pronounce *Gebel*, a mountain, and *Gamal*, a camel with the G hard, while others pronounce them soft, as Jebel and Jamal, so the Mahomedans in India, and probably elsewhere, pronounce the J as S or Z. In this way we can see how *Gulguleh* changes to *Jiljilleh* and ultimately to *Silsili*, from mere local pronunciation.

Dr. Stanley does not describe minutely the physical features along the course of the Jordan, but looking to its great fall I would expect to find that, like the rivers on the Peninsula of India, it must at one time or other have met with many barriers along its course, and that these barriers gave rise to an accumulation of soil in plains. This would appear to be the case above Jiljilleh, where Dr. Stanley mentions rich meadow lands on the banks of the river.

* Had nature capped the western side of the plateaux with granite or sandstone instead of trap rocks, how different would have been the soils of the Peninsula! Instead of the aluminous soil, retentive of water, which now covers large tracts, a light sandy soil would have taken its place. Those plants, such as cotton, gram, &c., which do not ripen until long after the rain has ceased, would have withered and perished, unless irrigation had been used to keep them alive. The power which the black soil has of retaining water renders irrigation unnecessary in the great basins where the soil is deep.

and rivers, there is a black soil derived from trap decomposing *in situ*. This is rarely of any depth, and is not so valuable as black soil accumulated by transport in depressions, because the water drains off more rapidly, nor is its colour of so deep a black as the great tracts of the soil which have been formed in basins. Wherever the drainage is imperfect there black soil may be noticed in process of formation. This may be observed on the top of some of the plateaux rising from the Deccan, as in the one north of the sources of the Godavery in Khandeish, at Supter Shring. A local depression on the top of the hill admits of water being retained, and black soil is seen in course of formation along the course of a stream, while in other parts of the hill the soil is red.

At Belgaum, again, in the Southern Mahratta country, a low hill composed of trap called "One Tree Hill," has a marshy depression on its western side during the rains, and the marshy ground, which is black, contrasts with that on the better-drained portion of the hill, which is of a red colour. Yet both are derived from the same variety of trap rock decomposing *in situ*. There does not appear to be any great difficulty in accounting for the black colour of the soil in one place, and its red colour in another. Professor Johnstone, in "The Soils we Cultivate," writes: "A tree or humble plant dies on a dry surface, and gradually decays and disappears into the air. Let it be immersed in stagnant water, and it *blackens*, falls to pieces, and crumbles, perhaps, but in substance long remains where it fell." Accordingly we find that the black colour has been imparted to those soils derived from trap, which have been accumulated by the present streams and rivers in depressions. When these depressions became silted up and the water shallowed, marsh-loving plants would grow up and die while the soil was still moist. These conditions exist at this day in the low land lying between Guzerat and Kattiawar, where the country is a marsh during the rainy season, and where black soil is now in course of formation.*

* As alumina enters largely into the composition of the soil, the latter has the property of absorbing water and retaining its moisture longer than soils without an argillaceous character. This further prevents the organic vegetable matter from being dissipated into the air even where the marsh does not last throughout the year.

At Belgaum the basin which is there formed by the trap and sandstone ranges of hills on the north, south, and east sides presents a good example of the conditions I have alluded to. The drainage is imperfect, and the basin is flooded during the rains. The soil washed from the trap hills on the south sides yields a black soil; the sandstone, schists, and limestone on the other side yield red soils.

With regard to the use of this term "black" soil, it must be observed that it includes soils of shades of grey and steel grey, and is in fact adopted from the natives, who distinguish the soils by "red" or "black." The red being, in general, largely charged with peroxide of iron, forms a strong contrast to the soils of grey or black shades. The former are found on the slopes of undulating ground, while the latter are always in depressions.

Accumulated, as I have attempted to show the black soil has been, in isolated depressions by all the streams and rivers of the Deccan, the same uniformity in mineral and chemical composition will not be looked for, as in the soils formed by one river, in, for example, the valleys of the Nile, the Indus, or the Ganges. But these black soils have certain characters in common, because they are all derived from trappean rocks. They vary, as the trap rocks in different districts vary, in compos tion Thus some of the trap rocks are characterised by an abundance of Zeolitic minerals, and from these the soils will acquire a large per centage of soda, potash, and magnesia. Again, the trap in other parts is highly calcareous, and has, indeed, probably been formed from the fusion of limestone beds. The soil derived from this will be largely charged with lime.

When jasper, chalcedony, and agate abound in the trap rock, the fertilizing Zeolites are generally absent, and the soil will show a small per centage of the salts of soda, potash, and magnesia.

In the chemical analysis of cotton soils from the Peninsula, it would be desirable to trace the history of the soil from the disintegration of the trap rock, to its accumulation in the basin from which it was obtained. There would be little difficulty in determining this, as the stream, flowing through the basin, must have brought the soil from the hilly tract at its source, when heavy rain falls, and where the trap rocks are in a state of decomposition.

CHEMICAL COMPOSITION OF REGUR.

The following table exhibits a comparison between the chemical composition of the Indian black soil, and that of the cane brake soil of Alabana, and the soil of the Nile.

	* Black Soil Deccan.	† Black Soil Rt. bank of Kistnah.	‡ American Cane brake soil	‖ Mud of the Nile.
Silica, ...	43.1	41.73	41.01	77.20
Alumina, . . .	21.5	19.93	13.05	11.15
Oxides of Iron, .	10.	11.4	6.26	
Lime, ...	2.8	6.5	2.77	1.90
Magnesia, . . .	0.57	0.14	0.54	0.2
Potash, ...	0.69	0.813	0.25	0.0
Sodium Chlor, .	0.04	0.05	0.20	0.0
Soda, ...	1.7	0.77		0.30
Phosphoric Acid,	0.02	0.03	0.152	0.0

It will be observed from this table how high the per centage of alumina is in the Indian soils. It is half again as much as in the American cotton soil, and double that of the Nile deposit. It is the large proportion of alumina which gives to the black soil one of its most valuable properties, viz., that of absorbing and retaining a large amount of water. With a less aluminous soil many of the large tracts of cultivated land towards the centre of the Peninsula, where very little rain falls, would be worthless for cultivation unless irrigated. The soil of the Nile valley, as I had frequent opportunites of observing, is, compared with the black soils of India, decidedly a sandy soil, but the latter no doubt is the best for irrigation. The Indian black soils, it will also be remarked, contain a larger proportion of the salts of potash, soda, magnesia, and lime; and this might be expected where the soils are wholly derived from amygdaloidal and trap rocks full of stilbites, mesotypes, and other zeolitic minerals.

Of the American cotton soils, the one which most resembles the "regur" of India is that met with in the "cane brake"

* Dr. Forbes Watson.

† Ibid.

‡ Dr. Mallet.

‖ M. Dumas in 'Annales de Chemie.'

district. Dr. J. W. Mallet thus describes it—"The uniform and very peculiar character of the cane brake region is strikingly seen on coming abruptly upon it from the sandy land seventeen miles further north. In less than a mile, one seems to have gotten into a new country, so great is the change from the hilly region of comparatively poor yellow sands and red clay, to the almost level, gently undulating or 'rolling' of dark coloured soil —often spoken of as the 'black land'—with roads running through it, that in summer take such a hard smooth surface under wheels, as literally to glisten in the sun; but in wet winter weather, become banks of tenacious mud, almost impassable—at times quite impassable for waggons. Above all, is the change in the flora noteworthy. Getting into the cane brake, any one acquainted with the vegetation of the south, might fancy himself in some river bottom or just about to reach a stream; on all sides are moisture loving plants."

Dr Mallet in remarking on the vegetable matter in the soil writes—"In these calcareous soils vegetable matter decomposes with great rapidity; leaves as they fall in the forest, decay so quickly that a horse's foot is scarcely more heard beneath the trees, than if on turf; hence no doubt the general dark colour of the soil."

The cotton grown upon this cane brake soil is characterised by "heaviness of staple," and the staple is rather longer than that of the sandy land. It is a desirable cotton for manufacturers' use.

It would appear from the following description of the country above Khartoum that black soil has been accumulated by the Nile in that part of its course, in a similar manner to the black soils of the Peninsula.

"The plain of Sennar for some distance above Khartoum exhibits only a sandy soil, apparently mixed with deposit m tfrohe river. But from Messelemiah up, its character changes entirely; and the level flat, now higher than the river, which has contributed nothing towards its formation, becomes a deep bed of argillaceous marl containing calcareous concretions in great quantity. The plain is covered with a black mould, the result of decomposition. The argillaceous soil is retentive of water, and when refreshed by rain (for these rich plains are nowhere reached by the waters of the Nile,) become exceedingly fertile.

But in the dry season it has an aspect of the most dismal sterility; no trees, little herbage, and the naked ground cracked and gaping in all directions with the burning heat."

No mention is made of any rocky barrier to the north of this plain, which might formerly have raised the bed of the river and formed a lake; but I presume that, as in the valley of the Nile, above Silsilis, the soil has accumulated at a higher level from this cause. Much of the above description would apply to some of the black soil plains of India. The black argillaceous soil, retentive of water, the concretionary nodules of lime—or as they termed in India *kunkur*—the cracked and gaping naked ground during the hot weather, and the plain above the level of inundation, are characteristic of both.

SUPERFICIAL EXTENT OF REGUR.

No satisfactory estimate has yet been made of the area covered by the black cotton soil. I have seen it set down at 200,000 square miles, but these figures are evidently taken from the area of the great basaltic district, which has been computed to extend over a tract of that number of square miles. This obviously cannot be taken as a measure of the black soil, for the great basaltic district is principally a hilly district, and the black soils are found, not only in that district, but in great basins to the eastward, overlying limestones, schists, and granite. In the British territories it would not, perhaps, be difficult to approximate to the area of the black soil, but in native states, where there is no revenue survey, and where there is no statistical information to go upon, anything like a correct estimate cannot be formed. To speak generally, this soil may be set down as covering all the depressed portions *of the table land of the Deccan*, from the river Taptee on the north, through 8° of latitude to the south, with a breadth of from 3° to 7° of longitude. It is moreover the principal soil in the southern part of Guzerat, from the deposits of the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda. It extends along the east and north of Kattiawar, on the south coast of Cutch. In various parts of Rajpootana, Malwa, and Bundulcund, and in all these districts it may be traced to the decomposition of trappean rocks, which, if not the dominant rocks of

the country, are still the highest in superposition and most liable to decompose by the action of the atmosphere. An arc described with a radius of 450 miles, from Bombay as a centre, will include nine-tenths of the black cotton soils of India, from which the English market is now supplied with cotton.*

EXHAUSTION OF THE BLACK SOIL.

The improvement of the soil by the restoration of those mineral substances, which have been removed by the cultivation of cereals and other crops during a long period—compared to which the cultivation in America is but as yesterday—is one of the great points involved in the question of the successful culture of cotton in India for the future. It will not be sufficient to establish European agencies in the cotton districts, to make advances to the native cultivators, and to instruct them in careful picking, ginning, and packing, although this is a stride in advance. Something more is required. If the scientific agriculture of the present day be not a delusion, then it is clear that the Indian soils are not fairly treated, and that in this respect they labour under an immense disadvantage, when compared with the American.

It is not the character of the Indian soil which renders its competition with American unsuccessful. Of the two probably the best is the Indian. It is derived from the rocks which yield most fertilizing elements. The best soils in the high farming counties of Fife and the Lothians are derived from the same

* It will thus be seen that the completion of the railway communication to the great cotton fields of Berar, Hyderabad, and Bellary will but confirm the supremacy of Bombay as the cotton port of India. The physical configuration of both the east and west coasts of India is such that only one good port, Bombay, is available for vessels of the tonnage now common in the Indian trade. Goa, two centuries ago considered the best harbour for vessels then in use, has been rendered useless by the natural operation which is going on at the mouth of all the inlets along the west coast of India, with the single exception of the deep indentation of the coast known as the harbour, but more correctly the Bay of Bombay. The formation of *bars* across the entrance to the *khurees* or creeks, which occur every few miles along the coast, has rendered many of them inaccessible to native craft within a recent period. It is fortunate that the only good port of the Peninsula is so situated that it is at once the most central point on the coast for tapping the cotton districts, and the nearest to Europe.

kind of rocks, basalts and amygdaloids, which in the Peninsula cover an area of 200,000 square miles—an area four times that of the whole of England. But no soils can be cropped for thousands of years without exhausting the fertilizing elements; and this has been the fate of the Indian soils. It is not impossible that the exhaustion of the soil has led to the degeneration of the cotton plant, and that in the time of Alexander the Great and Porus, the fibre of the indigenous cotton may have been as long as that of *Middling Orleans* of the present day.

The black soil, being in most places of considerable depth, would admit of deep ploughing and stirring up. For deep ploughing with steam ploughs the black soil plains are, from their level character, peculiarly well adapted, though the subdivision of the land among many small proprietors would necessitate a common agreement for their employment. This will be possible when permanent European agencies are established up country, and the railways bring about a more direct intercourse between the European merchant and the Indian farmer.

Vegetable and animal manures, when applied to some of the black soils, produce a rankness of vegetation, and are considered detrimental in many cases. This would not happen with *mineral* manure, and in Nature's own laboratory, among the trappean rocks, there is ready to man's hand an abundant supply.

Zeolites occur so sparingly in other countries that they have never been turned to any economical purpose. In the Deccan they may be procured in tons, and might with advantage be employed to fertilize the land. But the earthy matrix even of the amygdaloids and the decomposing nodular basalt, both of which may be obtained to any extent, are highly fertile, as may be observed wherever the natives have artificially formed soils by means of dams, across ravines in trap hills.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

It has been asserted by no less an authority than Mr. Laing, that India cannot hope successfully to compete with America in raising cotton, even though she were supplied with better roads and better legislation. "The radical fact," says he, "is, that the average production of clean cotton per acre in America had been

300 lbs., while in India it had scarcely exceeded 70 lbs. of an inferior quality. This arises mainly from two causes, climate and soil. The climate of India is more extreme, an excess of rain during the wet monsoon being in most parts of India compensated by excessive heat and drought during the remaining six months of the year."

This charge against the soil and climate will not bear examination, for as regards the climate the cotton plant neither suffers excessive rain nor excessive drought. Both the indigenous cotton and the American exotic cotton are annuals. They are sown in June or July at the commencement of the rains, *but not in districts where the rainfall is excessive.* A glance at the section where the rainfall is shown will enable the reader to form his own opinion on this subject. The excessive fall takes place on the hilly tracts, and rapidly diminishes, even within a few miles, as we proceed eastward where the black soil plains are. Again, the cotton plant does not suffer from the excessive drought caused by the hot winds of the Deccan, because they do not begin to blow till March, and the cotton fibre has by that time been pulled.

The climate of the Deccan during the cotton harvest is one of the steadiest in the world, and resembles the climate of Egypt in winter, though not quite so cold. It must not be forgotten, in comparing the climate of India with that of America as to its suitability for cotton, that the cotton plant yields its fruit in *winter* in India, and in America in *summer*, and after all there is probably little difference in the temperature at which it ripens in either country.

The cause to which we must attribute the small produce of cotton per acre in India compared with the American, lies in the *defective treatment of the soil.* It is the virgin soils or soils richly manured in America which yield 300 lbs. of cotton fibre per acre. If the American soils had been cropped for 2000 years without manure the yield of cotton would be very small.

The Indian soils receive but little manure, but wherever it has been applied, even accidentally, the improvement in the produce is wonderful. Mr. Mercer, the ablest of the American cotton planters employed by Government in the Bombay experimental cotton culture, thus alludes to the effect of manure on the soils of the North-Western parts of the valley of Berar:—

"There is no irrigation used for cotton nor manuring except when it is accidental, by the bringing in a piece of ground used as an encampment by the passing Brinjarries (pack bullock carriers), or by the villagers, as a herding place for their cattle. When this does happen, the superiority of the cotton is very remarkable."

Again, in Dharwar, Mr. Mercer reports on the New Orleans cotton, "It will not attain anything like the size I expected, but that is mostly the fault of the soil, for, where a spot occurs that has had a little accidental manure the plants are a very good size indeed, and would, if all the fields were equal, certainly yield not less than 300 lbs. per acre."

Mr. A. Mackay, who was deputed to visit the cotton fields of Bombay by the Chambers of Commerce of Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow, took a much more hopeful view of the prospects of India supplying cotton to the world, than Mr. Laing appears to hold; for after visiting Guzerat and the southern Mahratta cotton districts in 1851, he remarked, in my presence at Belgaum: "In twenty years, if we live so long, I expect to see India supplying Lowell in America with cheap cotton." Mr. Mackay had previously gone over the cotton states of America, and one of the reasons he assigned for arriving at this conclusion was, that the American soils were being rapidly exhausted, thus entailing a more expensive style of cultivation for the future, and reducing the great advantage possessed by virgin soils over those that had been long under cultivation, like the Indian soils. Since Mr. Mackay's death, the success of the American variety of cotton in the Dharwar districts has been placed beyond a doubt; but it is now alleged that it is only in a limited portion of the southern districts of the Bombay Presidency that exotic cotton can be successfully cultivated on a large scale, and this is said to be owing to local peculiarities of soil and climate. While admitting that the Dharwar districts are probably the very best in Bombay for successfully introducing the American variety of cotton, both perhaps on account of the soil and climate; yet the success of the experiment in that locality has been clearly due to the exertions of Mr. Shaw the collector of Dharwar, Mr. Mercer the American planter, and Dr. Forbes the superintendent of the Cotton Gin Factory. But for them, the local peculiarities of soil and climate would not have availed to produce a

successful result. The other districts suited to cotton culture have not, up to this time, had the same chance of success, and the experiments there, as far as the record of them goes, appear to be quite inconclusive. On reading the long catalogue of failures in the introduction of exotic varieties of cotton in India, one cannot help being struck with the almost total disregard of the physical conditions under which the plants thrive in their native country. The Sea Island cotton was tried on aluminous soils, when in America it is raised only on a soil almost entirely composed of sand. The immediate success attending the introduction of the tea, coffee, and cinchona plants into India may be ascribed to the application of a scientific knowledge of the physical conditions under which the plants thrive where they are indigenous. With the cotton plant this has been too much overlooked, and hence the numerous experiments ending in failure, and affording nothing but a negative result.

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OPINION

ON

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

BY

GENERAL ROSTISLAV FADÉEFF,

OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

TRANSLATED BY T. MICHELL,

SECRETARY TO HER MAJESTY'S EMBASSY, AND CONSUL, AT ST. PETERSBURG.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

One of my principal objects in publishing a work on the 'Armed Forces of Russia' was to direct public attention to military matters. That object has been attained. The periodical press has taken up the subject, and the wide differences of opinion between my reviewers and my book compel me to define more clearly those sides of the question which have given rise to misunderstanding. Although the discussion has not yet lost its original literary character, I nevertheless think that an idea, if sensible in itself, has a great chance of being converted into action in the course of time.

I do not desire to speak here of misunderstandings that are purely military, but I am bound to explain those which are raised by the very basis of the work in question, namely, by my estimate of the armed forces which I consider to be necessary to Russia.

Although this question is substantially a political one, yet it is the foundation of every military consi-

deration. The quantity of troops which a State requires regulates the general features of its military organization. As the relations between the numerical strength of the population and the quantity of troops which it can furnish on a war footing become altered, the military system of the State should be altered likewise. At the same time, every State determines the forces that it requires by a variety of considerations. No State can be guided in that respect by comparative statistics alone; it must measure the degree of its efforts by the geographical conditions of the country and its political relations, temporary as well as permanent.

After the abstract question, What force can a State supply? comes the practical question, What force does it require?

It is impossible to give an answer even approximately correct to the latter question without first arriving at a clear understanding of the political relations that may cause the State to be drawn into a war, and that will at the same time point to the seat of such a war and to the efforts which it will demand on the part of the State. My estimate of the forces which Russia would in such a case require is founded on a well-matured study of the political, or rather the historical, relations of Russia. The idea on which that estimate is founded is as follows:—Not one of the European questions in which Russia is interested, and more especially the chief or Eastern Question, can be terminated by a merely local war—for instance, the Eastern Question by a war on the Balkan peninsula.

The late war was in this respect an accidental and exceptional event, not likely to recur. The collision of Russia with Europe, or with any portion of it, can only be decided by a war on the western frontier; and the international power of Russia should therefore be measured, not only principally, but almost exclusively, by the force which it can place on that frontier, remaining at the same time in a defensive position on her other boundaries, wherever such an attitude may be found necessary.

This argument, which I consider to be beyond all dispute, has given rise to misunderstandings. Russians have replied that no other question but the Eastern is capable of giving rise to a coalition against Russia, for the question of Poland is of no essential importance to Europe; that the Eastern Question, as proved by past events, will not lead to a collision on the western frontier; that the Allies of 1854 did not undertake a war on the Continent, as England was not disposed to alter the map of Europe on account of Eastern affairs—a policy which may be expected in the future, &c.

I might answer these objections in a few words:—Firstly, A coalition against Russia is so far possible that, in 1863, when Napoleon endeavoured to form an offensive alliance against Russia at Vienna, a coalition was very nearly brought about. Austria hesitated a few days, and if her Government had acted with greater decision (there was no lack of good-will) a formidable alliance would have been established between France, Austria, and Italy, against Russia,

behind the back of Prussia, then of small consequence and little sure of her own strength; and this alliance would have had no reference to the Eastern Question. Every disturbance in Poland has threatened, and will still threaten, Russia with a similar danger. Secondly, It is true that England did not wish to connect the Polish with the Eastern Question, but not so far as to acknowledge herself vanquished and to relinquish her demands in the East, in order to escape from the Polish Question. It would, moreover, have depended, not on the Western Powers, but on Austria, to convert a maritime war into a war on land, for she alone could have opened to the Allies an approach to the western frontier of Russia. Thirdly, There was no land campaign in 1856, only because Russia retired before it, and gave up, not only her recent demands, but also her old advantages, in consequence of the Austrian Ultimatum; the whole burden of the war would otherwise have fallen on the western frontier. I took the late war as an exemplification in my inquiry into the armed forces of Russia, and it is evident that I was compelled to consider literally not that which actually happened, but that which must undoubtedly have happened if Russia had continued to insist upon her demands.

I had in view not an accidental or purposeless war, such as that of 1853–1856, but a war well considered, with means calculated beforehand to be sufficient for the attainment of the object in view.

For many readers this explanation would have been

sufficient, but it has not yet removed the source of misunderstanding between my book and its readers. My arguments respecting the military forces of Russia were based on a personal, but firmly established view of the military and political requirements of my country. I did not consider it necessary to develop that view, logically, in my work. The elementary and the practical bases, such as the special importance of a western army, seemed to me self-evident and synonymous, from whatever point of view they might be regarded. The misunderstandings into which my reviewers, and consequently my readers, have fallen, compel me to speak out. I cannot go into details, nor shall I present any new facts, but I shall prove the correlation between the facts from which my view has been derived.

CHAPTER II.

THE EASTERN QUESTION.

I SHOULD wish to concentrate the attention of my readers on the Eastern Question. It is in reality one of the most vital questions to Russia, since it is the only one that threatens her permanently with a hostile coalition. As during the prevalence of a strong epidemic all other diseases bear an impress of its symptoms, so also in the matter of the Eastern Question, so long as it remains unsettled, all the causes of collision between Russia and the West issue from it or merge into it; it is the bond of union between all political questions. To agree on the exact significance of the Eastern Question, and on the determination of the fundamental obstacles that have not as yet permitted its solution in a Russian, *i. e.* in a just sense, is to agree substantially on the military and political positions of Russia, and consequently on the importance of this or that basis of military operations.

The misunderstandings above alluded to have indeed arisen from a difference of opinion in regard to the limits and bearing of the Eastern Question.

Those limits have greatly expanded during the

course of the present century. Of the old Eastern Question only the name remains; everything else, its substance and its limits, are different. We may measure with great accuracy the internal growth of this question by the relations in which Austria has stood towards Russia whenever the latter has been at war with Turkey. No barometer can record the state of the atmosphere so correctly as the degree of enmity shown by Austria towards Russia expresses the condition of the Eastern Question; for to her the question is not a political one, as it is to France and England, but a home question, as vital to her as to Russia, but in an opposite sense.

In 1786 an alliance was concluded between Catherine II. and Joseph II. for the conquest, partition, and regeneration of European Turkey. That alliance was the last expression of an idea which had occupied the mind of Europe for three centuries, namely, the expulsion of the infidel barbarians from her soil, an idea that was not unalloyed with certain personal interests. The identity of the Russian religion with that of the people of the Balkan at that time signified much to the Turkish rayahs, but little to Europe; the blood relationship between those races and Russia was of no significance to anyone, for the modern spirit of nationalities was then unknown. Russia gave up to Austria, *en bloc*, the orthodox Slaves of Servia and Bosnia, in return for a promise of assistance in the restoration of the Byzantine Empire. There was no thought then of any other successor to Turkey. The Slaves were divided, like chattels, between the

Germans and the Greeks. On such conditions it was possible for the views of Austria to be identical with those of Russia.

In 1807, however, Austria took a different view of the matter, in consequence of the unexpected and successful rising of the Servians. How could a State, populated by nineteen millions of enthralled Slaves, view with equanimity these new Turkish successors, and where, moreover?—along the frontier of Croatia and the Voevodina. In her actions Austria then followed that new policy on the Eastern Question, which she has since undeviatingly pursued. The Cabinet of Vienna employed at that time all the means at its disposal in order to destroy the alliance between France and Russia, which threatened Austria with only one danger—but one that she could not tolerate—namely, concessions by France on the Eastern Question. In order to avoid such an arrangement, rather than for any other reason, Austria first threw herself into a war with Napoleon, then gave him an archduchess, and made an alliance with him.

She did not, however, succeed in preventing the liberation of Servia. The Emperor Alexander, who was not under the influence of Metternich at that time, remained firm. But we know what took place afterwards. When feelings of humanity and of shame before their own people inclined all the European Governments, even the Government of England, in favour of the Greeks, Austria alone remained stubborn, and long after kept a drag upon Russia, in the name of the Holy Alliance. It might have been supposed

that the "great idea" of restoring the Greek Empire, and still less the first step towards so distant an object, would not frighten the nephew of Joseph II.; but during the thirty years that elapsed after the Austro-Russian alliance against the Turks, Austria began to see clearly her way to the settlement of the Eastern Question. Where others spoke of Greeks, she already thought of Servians and Bulgarians. When at last the patience of the Russian Government became exhausted, and the late Emperor led his army beyond the Danube, Austria, notwithstanding the Holy Alliance, made the greatest efforts to raise against Russia such a coalition as she succeeded in forming twenty-five years later. She was incomparably more decisive in her action than England; each ill success of the Russian arms was celebrated at Vienna as a patriotic triumph. On that occasion it was only the confidence of Charles X. in the promise of the Emperor Nicholas not to destroy Turkey, and the friendly family relations between Prussia and Russia, that saved us from a hostile alliance.

Since that period the actual condition of affairs has become daily more clear. Long before the Crimean War, Europe, by the voice of Austria, inveighed against Pan-Slavism. The events of 1848, which proved the vitality of the Austro-Slave populations, could not, of course, have had the effect of recommending the Slaves of Turkey to the sympathy of the dominant classes and races of the Austrian Empire. The secret negotiations which preceded the Crimean

War are as yet but little known.* It is, however, beyond a doubt, that Austria endeavoured to remove the causes of quarrel in 1853 under a feeling of fear, until she became convinced of the readiness of France to risk a war, and that she began to fan the flames as soon as she had obtained that conviction. How can it be admitted that the newly improvised Emperor of the French, who had only just raised the banner of the Bonapartes, so dangerous to Europe, would have ventured even on the first threatening demonstrations which gradually brought about the war—a war that nobody desired—without knowing positively that Austria was with him, *i.e.* that the Holy Alliance would not be arrayed against him? Outwardly, that alliance, as far as Russia and Austria were concerned, appeared still firm; Prussia, although dissatisfied with the events of 1851, would doubtlessly not have wavered between her old allies and Bonapartist France, had outward appearances proved realities; and the French, instead of invading the Crimea, might have been obliged to defend themselves in Champagne. No one believed in Russian plans of conquest, and therefore, the Northern Powers being unanimous, it was impossible to reckon upon England. Had the Holy Alliance spoken loudly at that time, and it had every right so to speak, knowing how innocent Russia was of the perfidy of which she was accused, England would immediately have drawn back, leaving her ally of the hour to get out of his

* Except the negotiations with England, which did not take the initiative in the matter.

troubles the best way he could: unless support had first been secured in the opposite camp, the French demonstrations of 1853 would have been a senseless risk. It cannot therefore be doubted that the moral instigator of the coalition of 1854 was Austria, not France, notwithstanding the deceptive appearance of facts. Austria of course found it to her advantage to employ others to take the chestnuts out of the fire; but it was she that untied the hands of the Allies, by demanding the withdrawal of the Russian army beyond the Pruth, and by shielding Turkey with her troops. It was she, also, who at the last moment decided the war by throwing into the scales the weight of an army of three hundred thousand men; and it was she that was most obdurate at the conclusion of peace.

It is very clear why Austria delayed taking a final decision in the late war—a delay that placed the seat of war in the Crimea, not on the Vistula. In the first place, Austria was then still the historical monarchy of the Hapsburgs, and Russia was necessary to her for her German and Italian interests; she did not wish to hasten the final rupture with Russia, because she hoped to attain her objects by an armed neutrality alone; and in this she succeeded.*

Secondly, between the years 1853–1856 there was not the slightest mention of a *solution* of the Eastern Question, except in the verses of Homiakof; the quarrel related to details only of secondary importance.

* The first Austrian Despatch to the Russian Cabinet after the Treaty of Paris invited attention to the disturbed state of Italian affairs.

This was, however, sufficient to cause Austria to assume a hostile position, notwithstanding the danger of losing that support of Russia, which was so necessary to her in other matters with which she is no longer connected. What, then, would be the consequences, if the Eastern Question should now come to a *final solution?* The same mistake cannot be made more than twice, for that would be setting aside the results of experience; and since the time that Austria first understood thoroughly the substance of the Eastern Question, adopting towards it a well-defined system of policy, Russia has twice experienced the impossibility not only of settling, but even of improving to the slightest extent, the affairs of the Balkan peninsula without Austria. In 1829 the Russian army reached the Sea of Marmora, but only after a distinct pledge had been given that the articles of peace would concern Greek affairs alone, within limits previously laid down. Although it stood before Constantinople, the army was not able to liberate Candia. We were not able to make any advance whatever in 1854. In both cases the impediments were not in front, but in our rear.

It is generally considered in Russia that France and England are the principal obstacles to an armed intervention in Turkish affairs. But in reality, however much they might desire it, France and England are not in a position to defend European Turkey against Russia, provided the hands of Russia are untied on the western frontier. It is a matter of impossibility to struggle, by landing forces, against a Power of equal

strength, which has open access overland into the disputed country. Such a struggle is impossible, both in respect to time and to numbers. Of what avail would be all the means of maritime transport against an army of 200,000 men acting continuously? In 1854 the Allies employed a part of the winter and the whole of the spring in transporting 60,000 soldiers to Turkey; they then required a considerable time for the organization of their waggon-train; until June they were chained to the sea-coast, and they had not acquired mobility even by the end of that month. Their forces in the Crimea grew to the dimensions of a numerous army only by the gradual transport of fresh troops during the course of a whole year. Meanwhile the Russian army requires only six weeks, and even less, to march from the Danube to Constantinople, provided, of course, it be sufficiently numerous for the blockade of fortresses in the rear, during a forward movement, that shall also be as far as possible uninterrupted. In dealing with the Turks, a war may be pushed on as rapidly as the transport train can be made to advance. It is to be presumed that the war will support itself on the Balkan peninsula, provided the rapidity of the campaign does not permit the enemy to devastate methodically the country, which, under such circumstances, would of course not submit to him without opposition. Hitherto, following old traditions, Russia has fought in European Turkey step by step, besieging fortresses, to the astonishment of Europe, and without the justification of an unavoidable military necessity. In 1829, however, there was a political

reason for such a plan of campaign; it was necessary to secure, as far as possible, the rear of the Russian army against any sudden hostile attack on the part of Austria.

In order to settle the fate of European Turkey, in spite of the Maritime Powers, it will be sufficient for 150,000 troops to reach the Bosphorus, *i. e.* that 250,000 men, on the broadest calculation, should reach the Danube. There can be no difficulty in supplying these numbers, even with our present military organization, allowing also for a sufficient and satisfactory occupation of the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas, and for the employment of 50,000 active troops on the side of the Caucasus. Russia can always forestall the land forces of her Western opponents, not only in the Balkans but even at Constantinople. Even if they should succeed, after considerable difficulty, in meeting the Russian army in front of that capital with a force like that which, after the lapse of many months, they got together in 1854 at Varna, 60,000 Europeans, supported by any number of Turks, would not be able to defeat a Russian army of 150,000 men. Moreover, there would be no regular Turkish troops in existence at such a time: they would have been dispersed earlier in Europe and in Asia. The Straits would fall into the hands of the captors of Constantinople; their fortifications could not hold out against a land force; and the entrances into the Sea of Marmora, once occupied and properly defended, any serious attempt from seaward to dispute the possession of Turkey would become almost impossible. The largest

force that has ever yet been landed was the army of the Crimea, which consisted of 60,000 troops, without cavalry or waggon-train, and with but a small proportion of artillery. The landing was crowned with success in consequence of two special reasons, namely, the shortness of the voyage (only thirty-six hours), and the numerical inferiority—to the extent of one-half—of our troops on shore. But a landing in the face of superior numbers, or of an enemy of equal strength, abundantly supplied with warlike resources, would lead to destruction. The army of Wellington, transported in ships, supplied from sea, and having a strong place of refuge at the mouth of the Tagus, maintained its footing in Spain against the superior, although divided, forces of the French, only because the country was for that army; but imagine the opposite position: could a French army, between 1807 and 1812, surrounded by a national insurrection, have held its ground in Spain against superior English forces?—and such would be exactly the position of the European allies in Turkey, if Russia acted with decision. Indeed, were Russia to act with promptitude and decision, those allies would not in all probability be found in Turkey at all. Were the Maritime Powers to resolve on defending Turkey, without having the co-operation of Austria, they would defend it only with their naval forces, and only with such a number of land troops as they could carry on board their fleet without inconvenience; but they would never risk their army. Many are led into error by the fact that the allies of 1854 were able to carry the

war into Russia, and to maintain themselves there. But how were they able to effect this? Simply by taking up a strong position on the coast, which they succeeded in fortifying before a sufficient force could be collected against them. There are many similar positions on the Turkish coast; but it would be impossible to save the Turkish dominions by encamping a small force on a sea-shore. In reality, France and England can as little protect European Turkey against Russia with their land forces as they can protect Canada or Mexico against the Americans.

The difficulty is this, that it is impossible for Russia to carry on a war on the Balkan peninsula without the permission of Austria, and that permission she can, under no circumstances, obtain. Look at the map. Russia can reach European Turkey only by one road —through the gate formed by the south-east angle of the Carpathians and the mouth of the Danube: the key of that gate is in the hands of Austria. By crossing the Danube, or even the Pruth, a Russian army would expose her rear to Austria. In this awkward position the first threatening demonstration on the part of Russia's good neighbour would compel the army to beat a hasty retreat, as in 1854. The Lower Danube is accessible only with an Austrian passport. In relation to Russia the geographical position of European Turkey may be compared to a strong chest, of which Austria forms the lid; without lifting that lid it is impossible to get anything out of the chest. Russia has had sufficient experience of that.

It was rumoured in 1854 that Prince Paskevitch

strongly represented to the late Emperor that, once resolved on a war with Turkey, it was necessary, above all, to prepare for a war with Austria. He affirmed that the Eastern Question could be solved only at Vienna, not in Turkey. Events have proved the correctness of the views of that celebrated warrior.

While Russia held possession of the Black Sea, an attempt might have been made to break open the chest from the other side, *i.e.* to knock out the bottom of it by a landing in the Bosphorus. The result would have been a rising of the entire Christian population, the paralyzing of Turkey during the following months, and, probably, her final dissolution; but in whose favour? The seizure of Constantinople and the Straits would not settle that question. It would have to be settled by a war on land, against a coalition, of which Austria would be the soul. During the continuation of such a war the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula would be in a chaotic condition. It would fight the Mussulman inhabitants of the towns, but it would not be able to give Russia any assistance beyond its own territory. In order to occupy the Straits and the entire peninsula, it would be necessary to detach forces greater than those which would be required in case of a war in the West, to defend the shores and land frontier of Russia against a live Turkey. So that in reality the seizure of Constantinople from seaward, while such a seizure was yet possible, would have increased but very little the material probabilities of the final success of Russia. In questions of the character of the last Greek Ques-

tion, a fleet in the Black Sea might have exercised a weighty influence; it might have been used as a strong diplomatic expédient, but it would have been no very important military weapon, in view of the objects that appertain to Russia. It is naturally impossible to estimate, speculatively, the moral effect of such a stupendous event as the entry of the Russian troops into Constantinople, even if it were unexpected; but such an event would in any case be a double-edged weapon.

CHAPTER III.

AUSTRIA—THE CHIEF OPPONENT OF RUSSIA.

It may, I think, be concluded, on the basis of undeniable facts, that the principal obstacle and the chief opponent of Russia in this Eastern Question is neither France nor England, but Austria; the two former are nothing more than her allies in this matter, although they make more noise and place themselves more prominently forward. The Naval Powers alone could not bar the road to the Bosphorus against Russia, even by force of arms; Austria can arrest Russia, without firing a gun, merely by her armed neutrality. Not only to a military man who understands his profession, but to every man who can weigh the circumstances of a case, there is no truth more patent than this, that the question which is generally called the Eastern Question cannot be solved by a local war on the Balkan peninsula, and that Russia cannot even undertake a war in that direction, *whatever may happen and however much her forces may be developed.* So long as the Black Sea fleet existed, Russia could commence operations on the south, in order, however, to finish where it will now be necessary to begin, should it come to a collision, namely, on the western

frontier. Not having foreseen that termination in 1854 and prepared for it, Russia fell necessarily into a vicious circle. Russia has now no choice of a commencement; she can enter Turkey through Austria, but she can in no case leave Austria on one side. It depends upon Austria not only to restrain Russia from an open intervention in the Eastern Question, but it is in her power, also, to hurl the forces of a European coalition against our western frontier. She can, at her convenience, shield Turkey by an armed neutrality, as in 1854, or open a road to the Vistula by revolutionizing Poland, as she threatened to do in 1856. Such a part belongs exclusively to Austria, and her position in Europe is principally founded upon it. In two questions of vital importance to Russia—the Eastern and the Polish—Austria can be both the shield and the weapon of the hostile part of Europe, according as it may serve her interests. It may require but little patience to see how this double part will be played out.

In order to solve a difficult problem, it is first of all necessary to ascertain in what the difficulty consists. In order to discuss with advantage the Eastern Question within the limits usually assigned to it, *i. e.* within the boundaries of Turkey, it is necessary first of all to recognize the chief impediment in the way of Russia, which consists in this, that she cannot get there. To hold out her hand openly to the Christian populations of the Balkan peninsula would be tantamount to giving that hand to be cut off. Let us take as an example the last Greek collision. Both in Russia and

in Europe the idea was current, in private and diplomatic circles, that Russia could not arrest Turkey by force because she had no guns. But, suppose she had had guns? Could she have moved an army beyond the Danube, and have entered for that purpose the independent principality of Roumania, without at the same time stationing 300,000 men on her western frontier (a force which she would not at present possess, after detaching an army for the Danube), *i. e.* without preparing from the first for a great European war? To act otherwise would be to bring about an exact repetition of the events of 1854. Russia would within a few days receive a polite invitation to evacuate the Principalities or to allow herself to be cut off. To ask, as people frequently do ask, whether Russia is ready to support her demands on Turkey, is merely to carry on a drawing-room conversation. It is somewhat difficult to be ready for a war which it is impossible to commence. This strange position is far from being temporary. We can have no European allies in view on the Eastern Question, and while Austria stands she will always be a shield to Turkey.

Austria cannot act otherwise; it would be an act of suicide on her part to consent to a solution of the Eastern Question in a Russian sense, or even in a sense that might not be diametrically opposed to Russian views and feelings. The existence of free Slavonian states side by side with extensive Slavonian provinces in a state of thraldom—provinces with inhabitants that are not only of the same blood but that also form one people, speaking the same tongue

on both sides of the Save, is quite incompatible. On one bank of a rivulet, across which a fowl might wade, would be free Skuptchinas and a happy future; on the other, a gradual disappearance of a national identity which had hitherto existed in the form of an inferior race, without the slightest prospects, and which would not become either German or Magyar. Is such a state of things possible? Austria lost her Italian possessions because she admitted the existence next door of a small independent Italian kingdom. How can it be expected that she will consent to the creation along her southern boundary, of a Slavonian Piedmont, which from its national homogeneity would carry dissolution, not only into one corner of her possessions, but into the very body of the Empire? Was the Duchy of Warsaw voluntarily recognized by Russia in 1807? Austria can only have two issues in view: either the Slaves on the other side of the Save will be reduced by her to the position of the Hungarian Slovaks, or the Slaves on this side, as far as Saxony, will take up the same position as the Servians of the Principality. It is difficult to expect from Austria a just solution of the Eastern Question. The possibility alone of such a revolution in the future was a great danger to German Austria, while she was supported by all the forces of the Germanic Confederation; that possibility has become a mortal danger to Hungarian Austria, especially as far as the eastern part of her dominion is concerned, where she can only depend politically on one-third of the population against two-thirds. In that part of her dominions

she has to fear, not only the Slaves, but the Roumanians as well.

It is said that Joseph II. of Austria enjoined his successors, in case of extremity, to convert the monarchy of the Hapsburgs into a Slavonian kingdom. Many philanthropists advise the Government of Austria to avert this danger by a just behaviour towards the Slavonian subjects of the Empire. But, excepting the Czechs, who are, as it were, jammed in a vice by expanding Germany, the Austrian Government has nowhere the direct command over Slavonian populations; it commands the dominant classes and the races that are not Slavonian, to which those populations are subjected. With few exceptions, the proprietorship of land, the historical rights and traditions, and the provincial organization, are not in the hands of the Slavonians. The educated and intellectual classes among the latter are composed of the rural clergy and schoolmasters. Such was (if we may still use the past tense) the position of the people in the western provinces of Russia, even with this further resemblance that in Poland, as now in Austria, the foreign dominant element rested on a kernel of the nominally dominant people and on towns which were foreign and hostile to the villages. It would be futile to advise the Polish nobility to recognize the justice of the demands of the majority of the nation, and to make, voluntarily, a concession which neither an all-powerful Government nor the crushing force by which it is backed, has yet been able to wrest from them; and it would be quite as futile to give similar advice

to the Austrian Germans and Magyars, who are well aware of the undoubted superiority of their organized strength over the scattered impulses of the races subject to them. The Austrian Government could not re-establish the independence of the Slaves even in the name of a democratical principle, since the discord that reigns amongst them has not only reference to classes but to peoples; besides, what advantage would it be for the Government to exchange the support which it obtains from the dominant, politically organized races, for the sympathy of elementary forces, especially as, with the exception of Galicia, which hinders rather than assists the other Slaves, the dominant races and provinces in the remaining part of the Empire, are numerically equal to those that remain enthralled.

Nevertheless, the national feeling of the Austrian Slaves may be said to be spreading rather than lessening; in order to ripen and to take a definite form, that national feeling requires an amount of public latitude and concord which cannot be found where no definite practical object exists or can exist. Internal Slavonic disturbances are neither terrible to Austria as a whole, nor to Hungary as part of the Empire. The Czechs and Croats can only agitate; the other Slavonian subjects of Austria can only murmur. Austria may be likened to a loaded cannon, which will stand harmless for ages unless a spark touches it. It is natural that precautions should have been taken against the danger of such a spark alighting, and neither Austria nor Hungary can be blamed for it.

The same, although in a ruder form, is repeated

on the southern bank of the Save. There also the danger to the dominant nation consists entirely in the Slavonic race. The phantom of an Eastern Empire has been dissipated before our eyes; the quarrel about bishops has shown clearly how willingly the Bulgarians will receive Greek officials. It is not impossible to re-establish the Greek Empire by force, but it can neither re-establish nor maintain itself. If the question were merely about the Greeks, it would have long ceased to be a question at all. To Greece may belong Epirus, Thessaly, the south-eastern corner of Macedonia, Candia, Cyprus, and the islands of Asia Minor; these are the limits of the Hellenic race. The remaining Greek populations in the Turkish Empire are too mean in numbers and too scattered to think of dominating. Constantinople lies more than a day's voyage by steamer from the nearest Hellenic soil, and could in any case only be a colony in the hands of the Greeks; and a people of which scarcely three millions exist either on the mainland or on the islands could not hold as a colony a distant town, with a million inhabitants principally of an alien race. The brave and clever Greeks could be portioned out without any injury even to Turkey. Europe oppresses them, firstly, because they represent the protruding end of a ball of thread, an end which Europe fears to draw out any farther, in order that the entire ball may not become unravelled and disclose its Slavonian core; secondly, because the Greeks are aliens to Europe on account of their orthodox religion. Who can doubt that the Greeks would long ago have had justice

done them if they were Catholics or Protestants? The murder of a few Syrian Catholics was sufficient to bring a French squadron to the rescue. The complete liberation of the Greek people might be effected apart from the Eastern Question, without touching it substantially. The question is not about the Greeks, with the exception of the peninsula occupied by the Hellenic and Albanian races, and forming as it were an excrescence of the great Balkan peninsula; all the rest in European Turkey, from Dalmatia and the Danube to Constantinople, is Slavonian. Half a century ago there was neither direct contact nor sympathy between the Slaves of Turkey and those of Austria; the liberation of Servia created both. Of course Hungary cannot forget that in 1848 the free Servians came to the aid of their brethren, her subjects. A stream of running water, and the colour of a frontier barrier cannot separate morally the Slavonian mass which extends from the Archipelago to Saxony, since those masses have awakened to national consciousness. Austria can hold her part of the Slavonian mass as long as Turkey holds hers, and *vice versâ*. This position of affairs determines the relations of Austria towards the Eastern Question, apart even from the will of her statesmen. Turco-Slavonian and Austro-Slavonian affairs are wound up in such a tangled skein that it is impossible to unravel the one without touching the other.

Here is a specimen of the relations of Austria, and, after her example, of those of Western Europe towards the natives of the Balkan. The French press disclosed

that in 1863 the following conditions of an alliance between the Cabinets of the Tuileries and Vienna had been discussed. Austria was to cede Venice to Italy, and Galicia to a re-established Poland, in return for Bosnia, the Herzegovina, Servia, and Roumania. Whether free or not free, and not only the Slaves, but all the orthodox populations of the Danube as well, were to be exchanged into slavery in masses of so many souls for every soul liberated in Europe, inclusive also of the poor Russians (Ruthenians) of Galicia. For Austria, and many agree with her in such a view, this is the only possible solution of the Eastern Question: Austria to take whatever she can as far as the Balkans; to give everything that would not suit her to any other European power, as for instance, Albania to Italy, which is already looking out for her share in the Turkish succession; to leave whatever she cannot as yet take in the hands of the Turks; to indemnify Turkey with the Caucasus—with the Georgians male and female—to which the Pachas are agreeable; if driven to extremity (perhaps) to replace Turkish by Greek violence beyond the Balkans, to the ruin of the Greeks and the Bulgarians; but on no account to give independence to a single Slavonian soul. If we continue to regard the Eastern Question from a European point of view, with the hope of settling it by a campaign beyond the Danube, the result would be in all probability very similar to that which has just been sketched out.

It would appear, therefore, that of the historical question, *i. e.* the question of the weakness of Turkey, the name alone remains. While, started by Lord

Chatham, that question has been discussed during a whole century, another question still more important, and which can only be called the Pan-Slavist Question, has grown from under it; and the debatable boundaries, which now include not the Balkan peninsula alone, but the entire country between the Ore mountains and the Archipelago, have grown with it. To Europe, which does not desire the independence of the Slaves, the Eastern Question may continue to exist in its previous form,—as an unfinished question of the dissolution of Turkey; but we, Russians, have no reason to close our eyes against realities. We must see in the famous question that which really exists in it—a Slavonian family question, depicted on the map of Europe in two different colours, but indivisible in reality, and not to be solved except conjointly; for the reciprocal connection of both parts of the question is now an undoubted fact, and one that cannot be affected by any eventualities.

Without doubt, the Slavonian Question in its two divisions—the southern and the northern—is distinguished by strong contrasts. In Austria, the Slave vainly beats against the bars of his cage, but he can still live as a man. In Turkey he cannot live as a man. The hanging of priests, the suffocation of people with their heads thrust into bags of millet—all these barbarous proceedings of a Tartar horde against a Christian people act, of course, differently on Russian nerves than does political oppression in Austria; the question of humanity is sometimes in advance of the impulses that result from an identity of blood and

religion. In consequence of this, the southern Slavonian group makes itself heard more frequently, and demands from diplomacy temporary measures, which are inapplicable to the northern group. The ordinary ways of diplomacy are not applicable to both groups; nevertheless history has tied both these questions into one knot, has cemented them, and does not admit any partial solution of either. Europe purposely averts her eyes from a dangerous unity, and does not wish to see it, but understands it very well; we have only to remember what a disturbance the innocent visit of the Slavonian delegates to Moscow created in the European Press. Russia cannot, however, but see it. She stands with her face to the west, and the rising sun does not dazzle her eyes.

As yet I have not departed from the domain of facts. It is not arguments but facts that demonstrate that Russia cannot reach the Danube except through Austria. This position, apparently without issue, was defined with mathematical accuracy in 1854, and continued unchanged until 1866. For ten years Russia was unable to touch the Eastern Question effectively, without involving herself in an Anglo-Franco-Austrian alliance on her western frontier, and without giving her opponents a possibility and a pretext for connecting the Eastern with the Polish Question. The victory of Prussia, some think, has shuffled the cards to the advantage of Russia. In any case, the events of 1866 have altered the international relations of Europe, and cannot but have an influence on the position of the Eastern, *i. e.* of the Pan-Slavonian, Question.

CHAPTER IV.

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND PRUSSIA, AND THE FOREIGN ALLIANCES OF RUSSIA.

It is impossible to speak of the military and political relations of Russia towards other Powers without taking into consideration the new position of Prussia.* But here we must involuntarily leave the firm ground of realities, for that position has not yet been defined by established facts. National tendencies, to which modern Governments are obliged to submit, have taken the place of international relations based on past events.

We all know the circumstances under which Russia can form an alliance with "*her ally*" Prussia, as we often now hear that country called. Those circumstances are—that inimical Franco-Austrian alliance which is periodically announced by journalists (notwithstanding its improbability), and which, although directed mainly against Prussia, is to affect Russia indirectly. In the face of such a political combination Prussia would certainly make large concessions on the Eastern Question, even in a purely Russian sense.†

* Written before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

† *i. e.* as a Pan-Slavist Question.—TRANS.

She would pay that price for an alliance against a dangerous foe.

But except in the event of such a combination, it is difficult to imagine any circumstances under which Prussia would offer her alliance to Russia; still less can she be expected to make such an offer in connection with the Eastern Question, unless she is compelled to do so. Even old Prussia was not sympathetically inclined towards that Question from a Russian point of view, as soon as a connection between Austrian and Turkish interests became evident; and it should be borne in mind that in old Prussia, special, not German interests had the precedence over sympathies for race. A large reward might have rendered possible an arrangement with old Prussia on Turco-Slavonian and Austro-Slavonian affairs, which are indissolubly connected; but now Prussia has become Germany. The whole thought of her Government consists in this, that she has taken upon herself to uphold the external interests of Germany, of which she has declared herself the buckler and the sword; and it is only on that condition that Prussia can maintain her pre-eminence. The German interests of Austria are at the same time as dear to Germany as those of Prussia, whether on the Upper Elbe and the Save, or on the Warta and the Lower Vistula.

In this respect the German tendencies can scarcely be called tendencies, for they are considered in Germany as inalienable rights.

In the eyes of every German all that is included within the dominions of the Austrian Empire is the

inheritance of Germany, while anything that can be added to it will be regarded as a German acquisition. Open whatever book you like of Travels in Austria by a non-Austrian German, and you will find that half of it is devoted to reproaching the Austrian Government for not having known how to Germanize, during so many centuries, the Slaves, the Roumans, and even the Magyars,—to suggestions for their more rapid Germanization, and to the expression of a conviction that, in the hands of other more energetic sons of Germany, that Germanization could be speedily effected, and the Danube become an exclusively German river. The giving up not only of the whole, but of any part of the Austrian Slaves would be regarded by any German in the same light as a Russian would regard the cession of the provinces beyond the Dnieper. The question of the Baltic provinces in Russia represents, perhaps, still more correctly the light in which the provinces of Austria are regarded in Germany.

There is no German who will in his heart consent to acknowledge the independence of the Magyars for an indefinite period. Nevertheless every German understands that his countrymen are as yet unable to cope with the Slaves of the Danube without the assistance of the Hungarians, who, on their part also, are well able to understand the necessity of mutual support. The Hungarian Premier boasted but a short time ago that were he in the position of Chancellor of the Empire he would soon quiet the Czechs. In respect to Russia, Hungary is the advance guard of Germany, while the Hohenzollerns in Roumania are

but its outpost. Many politicians, both in Europe and in Russia, are ingenuous enough to express surprise that Austria should tolerate the influence of Prussia on the lower course of the Danube, proving, as it does, in their imagination the perfidious intention of Prussia to outflank her rival. Meanwhile, Austria appears to be perfectly satisfied. There can be no doubt that, as far as she is concerned, it is very immaterial to her whether the influence exercised in that direction be Prussian, Bavarian, or Austrian: it is still literally German. Having placed herself at the head of Germany, Prussia must necessarily secure to the German race the limits which it has marked for itself, together with all its advanced posts. This is an indispensable condition of the existence of the Prussian dynasty.

Circumstances might certainly arise (such, for instance, as an Austro-French alliance) in which Prussia would not only consent to the dismemberment of Austria as an empire, but would also assist in such a work, and set up Hungary in her stead. Prussia could never go against the preponderance of Germany in the Austrian provinces, nor oppose its establishment, except in case she were threatened with too great a danger herself.

But if Prussia cannot admit the independence of the Austrian Slaves, she cannot admit that of the Slaves of Turkey either, for the independence of the latter involves that of the former. The liberation of the southern Slaves of the Danube must be followed by that of the northern Slaves; the Hungarian Roumans are already holding up their heads since their bre-

thren of the Principalities have achieved their semi-independence. How is the deep-thinking German not to understand a thing so plain? If Russia continues to reckon upon the sympathy of Prussia, the result will be similar to that of the last conference on Greek affairs. Old Prussia might not have been the confederate of Austria in the Eastern Question, but new Prussia is compelled to enter into partnership with her. The interests of Austria in the Eastern or South-Slavonian Question are German interests securing the historical preponderance of Germany in the valley of the Danube and on its affluents. Prussia morally guarantees those interests, and in consequence of having given that guarantee stands at the head of Germany.

It is, therefore, strange to find the idea so prevalent in Russia that the alliance with Prussia possesses a character of durability. Old friendships and family relations did not prevent Russia from siding against Prussia in 1851, even without any very great necessity, nor did they prevent Prussia from taking part against Russia in 1854. The latter circumstance is particularly remarkable. The Prussia of the past—the second member of the Germanic Confederation—although but recently humiliated by Austria, considered herself bound to stand up for her rival against Russia. How then can the Prusso-Germany of our days abandon Austria to her fate in a struggle with the foreigner?

In the case of a war with France,* Prussia would

* Written before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War.

naturally pay for the alliance of Russia by large concessions even on the Slave Question; but France would offer a similar price for such an alliance, and it would be easier for her than for Prussia to make concessions, which would be sacrifices only as far as her policy, not her national feeling, was concerned. Except as regards a certain community of interests in the Polish Question—a community which is quite extraneous—all the more substantial interests of Russia and Prussia are much more antagonistic than those of Russia and France. It is impossible for Russia to reckon upon an ally whom a feeling of self-preservation impels in the greater number of cases to play the part of a rival, and even that of an enemy.

As far as Russia is concerned, the extension of Prussia into Germany has lessened the danger of the quadruple alliance between England, France, Austria, and Italy, which has so constantly threatened the Eastern Question; or rather, it has lessened the danger of the direct action of such an alliance on the western frontiers of Russia, without, however, removing the danger entirely; the possibility of an attack on Russia by sea remains in all its force. But while reducing one danger, the extension of Prussia has created a new one. In the first place, by converting Austria politically into Hungary, the war of 1866 placed the government of that empire in hands far more energetic, ambitious, and greedy of annexation than those which had previously ruled the country; and at the same time, by setting up a wall between

Austria and Europe, the results of that war left her liberty of action only towards the south and east, *i. e.* all the thoughts and ambition of the empire became directed towards the Turco-Slavonian and Roumanian provinces. Secondly, the results of that war have given to Austria the support of the contiguous, concentrated, and kindred forces of Germany, in lieu of the distant support of the Western Powers. If Austro-Hungary continues honestly to follow the new groove in which she has been placed (of which there is but little doubt) Germany will stand up for her, as for her own property, in any case that may in future arise.

In both respects, therefore, the war of 1866 rendered worse, not better, the military and political positions of Russia.

It has already been shown that the knot of the Eastern Question lies in Austria, not in Turkey. Russia cannot enter Turkey except through Austria. Under such circumstances (and they are no longer doubtful nor susceptible of any change) everything that strengthens Austria is a new impediment to Russia. At the same time it is evident that the termination of the old feud with Prussia and her alliance with that Power will give Austria much more solidity than would an alliance with unsteady and non-contiguous France. Whether it be in respect to the number of forces, the convenience of concentrating armies, or the durability of the connection (based, as it would be, on popular feeling), the advantages of an alliance with Prussia far outweigh those of an alliance

with France. If the position of Russia in the Eastern Question has heretofore been one of difficulty, owing to the fact that Austria has acted as a shield to Turkey, it has become considerably more difficult since Austria is shielded by Prussia. There are now three tiers of shields piled up against Russia.

In the new position of affairs created by the successes of Prussia, the chief opponent of Russia in the Eastern Question—the question of the independence of the Slave races, even if only those beyond the Save—will not be the west, but the centre of Europe, the German race. Political opposition is now supported by an opposition inspired by national feeling.

But while the unification of Germany has been of immense disadvantage to Russia in general, it has in one respect conferred an advantage by opening a wider field for agreements and perhaps for an alliance. Until 1866 the most moderate agreement on Eastern affairs with France, free as she was in her actions, and accustomed to go hand-in-hand with England, was always either doubtful or fruitless. Russia had thus the chance of only one alliance—with Prussia—but only in the event of Western Europe joining Austria in an attack on the western frontier of Russia. In such a case probably, although it cannot be assumed as a certainty, Prussia would not allow herself to be outflanked. Since, however, the consolidation of Germany, France no longer disposes of her former liberty of action, and is obliged to seek a serious alliance wherever it may be possible. Notwithstanding the assertions of journalists, an alliance between France

and Austria, on the basis of a restoration of the rivalry between the two German Powers, could never have been seriously contemplated. It is evident that the Austrian Government does not dispose of a sufficient degree of independent will for such a decision, hampered as the Government is in its action by the Diet of Vienna as well as by that of Pesth. Neither the Magyars nor the Austrian-Germans would exchange their new future, however different it may be to them both, for the previous state of affairs, for the restoration of which they will certainly not shed their blood.

An agreement with Russia has become much more important to France than it was formerly. The establishment of intimate relations with Russia is impeded by the antagonism of the French public, under the influence of the clerical and liberal parties and the permanence of its sympathies for Poland, but not by the operation of any interests that are all-powerful in questions of policy. I do not intend to discuss the comparative advantages of this or that alliance, for they can only be properly estimated by the Imperial Government on the strength of well-defined events; but it appears to be pretty clear that in view of the rivalry which has arisen between France and Prussia as a result of the war of 1866, Russia has acquired a freedom in the choice of an alliance which she did not previously possess.

I think, however, we should not deceive ourselves as to the importance of any alliance whatever in Europe. The positive historical interests of Russia are of such a character that no one will voluntarily

stretch out a hand to assist in their realization. The centre of the opposition against Russia, as already shown, is in Austria; it is impossible to get round her. At the same time, unless that centre of opposition be removed, Russia will not only be unable to establish satisfactorily her external relations at any future period soever, but she will also allow to be amassed dangers of the greatest imminence to her internal affairs.

And where can Russia find a true ally against Austria? Austria, or even her successor Hungary, is undoubtedly dearer to Europe even than Turkey. In Turkish affairs, it is only the present that is of any importance; sooner or later, the Turkish succession must inevitably become vacant, and it is only a question as to who shall be the heirs. Meanwhile the whole of Europe repeats in chorus the old adage that if Austria ceased to exist (it will soon be changed to *Hungary*), it would be necessary to create a new Austria, and that the union of the Danubian races under one sceptre is indispensable to Europe, as a barrier against the East.

The East formerly meant: Turkey and Mahomedanism; it now means: Russia, Pan-Slavism, and Orthodoxy. In ordinary times, when not torn by any intestine dissensions, Europe would cordially unite in defence of such a Danubian union. To Western Europe, that union represents the political balance of power; to Central Europe, national greatness; to the clerical party, a bulwark against the orthodox East (which in the eyes of that party is even more important than the temporal power of the Pope); while,

as far as the masses are concerned, that union represents the protection of civilization from a new invasion of Mongols in the form of the recently-discovered Muscovo-Turanian race. While this deeply-rooted feeling exists, any agreement that runs counter to it will be subject to the operation of a secret intention to withdraw from such an agreement at the first convenient opportunity. Concessions will terminate with the last shot fired; and the ally of yesterday will begin to counteract the consequences of such concessions to the same extent as the foe of yesterday. Whatever alliance Russia may form, and however victorious she may be under it, she will only retain that which she has completely secured during the continuance of the war. But in the great question which, as we shall see presently, Russia has before her, there is nothing that can be finished at one stroke; a war can only sow the seed, and peace must ripen the harvest. It is the gathering in of the harvest that both friend and ally will oppose, visibly and secretly.

A European alliance can only give Russia the possibility of acting during a short interval, without fear of being hindered, and of sowing the seeds of a future harvest; but it would be a mere idle dream to depend upon any alliance for the systematic solution even of the most ordinary and legitimate international requirements of Russia.

I may say, *en passant*, that the only ally Russia can possibly have in the world, and who is not inimical to her historical interests, is America; but an alliance with North America, although of immeasurable im-

portance to Russia as a counterpoise to the naval force of the Western Powers, can give her no assistance on land.

Speaking of alliances, it is always necessary to bear in mind the fact that under no circumstances will it ever depend upon Russia to create an alliance; the other Powers are cautious of her, and her initiative in the matter of an alliance would excite the distrust even of those whose interest it may be to side with her. Russia can only join one of the two camps into which Europe is at times divided; but without having the initiative, it is difficult to give a direction to events. Questions of the utmost gravity to Russia may arise exactly at the time when there is no direct cause for division in Europe. In the present order of things—since Prussia, in virtue of her new position, stands in reserve behind Austria, and while, at the same time, the Western Powers continue to regard the Eastern Question with the same strong feelings of enmity, Russia may be subjected to the unanimous veto of Europe at the most critical moment of her existence.

It is evident that Russia should always be ready in a military point of view, in order not to allow the escape of opportunities which may never return.

Indeed, from whatever side we may approach this great question, it still remains one that cannot be solved by any ordinary means. Russia stands alone, without hope of consideration from others, in view of Turkey in a state of dissolution, and which she cannot approach; in view of the Black Sea, which has been

closed to her; in view of the Slavonic provinces of Austria which are being forcibly Germanized and Magyarized; in view of the Russians of Galicia, whose groans are so audible; in view of the Polish Galicians and the Emigration, steadily awaiting a fitting opportunity for the renewal of their sedition, and, if possible also, for the carrying of a European war into the kingdom of Poland and the western provinces of Russia.

It requires no further explanation to show what would be the position of Russia, what sacrifices, and what a hard fight she would be called upon to make under the most unfavourable circumstances, if the principal questions that now agitate Europe should ripen, and, finally, be settled without Russia being taken into consideration, and in a sense unfavourable to her interests. Those questions cannot be circumvented; they will always crop up. The advantage will probably be to those who begin the game earliest, and get the start. It is a question of means and resources. However great may be the national strength of Russia (or rather, however great *might be* that strength), the total which the adversaries of Russia can bring forward is stronger still. Unless there be a division in the enemy's camp, Russia will not be able to remove the obstacles that oppose her progress, nor can she in such a case reckon upon a sincere accord with any European ally soever.

CHAPTER V.

THE SLAVE ALLIES OF RUSSIA.

THE undoubted, but still very abstract, sympathy of the forty millions of Slave and Orthodox populations by which Russia is surrounded is yet but of little practical importance to her. Not only are those populations for the most part unable to dispose of themselves, but even in their sympathy with Russia there is nothing definite; they are content to know that there is in the world a great and independent nation—akin by language and religion—and that is all. It is only the most down-trodden and helpless of those tribes, the Ruthenians, Galicians, and Bulgarians, that would desire the direct aid of Russia. Nevertheless, the Slaves and the Orthodox are near to our hearts. At the same time, the principal force which restrains the natural tendencies of Russia consists in the proportion of two-thirds, of the very same men, who are not only *not* inimical, but who even in a certain degree sympathize with us,—a phenomenon that is at all events strange, particularly at a time when the question of nationalities is everywhere rife. If the chief part of the forces at the disposal of France

consisted of Alsatians, speaking a German dialect, although one almost unintelligible to a Prussian, the fact would certainly not be lost sight of by Prussia. It matters little who owns the body as long as the spirit is with us. To Russia the future depends upon a correct application of the question, What is necessary, in order that all should be with us in spirit?

In the Eastern Question, it is only its border, namely, the Southern border (which is gradually falling off from it of its own accord), that is not Slavonian. The Eastern Question is, therefore, only the Southern half of the Slavonian Question, which either cannot be solved singly, or can be solved only in a sense directly hostile to Russia. Austrian affairs are to such an extent interwoven with those of Turkey, that it is impossible to touch one part of the Question without touching the whole. We can proceed to a solution of the great Slavonian Question in its entirety, but we cannot even approach the Turkish half of it alone. By acting differently, we should be following a spectre that cannot be reached, and we should find ourselves within a vicious circle, as in 1854. Nothing good can be expected in the future, until a recognition of this truth has been firmly implanted in the Russian mind. *Names have a great significance; as regards the masses, they take the place of matured opinions.*

It is only when the Eastern Question shall have been baptised with its proper appellation, expressive of its substance, when it shall in fact be called the "*Slavonian Question*," that we shall be able to believe

that the Question is properly understood in Russia. Even the expression of "South-Slavonian" will not do, for, practically, a South-Slavonian Question has no separate existence. When we shall have given the Question its right name, the Slavonian world will more readily understand that our solicitude concerns all, not ourselves alone.

Under certain circumstances the attainment of the whole of an object may appear easier than the attainment of only one-half of it. In whichever way we may approach the Eastern Question—whether we approach it, or it approaches us—we shall still have on our hands a coalition of which Austria will be the heart, if not the head; we shall have to recede, as in 1854, or fight Austria. But in such a case, what is best: in entering upon a struggle with Austria on the Slavonian Question, to find numerous allies within her borders (having, of course, taken the upper hand in advance), or in undertaking a war on the metaphysical Eastern Question in a European sense, to find her composed only of Austrians? A Danubian alliance, as they call it in Europe, will become impossible only, when the Slavonian tribes shall know positively beforehand, from the settled and undoubted direction of the whole policy of Russia, that we are on their side—as soon as they shall become convinced that Russia raises the Slavonian standard, not for the hour, in consequence of temporary difficulties, but that she holds it firmly and erect as her historical destiny. The national policy of Russia is yet so new that it has been unable to ripen, even in its own consciousness; her kinsmen

abroad do not yet see or believe it. To the majority of them, Russia remains traditionally the Russia of the Holy Alliance, but with some kind of new and not quite intelligible ways about her. The Slaves know that, in 1849, the Galicians, who used to repeat "We are Russians, we are groaning under a foreign yoke, open to us the doors of our own house," received the following answer: "We came here, not to incite subjects against their lawful Sovereign, but in order to compel them to submit to him."

The Slavonians know that Count Medem, the Russian Envoy at Vienna, in replying to an observation made by his predecessor Tatistcheff respecting the sympathy of the Slaves with Russia, said, "I only know Austrians in Austria;" and that the same Count Medem several times turned Ban Jellachich out of the house of the legation, when he came to him as the representative of Russia, in 1848, for advice.

The Slaves, who are struggling in the hateful grasp of Germany at home, consider German influence all-powerful in Russia, and do not believe in the sincerity of Russian diplomatic agents with German names. The recent marks of our sympathy with them have been of a very feeble character. Of the 70,000 roubles,* which is the estimate of only the most indispensable aid for college exhibitions, &c., with a view to the support of the Slavonian development, not one-third of the amount is collected during the year, while the Slavonian guests who come to St. Petersburg see

* About 9000*l.*

that a private individual will think nothing of spending 70,000 roubles on his whims. The Slaves know, from the Russian Press, the extent to which our present Conservatives are in accord with our former Nihilists in disregarding their fate; they accept the expressions of sympathy which reach them from time to time as the manifestations of a small and practically uninfluential group of men, and they could not judge otherwise from the result. The Slavonian leaders have now, of course, become convinced that the heart of Russia has been stirred in favour of her kindred; but, in addition to the fact that the opinion of a few individuals, although of high-standing, does not penetrate into the masses at once, those leaders know also the extent to which public opinion in Russia is vacillating; acts are not in keeping with words, nor is the morrow in unison with to-day's beginnings. They know that Russia is not America, and that the feelings of Russians do not go beyond them, and there is no work to be seen. It is even astonishing that the Slaves should maintain their present inclinations towards Russia and their faith in her. These feelings on their part prove only one thing—a recognition of the impossibility of escaping by their own efforts from the vice in which they are held and which compels them to grasp at such a straw as their hope in Russia has hitherto been. But we must not mix up two separate things: the want of strength to stand upon legs that are bound together does not prevent the exhibition of enormous power as soon as those legs are unfastened.

Everything now depends upon ourselves, using the word "ourselves" in the sense of the State and the public taken collectively. The Slavonian populations of Austria and Turkey sympathize with us only partly, and that in a literary kind of way rather than in any other, even where they dispose of a certain liberty of action, as in Servia. And it cannot be otherwise. Did the Italian populations sympathize more strongly with Piedmont in 1848? The western Slaves are not sufficiently near to us, historically, in order that they should cherish, disinterestedly, towards Russia the feelings with which the Russian Galicians are animated; they are, nevertheless, sufficiently near by blood in order to be able to distinguish the hand of a brother from that of a stranger, when that brotherly hand is extended towards them,—or as soon as they see in the meanwhile, at all events, a firm resolve on the part of that brother to extend it. They are still looking around the horizon and waiting for some bright spot in the sky. We can well understand it. Some of our western kinsfolk, half free, like the Servians, are proud and would do everything for themselves. In this respect, we might point out to them the experience of the past, we might point to the Cabinets of Vienna and Pesth in the first line and to those of Prussia, England, and France in the second, in order to undeceive them finally, and to take from them every hope of finding an issue by their own efforts. Of the subjects of Austria we need not speak; like men buried alive, they will beat against the lids of their coffins until they are suffocated, or until a friendly

hand comes and removes the lid. After each effort and the disenchantment by which it is succeeded, the Slaves will again look to Russia. But in order to be able to reckon upon the sincere and active sympathy of both the Slavonian groups—on a sympathy directed towards a practical object, it is necessary that Russia should give them a material guarantee of her readiness to pass from words to action, to the extent of her power and ability. To those who are interested in the matter it is clear that the power, the ability, and the time, will not depend upon ourselves; but it is important they should be convinced of the sincerity of our desire to assist them. It is likewise clear to all, that an empire, of which the population will in all probability attain a total of 100 millions by the end of the present century, will not be content with mere useless desires for too great a length of time.

That conviction can be given to the Slaves, not by diplomatic despatches, but by acts, in which there is a share for all: for the authorities, for private means, and for the good-will of classes of society and of corporations. It is necessary to inspire the Slaves with a conviction that Russia does not take her eyes off them, that their leaders are supported, that every Slave is at home in Russia. I only state the heads of what has long been said by others. It is necessary to give the means, not abundant means, but such as shall be sufficient to support the mental Slavonian movement, at all events with a view to forming nursery beds wherever local means may be absent. It is necessary to encourage the Slavonian leaders

of celebrity by marks of high attention. It is necessary that each champion of the Slavonian cause, persecuted for his love of his own nationality, should not remain helpless at home, but that he should, in extremity, find a refuge in Russia and be guaranteed against want. The learned corporations of Russia are best able to afford assistance in this respect, since the Slavonian leaders abroad belong almost entirely to the learned class. It is necessary that, whenever Russia has need of men of learning, they should be drawn principally from Slavonian countries, where there are so many of them; and that special relations should be established for such an object. It is necessary to disseminate the literature of Russia among the western Slaves by making it materially available to them: it is only in that literature that they will find a common national bond both between themselves and with us. It is necessary, at the same time, to make Russia acquainted with the Slavonian world, to establish Slavonian chairs of history, statistics, &c., in our universities and upper schools, on an equality with Russian chairs. It is necessary that it should be recognized in Russia that the Slavonian Catholic clergy, the chief leaders and guardians of national feeling, are full of love for Russia, that they consist, for the most part, of ardent Russian patriots; and that we should replace by as many of them as can be found willing (first of all in the army) the present Roman Catholic clergy,* both upper and lower, who detest the Russian name. It is necessary, in my opinion, to

* The author implies priests, &c., of Polish origin.

open the service of Russia, and particularly the military service, to Slaves of foreign origin, placing them on an equality with the subjects of Russia, and admitting them with the rank they previously held, without granting a similar privilege to other aliens; such admission into the service will be useful to them and to ourselves, both in the present and in the future. These measures should be made a general rule, not a demonstration only in a certain eventuality; it is necessary to create a constant moral contact between Russia and her brethren abroad. Such of the measures above specified as may not be dependent on official authority, require, nevertheless, that an impulse should be given to them from above, for without that, nothing can as yet make any progress in Russia; after that, however, it will be the duty of the Russian public to appropriate and extend those measures. It is not sufficient to inspire those feelings; they must be brought into fashion, and then converted into a question of honour. If, after that, those duties should not meet with general recognition, of course it will mean that no faith can be placed in Russia.

In speaking of the Slaves—I mean the whole group of nations connected with Russia by historical destiny, by blood, and by religion—we cannot pass over the Greeks and Roumans in this great question; the latter have more particularly grown into the compact Slave body, and must of necessity share its fate. Both have the same enemies, and both are equally unable to attain their legitimate object by their own means. The Greeks understand very well, that the only people

that sincerely desires their liberation, and is ready to shed its blood for them, is the Russian people, and none other. A divergence in our views respecting the Eastern Empire,—that senseless chimera of which Russia cannot of course permit the realization, and which is only the fruit of the archæological fancies of the Greek learned party,—will not alienate the national masses from us, for they only desire actualities, *viz.* liberty, and national development. No one doubts that Russia, having once come forward, will carry the Greeks with her. A doubt exists with respect to the Roumans: their leaders are bewildered by a stubborn intrigue from without. But no intrigue can long stand against what is evident; and in this case the truth is fully laid bare. The only nation which has any reasonable cause to desire the independence of the Roumans,—the only nation which has created and supported that independence,—is the Russian nation. Not only is the Rouman race unable, by its own efforts, to gather together its scattered branches, which, like the Slaves, are trampled under foot by the foreigner; but it cannot even maintain its position of a free nation, except with the aid of Russia. The negotiations of 1863 between Austria and France, which magnanimously disposed of the fate of Roumania, and much else which has been said and written in Europe about the Roumans, must at last have opened their eyes. The fate of all the populations on the Danube is oscillating on the point of a needle: they will either become free in an alliance with Russia, or they will become, at first, provinces, then lower races, "Slovaks," of Hungarian

Austria. The considerations which do not permit Hungary or Austria, and Germany beyond them, to agree to the free existence of the Turkish Slaves, extend in the measure to the Roumans. The two millions of Roumans subject to Hungary, without speaking of the strong tendency of the German race and its Hungarian advance guard towards an occupation of the entire course of the Danube, would appear to constitute a sufficient threat to the defenceless Danubian Principalities. In case of a new struggle on the Eastern Question, or rather on the new Slavonian Question, which has taken the place of the former, the existence of the Roumans, not only as a people, but as men, as citizens, will depend exclusively on the victory of Russia. The Hohenzollern Prince does not guarantee the future of the Roumans, but is an omen of bad augury to them. When people have to choose between such extremes, reliance may be placed on their own feelings of self-preservation, but we should not forget, as far as possible, to open the eyes of all and each unweariedly. The Greeks must be with us or they will long continue to see one half of their people enslaved; the Roumans must be with us or perish. Neither the Greeks nor the Roumans would desire the latter result.

Russia is necessary to the Greeks and Roumans; they are not so necessary as dear to us; and even the Roumans must be dear to us, as orthodox co-religionists, notwithstanding their haughtiness. I do not wish to discuss a religious subject, but I must make reference to one peculiarity. Orthodoxy is not

scattered over the face of the earth, like Catholicism; it illuminates a compact mass of people, who live side by side, and who have been closely connected with each other from their first appearance in history, and who have before them almost the same religious, moral, and probably also civil, future. In this respect, orthodoxy is stamped with a peculiar, and we may say social, character. Unchanged in its foundations, it recollects the unity of faith, enlightenment, and civil organization which brightened the first day of its triumph,—a tradition which has long been lost in Catholicism. We may convince ourselves by personal experience that to each priest, even to each layman, brought up in the literature of the Church, not only in Roumania, but even in Syria and Egypt, the Russian Tsar is the only orthodox and lawful Tsar, the direct successor of Constantine the Great; the rest are mere rulers. In Russia now lies the centre of orthodox society, not, of course, of the orthodox faith, but of men confessing that faith: the knot of a close secular union between the orthodox people of the world is to be found in Russia. We, Russians, should not forget that.

Our historical strength lies in the immense sympathetic population that borders the south-west confines of Russia. Our weakness consists in this, that it is only yesterday that we recognized our relationship with tens of millions of a bordering population, and that we have not only omitted to obtain a moral influence over them, but that we have scarcely begun to understand the importance of the crisis in Russian

history which is before us, and which will probably be the last. It is not, however, very difficult to correct the involuntary error of the first three quarters of the present century. In this age of rapid progress, not only are events consummated with extraordinary rapidity, but even the views and feelings of men are subject to equally rapid changes, as soon as reasonable foundations shall have been laid for them; and neither the changes in events nor those in ideas can be measured by the old scale. Even in international policy it is principally a question of firm public conviction, provided the necessary forces are to some extent commensurate; and in our case those forces are evidently commensurate. It is only necessary that a reasonable incitement to an unanimous effort should become evident in a similar degree.

The forces of the population beyond our borders are immense, but they are as yet disjointed. There is no doubt whatever that the Slaves and the orthodox races of different blood by which they are neighboured, and whose fate is bound up with theirs, would at once turn against the present order of things in Turkey and Austria, if they could agree among themselves, and if they undertook the work unanimously, without fear of the rest of Europe. But such an unanimity, growing of itself, is as impossible and as little to be thought of as is the regular motion of the planets without the sun as a centre. Moreover, in this silent struggle, no one member of the great family disposes of a sufficiently evident preponderance of power and development in order to become the recognized leader

of the rest; but each tribe wrestles separately with the circumstances by which it is being crushed: no one tribe can extend a hand to the other, because, firstly, it cannot acquire by its own efforts sufficient liberty of action for the purpose; and, secondly, the direct objects,—the objects of the day,—are in each case different. The populations that are sympathetic towards us are within a vicious circle, without the possibility of attaining unanimity, because they have not sufficient independence; on the other hand, they cannot attain that independence without previous unanimity. Even the independent nations of the Balkan peninsula,—the Servians, Roumanians, Greeks, and Herzegovenians,—are too much divided and crushed by Europe to think seriously of an alliance without unification from outside; the immense Slavonian and orthodox mass is powerless; but collected round a common support, it becomes invincible. Beginning with the northern group, the greater half of the Austrian army is composed of Slaves. On a general call to arms, the Czechs, on both sides of the mountains, can supply 120,000 first-rate soldiers; the Russian Galicians, 60,000; the Slovaks (mixed, however, with other populations in the Hungarian ranks), 30,000; the Slovenians of Illyria and Styria likewise 30,000 men; over and above this, the entire Servian population on the southern frontier of Austria forms a great military camp of the celebrated "red mantles;" the Dalmatians, who are the best seamen in the Mediterranean, man the entire fleet; the Hungarian Roumans, who are in the same position as the Slaves, supply

80,000 men. Of Germans and Magyars, who constitute the entire political support of Austria, not more than 280,000 will be found in her ranks, including even the Poles. Of course the Slavonian and other regiments, composed of alien races, constitute as yet the power of Austria, and a power that can be relied on as long as the black and yellow standard floats over them; but those regiments would be still more faithful to their national standard, should it be raised.

Further within the confines of Turkey, from Dalmatia to Roumania, dwells the other half of the Servian race—a nation of warriors by nature—which has not hesitated to rise against all the forces of the Turkish Empire, and to defend its independence without foreign aid:—on the shores of the Adriatic are the Herzegovenians, a branch of the Servian race, who for centuries fought against the dominion of the Solimans; on the south are the Greeks, the only people in the world who are ready to die for the national cause, without hope of success; between the Servians and Greeks are 5,000,000 of Bulgars, not warriors as yet, but capable of becoming warriors, and like all Slaves, capable, as we see, of shaking off their yoke any day. Lastly, in the rear of the others, are 4,000,000 orthodox Roumans; their enslaved brethren cry to them, Europe traffics in them in her political arrangements: it will be time for them also to think of the morrow. Our natural allies at present supply almost half a million of soldiers, in order to fasten more securely the hateful yoke which is over them; they will supply, if taken altogether, 700,000

men and a similar force of local militia for the defence of their independence, whenever their hands are untied. Even before that time many of them will range themselves on our side without hesitation, and all will be strongly stirred as soon as the possibility of liberation, not in words, but in deeds, shall flash across them. But of course it is not manifestoes issued on the eve of war that will secure the confidence of our kindred by blood and by religion, for we may remember the effects of the manifestoes of 1854; but it is by a brotherly and active sympathy proved by every-day experience, and by a community of mental and moral life previous to the breaking out of war.

A cause so great cannot be suddenly achieved; even the liberation of Italy, comparatively insignificant in its dimensions, is not yet completed.* It will require several periods of repose before the modern "Austro-Danubian" and "Tartaro-Balkan" Confederations (using the language of Europe) shall be converted from hostile to friendly Confederations as far as Russia is concerned. As yet we are not in direct contact with the Slavonian world, not only morally speaking, but even geographically; we are separated from it on the west by Galicia, Russian and Polish, and on the south by the strip of land ceded to Roumania in 1856.

Russian Galicia presents an insuperable obstacle to our *rapprochement* to the Slaves; it destroys the confidence of the rest towards us at its very conception. Ask any foreign Slave you like about this, and he will say, "What hope can cousins have in Russia,

* Written before the fall of Rome.

when her own brothers, groaning on the Russian borders, can receive no help?" It is indeed Russian Galicia that, more than anything else, inspires Slaves with an idea that our country is at heart foreign to them, that Russian sympathy with the Slaves is nothing more than the expression of the opinion of a small literary circle. You will in vain endeavour to prove to the Slaves that in politics it is a question not of desire but of possibility and favourable circumstance. They insist that the unfortunate Russians of Galicia might have been freed without any extraordinary efforts in 1849, afterwards in 1859, and later still, in 1866. With the western Slaves we may be able to speak of their affairs with some result, only when the plan of Red Russia now six hundred years old shall be realized. We shall at the same moment find ourselves in direct contact with the Slavonian world.

The view of Ismaïl, torn from Russia, inspires the Turkish Slaves with the same feelings. They have heard the Ismaïlians say, "The first year we laughed at the Moldavian officers, and waited only for the coming spring; the spring came, and we deferred our hopes to the third year, then to the fourth; now we no longer count the years, and the Moldavian officers laugh at us." People are apt to reckon on the aid only of those who, in their eyes, know how to help themselves.

Nevertheless, who can doubt the inexhaustible vitality and the great destiny of the Russian people, in view of this example of Red Russia? Germans become excellent Frenchmen within two centuries, as

in Alsace; Frenchmen excellent Englishmen, as in New Orleans; Poles zealous Prussians, as in Silesia. But here are two small bits of territory torn from Russia, one yesterday, the other six centuries ago,—and it is impossible to say in which of these remnants Russian feeling is strongest, and which of them awaits with the greatest impatience its adhesion to the kindred stem. The first step which modern Russia has to take if she follows the path of her historical destiny, is to liberate Cis-Carpathian Russia and Ismaïl. In the meanwhile it is possible and necessary to assist the Slaves as men, and to come into closer connection with them; but it is of no use to speak of Pan-Slavism and still less of an Eastern Question which does not exist separately, which is inaccessible to us, and which is therefore as yet a matter of fantasy.

With the exception of Red Russia, Polish Galicia still remains a watch-post of the enemy on this side of the Carpathians; that is, we may say the enemy stands within the "natural" confines of Russia, awaiting favourable opportunities. In this angle is concentrated the chief focus of the *aggressive* forces against Russia, just as at the opposite angle, at the south-eastern bend of the Carpathian Mountains, lies the knot of the *defensive* forces of the enemy, barring the road to the Balkan peninsula. Western Galicia in the hands of Austria constitutes an hourly danger in the Polish Question, and a danger of a European war for Poland.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE POLISH AND EASTERN QUESTIONS.

WHILE the Pan-Slavonian cause remains undecided, the Polish Question is inseparable from the Eastern Question. It is a sharp weapon in the hands of a foe, which may be used against Russia as soon as she makes the slightest move in the direction, for instance, of the Eastern Question. The future of Poland is, moreover, of importance *per se* to two of the great Powers—France and Austria;—to France, apart from national feeling, because an independent Poland would divide Russia from Germany, and would constitute a French auxiliary force in the rear of Prussia; to Austria, because sedition in Poland is the only arm that Power possesses against Russia, which, on the other hand, has an arsenal full of a variety of arms which can be used against her. But the difference between France and Austria is this, that as far as the former is concerned, the Polish Question is one purely of policy, which can only be indirectly handled, owing to the distance that separates Poland from France, and a question, therefore, which France would will-

ingly get rid of for a good price; whereas to Austria the Polish Question is one of vital interest.

It is clear that the day on which a heartfelt peace shall be concluded between the Poles and Russians will be the last day of the "Danubian Union." The following dilemma is present to the mind of every Austrian statesman and every Hungarian patriot: it is either Austria that will seize upon the Polish Question, and defend herself with it against her formidable neighbour, or it is Russia that will obtain possession of it, and succeed in making Poland, not a wall, but a bridge, between the two Slavonian groups—the Eastern and the Western.

Austria can scarcely be apprehensive of any serious opposition on the part of Prussia in respect to the Polish Question. That Power has rendered so secure her dominion in the Polish provinces which she holds that even an independent Poland would subject her tenure to no risk; in a certain time those provinces will be as Prussian as Silesia or Pomerania. At the same time, it is the moral duty of Prussia to protect all the interests of the German Fatherland and its annexations. As soon as it becomes evident that the re-establishment of Poland is necessary for the protection of Austria, *i.e.* for the preponderance of Germany on the Danube, Prussia will be forced to co-operate in the liberation of Poland. Nor will she shrink from such a duty, for an independent Poland would be of great advantage to her. The restoration of Poland by German hands would be tantamount to giving that country up to be devoured by Prussians—it would

give a new impetus to that "*Drang nach Osten*," which is at present arrested by the Russian boundary.

It is clear that in the Polish, as well as in the Eastern Question, the centre of opposition to Russia lies exclusively in Austria. The other evil-wishers of Russia are in both questions merely her allies, more or less staunch, but without exception sincere, as long as they are not carried away by some great conflicting interest.

In the event of danger, Austria holds, in Western Galicia, so to say, Polish sedition in the form of an extract. She has only to pour some hot water upon it, and the remedy is ready at hand. In case of a war with Russia, Austria will take care to make a Polish insurrection as wide-spread as possible, or at all events as wide as in 1863, in order to deflect as great a number of Russian troops as possible from the field on which the fate of the war will be decided. The success of such a plan would be very probable in the present state of the military organization of Russia, without reserves. Without wishing to go into purely military questions, it is impossible not to notice the following facts here. We may well ask, What would be the force left at the disposal of Russia out of the forty-seven divisions of infantry (*i. e.* of the 500,000 regular troops of all arms which at present constitute *the whole of the fighting force* of Russia) against 300,000 Austrians, when out of those forty-seven divisions troops shall have been marched off to defend the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas, to strengthen

the army of the Caucasus, to form an army on the Pruth, and to occupy the kingdom of Poland and the western (old Polish) provinces, as during the time of the last insurrection?*

The borders of Poland are now much more dangerous in the hands of an external foe than they were in 1812, when the Poles passively awaited the defeat of the *Grande Armée*. The intelligent classes have now found out a means of operating against Russia. Each company of Galician Poles that makes a dash over the border into Russia will be immediately converted into a regiment well armed on Austrian account. Bands armed with rifles and strong in numbers would not, of course, be equal to good troops, but they would not in the least resemble the bands of 1863, and Russia will be compelled to scatter throughout the Polish provinces a still greater number of active forces than during the last insurrection.

No one can imagine that the Polish Question is in reality settled. All its component parts are quite as alive now as formerly. As yet the state of affairs has been improved only in one respect,—the people have been removed from the direct influence of the upper classes of society inclined to revolution. That measure is certainly a considerable obstacle to any *indigenous* rising, but it offers no impediment to a rebellion sus-

* In the event of a war with Russia, Austria has no occasion to divide her forces for the defence of any other boundary, for she will be backed by a sympathetic Europe. Can it be expected that Prussia will assist in wresting from Austria the inheritance of Germany on the Danube? Would Italy throw herself into the struggle, in order that she may be repaid, as Greece was repaid in 1854, by the landing of Francis II. at Naples with a suitable force?

tained from without. A province that remains loyal when occupied by an enemy is a burden to him, because the necessity of keeping it in submission divides his forces. But the western provinces of Russia, in their present condition—and not only the kingdom of Poland, but even the province of Volhynia as well, where the Catholics number only ten per cent. of the population—will certainly become thoroughly Polish and hostile to Russia on the first appearance of a foreign foe. The "intelligent classes," little scrupulous in the means they employ, would immediately seize the power they formerly possessed, and compel the local population, against their will, to toil for the foe of Russia with a zeal equal to that which a trueborn Pole would employ. The numerical preponderance of the Russian race would not impair the quality or weaken the numbers of the armed forces which the province of Volhynia would add to the ranks of the enemy; ten per cent. of the population, hostile to Russia, will easily supply a full contingent for the entire province, provided the maintenance of the families of those who go to the war be laid on the remaining masses. It is not necessary to speak of the provinces in which the majority of the population is under the influence of the Catholic priesthood, and it appears equally futile to repeat the well-known truth that until the majority of the educated classes and of the landed proprietors in the western provinces become Russian (an end towards which but little advance has been made), that part of the Empire will be subjected to all the eventualities of war in the same degree as the kingdom of

Poland. This position of affairs is well known at Vienna, Pesth, and Cracow.

Of course Austria will not enter upon a war except under particularly favourable circumstances. She holds the Polish Question as a kind of lightning conductor, in case of the Eastern Question being raised. The latter, on the other hand, is a direct incentive to a European coalition against Russia. By pressing it, in the sense in which it is generally understood, Russia would create the circumstances which would be favourable to it.

CHAPTER VII.

POLAND MUST BE ADMITTED INTO THE SLAVE FAMILY

THE Polish Question can only remain a weapon in the hands of Austria until the western region of the Empire, or at all events its six purely Russian provinces, become thoroughly Russian; and this object can easily be attained.* The question will then present itself in a different light, both to Russia and her neighbours. The absurdity of the dream of the restoration of old Poland, which was not a nation, but a casual historical Federation established by force, and quite identical with the proposed "Austro-Danubian" and "Tartaro-Balkan" Federations of the present day, will be patent to all, even to the Poles

* The manner in which the Russification of those provinces can be effected has now become very clear:—it will require a few tens of millions of roubles, pertinacity without violence, sincerity in execution, and three or four years of time. For every ten million roubles not invested in time in the Russification of the country beyond the Dnieper, it will be necessary to spend one hundred millions extra during the first war in which we may be engaged, and in which we shall continue to remain in a highly dangerous position, notwithstanding such an expenditure. Sacrifices for the western provinces constitute a war, not a peace expenditure, and they should therefore not be laid to the account of the current budget, nor made commensurate with its expansibility.

themselves, equally with the dream of the restoration of the empire of Charles V. Until the year 1863, the Poles could not have been blamed for such a dream; they had not the means of convincing themselves of its futility. How were they not to dream of the Poland of 1772, when they saw that a Russian could not obtain an appointment at Jitomir, simply because he was a Russian! The Poles who have emigrated still retain their ideas; but the Poles of Russia, who have not entirely lost their heads, begin to understand the actual state of affairs. One more bold and sensible step, and Russia will be able to take the Polish Question out of the hands of Austria and place it in her own, converting it into a private Slavonian Question.

As I do not think I can be suspected of a want of patriotism, I consider that I am right in expressing my opinion on the question of the boundaries of Poland, so far as it concerns the general position of affairs.

Contemporary history has rendered sufficiently clear the substance of the quarrel between Russia and Poland, that has lasted for four centuries. Poland has acted in that quarrel not as the chief party interested, but in the name of Lithuania, *i.e.* in that of the western half of Russia, to the rights and pretensions of which she accidentally succeeded. The principal pretension was, nevertheless, the unity of Russia under the sceptre of a Western or Eastern Dynasty. The dispute was settled at the close of the eighteenth century, and everything that had anciently belonged to

Russia was then restored to her. The fusion of the two halves would now have been complete if the first two successors of Catherine had undeviatingly followed in her footsteps; the causes that render the fusion difficult have been created, solely by the policy of the Russian Government between 1796 and 1830. In any case, the difficulty is purely artificial, and reminds us, not of the long-continued quarrel between England and Ireland, but of the opposition of the higher classes of Naples, Hanover, or Frankfort, although in a more trenchant form. While the opposition lasts, it constitutes an actual danger in case of war; but measures of Government, similar to those which once gave that opposition power, may now as easily take that power away.

In this respect we have not to deal with an historical question, for history has already pronounced her last word; but with an administrative, financial, and police question, which is not so important as to tie the hands of a natural policy on our part. But beyond the Russian border lies a border which is purely Polish, which we acquired accidentally, and which is a source of constant disturbance in our western provinces; and here the matter assumes another aspect, for we stand on foreign soil, and see not an artificial, but a real disregard of Russian authority. The wisest and the most equitable measures introduced on that borderland, such as the allotment of land to the peasantry, can only be politically useful for a time, or during the life of the generation which benefited by them. Within a few years there will be a million of citizens

n the kingdom of Poland,* instead of two hundred thousand; such, probably, will be the final result of the allotment of land to the peasantry.

Being now convinced of the impossibility of making any concessions whatever, the Russian Government is of necessity compelled to extend the measures already adopted in the western provinces, to the kingdom of Poland; but nature will not be violated, and identical measures do not lead to identical results in the western provinces and in the kingdom of Poland. The former can and should be thoroughly Russified, and within the shortest possible period; but for the Russification of the kingdom of Poland, in the present social condition of Russia, there is scarcely any hope; we can only put a Russian sign-board over it. Without speaking of the great intensity of the Polish national feeling, side by side with the kingdom of Poland lies Galicia, an inexhaustible source of Polish feeling and Polish visions, and from whence they cannot be prevented from inundating the provinces that belong to Russia. Even the conquest of Cracovian Galicia would not improve the situation in the present state of things; it would only double the numbers of those by whom we are opposed. Nevertheless, the measures which are adopted with a view to Russifying the kingdom of Poland, although of little promise, are of this temporary benefit, that they constitute the most complete negation of the autonomy of the kingdom. It is impossible as yet, either to make concessions to the Poles,

* The author, as is customary now with Russian writers, calls the kingdom of Poland "the provinces on the Vistula."—TRANS.

or to cherish a well-founded hope of overcoming them. This unsatisfactory state of things is probably only a passing crisis in Russian history, but one which will last until Russia, after having in some places outgrown the tribal limits of her own Russian people, shall become in reality the head of the Slave world.

A firm elevation of the Slavonian banner would place the Polish Question on another footing, and give it a legitimate issue. After the Russification of the western provinces, and the proclamation of the Slavonian idea, the kingdom of Poland will not constitute a Russian internal question. The Polish nation will have to choose between the position of a younger brother of the Russian people and that of a German province. Even now the Poles are only the leavings of the German feast, at which their kindred, and portions of their own body, from the Save to the Vistula, were devoured. Can a narrow strip of land, hemmed in between Russia and Germany, maintain itself in the position of a State, disposing of a sovereign liberty of action,—a liberty that now only belongs to great Powers? Whatever the extent to which we may consider the Poles to be dreamers, it is impossible and contrary to logic, that many of them, and especially the most clever of them, should not see the inevitable necessity of a choice between tribal independence and ruin. It is unnecessary to speak of the Polish emigrants;—they have become a nation of wandering adventurers, for whom sedition on the Vistula, or anywhere else, is only a pretext; but the Poles with fixed habitations, even the most fanatical of them, will

understand their position as soon as they see three-fifths of the estates in the provinces of Minsk and Volhynia in Russian hands, and particularly when they find themselves not on the borders, but in the centre of a country which sympathetically accepts the priority of Russia in a general Confederation. As a man who naturally attaches much value to his nationality, the Pole is in a position from which he cannot escape. He may be prevented from breaking out into revolt, but the hourly idea of revolt cannot be removed from him. His illusions respecting Napoleon having been dispelled, he now rests his hopes on the Diet of Lemberg, on Baron Beust, or on Hungary; while a man lives, he must hope in something. He will cease to rave about the destruction of Russia, as soon as the possibility of establishing a realizable Poland, without becoming a Russian traitor, shall have flashed upon him.

The existence of a Russian Party among the Poles has hitherto been an impossibility, for such a party could have had no definite object in view. The Poles have considered it more convenient and desirable to restore ancient Poland at the expense of Russia, than to establish a Polish nationality within its narrow limits with our aid. But when, on the one hand, the Poles shall have lost all hope of being able to convince the Russian inhabitants of the provinces of Grodno and Minsk, when once on their legs, that they have something in common with them; and when, on the other hand, a hope shall have arisen of preserving true Poland, ten men, earnestly united,

will be able to lay the foundation of a dominant party. Many absurd dreamers will of course be left, but strength lies everywhere in advanced ideas, not in the multitude that lags behind.

The creation of such a party implies the taking of the Polish Question out of the hands of Austria and placing it in those of Russia; it implies also the laying of our principal danger upon the back of our foe.

What then should be done with that object? I think, nothing very extraordinary: we have only to continue the Russification of the western provinces with a determination unmixed with violence, and without sparing any sacrifices; we must consider the Poles as a Slavonian people, who have, in the eyes of Russia, the same right to existence and to Russian aid in the future, for the reuniting of its sundered but still living members, just like any other Slavonian people; and having placed such an object before them, we should discriminate between those who are sincere and insincere in their desire to attain it, for without such a discrimination it is impossible to govern even one's own people. This task cannot be accomplished by Russia so long as she does not recognize her historical destiny and the real import of the obstacles before her; but it will probably not be very difficult when all these facts shall have obtained recognition in Russia. The Poles do not respond to the Czech call to Austrian Pan-Slavism, in order that they should not lose the support of a Government in which their entire hopes are as yet centred. The voice of Russia

is another matter. The laws of logic and probabilities will have been turned upside down if a call from the Russian Government, inviting the Poles to occupy their legitimate position in the Slave family be not soon responded to by a strong party.

It is impossible to raise the Slavonian banner without recognizing the legitimate position of the Poles in the Slavonian family. Four millions of Russian Poles, and two millions of Austrian Poles, daily incited to hatred of Russia, would form a wall between us and Western Slavonia. On the other hand, the perpetuation of the present state of things in Poland, elevated into a principle, will frighten the Slave world and destroy all confidence in Russia at its very root. The Slaves, who to this day fear the phantom of an insatiable Russian ambition would consider our brotherly call as a stratagem. An insurrection of the Poles, although possible against Russia, would become impossible against a Federation that shall voluntarily recognize the priority of Russia—a Federation that shall have surrounded their country on all sides. To me these things are as clear as that twice two make four. I do not know whether they are equally clear to others.

The recognition of the right of the Polish race to form part of the Slavonian family, would not lead to anything similar to the political system of the Marquess Wielopolski, provided effective measures be adopted for the Russification of the western provinces. It would, indeed, be diametrically opposed to that system, the ultimate object of which was the

concentration of the Polish power, for the purpose of employing it in the East, in the resuscitation of the ancient, violently created Polish dominion. The recognition of the Slavonian right of the Poles to direct their power towards the West, to the restoration of a real and legitimate Poland, converts them into an advanced guard of the Slavonian movement, and transfers the Polish Question from the hands of Austria into those of Russia.

If Russia should, sooner or later, restore the Slave world, she will have succeeded in that work in virtue of having been called to it by Providence, and in consequence of having been entrusted with the fulfilment of destinies marked out for humanity. But it is impossible to serve Providence and to deny justice at the same time, particularly to a member of our own family.

Except in respect to the irritation to which the events of many centuries have given rise between Poles and Russians, the Polish Question, being one of race, in no way differs from other local Slavonian Questions.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE POLICY AND FUTURE OF THE SLAVE RACES.

ALL the Slave races are in the same position, approximately, as the Poles. They all have to choose between two issues: either to close in around Russia in order to preserve their national individuality, or to sacrifice their individuality entirely. The vast debatable zone between the confines of the purely Russian and the purely German races, already, to a great extent, politically seized by the Germanic race, will be Germanized to the last man; there can be no doubt of that, if each of the mosaic squares of which that zone is composed be left to its own resources. As soon as the unification of Germany shall have been completed, there will be no hope left for the Slaves on either bank of the Save. Prussia does not act in the same manner as Austria. When Frederick the Great learnt that the rural population of Pomerania still spoke Slavonian, he ordered *an end to be put to such a disgrace*, and the *disgrace* no longer existed towards the end of his reign. Many Western writers invite the Slaves to "submit to their fate willingly, and to disappear from off the face of the globe without leaving any trace of themselves, history having provided no

corner for them, and it being impossible to oppose the laws of nature and history." There can be no doubt that this will happen if the Slaves be left to defend themselves independently of each other. The Czechs, surrounded on all sides by Germans, will be the first to disappear; the turn of the other Slaves will soon come. Had not Russia suddenly put in an appearance on the confines of Europe, there would now have been no mention of the Slaves, and there would have been no motive for the revival of the spirit of Slavism. What Russia has thus commenced unconsciously, she *alone* can finish consciously. Not only is it impossible for the Slaves to avoid their fate—that of losing their national individuality—except by grasping the hand of Russia, but even if they were to set themselves up by some miracle, they would never be able to retain their independence, except by resting upon Russia. What international independence, based on their own individual strength, can the scattered Slavonian groups ever achieve, hemmed in as they are by the Germans and Magyars, and overcome by the masses and superior culture of the former, and the strong political organization of the latter? In these days, when Europe is divided into a few enormous masses, when only that State which can put forward half a million of soldiers has a right to separate existence, when even such old countries as Holland and Switzerland are beginning to fear for their future, who cares for such international rubble as the Czechs, Croats, and others, and since, moreover, that rubble is not recognized, is despised by powerful neighbours whom it

humiliates, and across whose history, hopes, and interests it suddenly places itself? The Slaves are numerous from Saxony to the Archipelago; their mass acting together is powerful, and might withstand the pressure of Germany. But how can the general connection of those masses be constituted? By union? The country of the Slaves is intersected in several directions by strips of alien and hostile races under whose dominion they still remain; the several Slave groups cannot give each other a hand without extraneous aid. In what language, morever, is such a tribal union to speak? It is stated that at the Diet of Prague in 1848, the representatives of the several Slavonian groups spoke to each other in German. In this respect, as in everything else, they require unification, and they will never attain it by themselves. The Bulgarians will certainly not elect to use the language of the Czechs, nor the Czechs the Servian, as a common political vehicle of thought. Certain of the Slavonian tribes, moreover, such as the Bulgarians, Slovenians, and Slovaks, reduced to the position of lower classes of the population in their own country, must first of all become a nation, a process that requires time, and during that time they cannot live without tutelage. The Slaves are many, they are clever, brave, and they are thirsting with a growing desire for national life; but they can neither attain it nor retain it by themselves. The Slavonian world may be likened to the cosmical nebula which can only be converted into a world by a unifying centre of gravity.

The Slavonian race should endeavour to attain two objects, each separately,—an independent political and social life in their own country, and all, together, a closer tribal union with Russia, under her military and international predominance. Each tribe requires a Sovereign of its own for its domestic affairs, and a great Slave Tsar for the affairs of all collectively. Except under the latter condition, the independence of the Slaves of the Balkans and of the Danube becomes an impossibility. Were they to be freed to-day without uniting around Russia, they would return to the same or even to a worse condition to-morrow. The day on which Russia shall raise her real standard, there will be no truth more evident than this to every Slavonian and every orthodox Christian.

The covert enmity of Europe towards Russia and her constant fear of us are based on a recognition of the impossibility of avoiding such a solution of affairs, as soon as the necessary impulse shall have been given. Austria does not admit the independence of the Slaves of the Balkans from a feeling of self-preservation; but the Western Powers would not oppose that independence if they could rely upon the complete political independence of the provinces, should they even have been liberated with the aid of Russia. England was not in the least afraid of the liberation of Italy by the arms of France, of whose successes she is generally so suspicious. Europe jealously guards Turkey, from a conviction that her remains can never become independent in an inter-

national sense, and that by a natural gravitation they will, while escaping from the Germans, throw themselves into the arms, politically, of Russia. The Austro-Slavonian population is exactly in the same position.

But if the Slaves of the Balkans and of the Danube cannot do anything without Russia; Russia cannot, for the same reasons, do very much without them. Russia has Europe against her. She lived in peace with Europe as long as there was no mention of the tribal, legitimate task of Russia. The suspicion of Europe was aroused as soon as the nature of that task flashed across the minds of politicians, and her enmity was excited as soon as the historical individuality of Russia became sufficiently pronounced. This turn of affairs was inevitable. No race but the German was opposed to the unification of Italy. Many will oppose the unification of Germany if, as we may expect, she follows the programme of all the well-known insatiable pretensions of her people; but the whole of Europe stands up against the historical development of Russia, threatening, as it does, a still greater breaking-up of present systems; and it is only from the other side of the Atlantic that she is regarded with a friendly spirit. The first two revolutions—the Italian and the German—have slipped into history by accident; no one expected them in the form in which they were ultimately accomplished, and that is why they met with no decided opposition from the very first. The German revolution, however, is not yet quite finished. Russia cannot attain any of her objects, either in the

Eastern Question or in anything else, suddenly taking advantage of opportunities; for a watch has long been kept for any step that Russia may take. She can certainly accomplish much at a time when Europe is a prey to that discord which recurs periodically; but the more she accomplishes, the sooner will her rivals make up their quarrels in order to combine cordially against her. Russia has no reliable allies in Europe, beyond the members of her own family—the Slaves and the Orthodox. As soon as that family is thoroughly imbued with confidence in Russia, it will be necessary at the first favourable opportunity to assist it in rising, *i.e.* it will be necessary to reach that family by a victory at the outset. For the continuation of a prolonged struggle, or one that will have to be frequently renewed (a kind of struggle that is unavoidable), Russia will, by-and-by, have allies of her own.

The principal international difficulties of Russia in the Eastern Question, in Polish affairs, and in respect to her dominion in the Black Sea, are all wound up in a ball—it is impossible to touch one without the other. The Eastern Question cannot be divided in the Balkans, the Polish Question cannot be unravelled at Warsaw, and the Black Sea Question does not terminate in the Bosphorus. All three difficulties are tied up in a common knot, which lies on the Middle Danube. As in the fairy tale the horrors of the enchanted castle are dissipated only by a blow given to the magic shield hidden in its secret recess, so also the political difficulties of Russia, apparently

without any issue, can only be solved by a blow the direction of which was indicated long ago by Prince Paskevitch. None of the questions by which Russia is assailed can be seized singly, because none contains within itself the substance of the entire question, but only presents one of its sides: the substance is, the Pan-Slavist Question. The task is not easy of accomplishment, but that is just the reason why Russia requires allies, and exactly those allies which she can obtain in such a cause.

We have seen the impossibility of opening the Slavonian Question in the southern group of Slaves. Russia cannot reach that group, and besides she has nothing to do there. As soon as the affairs of the northern Slave family are satisfactorily arranged, Turkey will lose the roof under which she is now living out her numbered days. Nor could any efforts on the part of the Maritime Powers prolong her existence for a single year under such circumstances. Russia will, in all probability, come into collision with an European alliance on the Middle Danube, but she will scarcely meet one in Turkey.

It is clear Russia cannot permit the fate of the debatable zone of her outer borders to be decided in a sense unfavourable to her interests. Meanwhile it is beyond doubt that the fate of that region will be settled in a fully hostile sense to Russia, in the measure in which any foreign intervention, from whatever quarter, shall have been admitted. In other words, Russia will breathe freely only after she has settled the affairs of her outer borders by her own

power, with the aid of the sympathetic forces which are now crushed, and without asking leave of Europe. But for this purpose it is first of all necessary to think a little about those sympathetic forces and to inspire them with the assurance that they have a common interest with Russia.

Speaking more positively, the solution of pending questions in a sense hostile to the interests of Russia, means a solution which shall transport the question from the outer to the inner borders of Russia, which will inevitably take place if the international questions in which Russia is concerned are not settled by herself. Since the Crimean war, while Russia has maintained an attitude only of observation, all the most important political events in Europe have decidedly been to the prejudice of Russia.* It will be the same in the future. Considering the general absence of sympathy with Russia, it would be wrong to rely on mere fate and opportunity, and to shut Russia up within herself. A policy of expectation will not avert the decisive moment, but will create such a condition of affairs around that it will be impossible for Russia either to submit to her fate or to fight with success. The Eastern Question will sooner or later make a move of its own accord, apart from the will of Russia,—

* The war of 1859 gave Russia a new rival in the Eastern Question, and strengthened the enemy's camp by an army of 200,000 men; the Danish war impaired the position of Russia in the Baltic; the war of 1866 concentrated the forces and attention of Austria on questions of particular moment to Russia, and placed, as a reserve in her rear, an united Germany, bound to guarantee German interests; while the Candiote and Greek collision has rendered Turkey secure for many years to come, and has given her renewed confidence.

whether in consequence of internal events in the Balkan peninsula, or as the effect of some new combination in Europe; and it will then bring simultaneously to the surface all the political difficulties of Russia in Poland, in the Black Sea, even on the Caucasus.

The most ordinary event—a wide-spread insurrection in any part of Turkey which, after negotiations in the proper quarter, might give the Austrians a pretext for crossing the Save "for the protection of her security during the continuance of the troubles," may serve as the beginning of the end. Europe would not in such a case divide into two camps for the defence of the hateful interests of Russia in the Eastern Question. England will always side with those who will defend the Balkan peninsula against Russia; Prussia will cover Austria with her guarantee, as in 1854, which is tantamount to a defensive alliance; France would not at such a time break with England, Austria, and Prussia, in order to clear the road to Constantinople for Russia. What will Russia have to do in such a case? Cross the Danube and leave Austria aside? That would be impossible. Should she march on Austria? But as yet, in the event of a war on the Eastern Question, all the probabilities are on the side of Austria. In addition to the fact that Europe will not allow her to be sacrificed, it is she, and not Russia, that holds the key of the debatable border. Supported by the guarantee of Prussia, by England, by Turkey, and by a revolution on the western frontier of Russia, which Austria can at any time incite, Austria can scarcely be deemed vulnerable from the side of Russia, considering also

the relation that the forces of the two countries bear to each other; and it is more likely that the aggression will proceed from Austria. As long as the means of Russia for acting on the Austrian Slaves consist merely in a Slavonian Committee, which has not the means of carrying out one-tenth part of its modest desires, and while the means at the disposal of Austria for acting on the *Russian Slaves* consist of a Diet at Leopol (Lemberg) and of 100,000 Polish soldiers (for under the Austrian Standard all Galicians are Poles); as long as a Russian party does not exist, not only beyond the Carpathians, but even on the Vistula, while 7,000,000 of Russian subjects who confess to Polish priests belong, in an immense majority, in the event of war, to the ranks of the Austrian party,—the success of Russia is very little probable.

The active forces of Austria are backed by reserves, strong in numbers, which Russia does not possess; Austria may by a signal raise an organized insurrection along the whole of the western border of Russia, and cause her army to be subdivided. Russia, on the other hand, can do nothing of a similar kind to Austria. She may, perhaps, meet with sympathy, but not a single hand will be raised in her favour. There is consequently every probability that the Austrians would give battle with considerably superior forces. And what would be the consequences to Russia of the loss of a battle under circumstances such as prevailed in 1863? In my opinion the consequences would be the retreat of Russia beyond the Dnieper, and the restoration of Poland within the limits of 1772, with

an Archduke at the head. In such a serious struggle Austria would not show herself stingy as regards Galicia. Russia can of course be made much stronger than she is at present; it is a question of her natural resources, not of their present organization. But, nevertheless, until Russia raises the Slave Standard, while the Slave Question remains concentrated in the hands of Austria—materially on the other side of the border, and politically on this side of it—the chances of success in the case of a war, whether it be one on the Eastern Question as in 1854, or a war on the Polish Question as might have happened in 1863, will not be on the side of Russia. By taking the matter up properly, Russia can arm herself sufficiently, in order to defeat, with good luck, both the Austrians and a coalition on the Middle Danube; but even in such case, meeting only Austrians in Austria, Russia will not be in a position to secure the results of the victory achieved; and unless she is able to do this, the Eastern Question will always remain unapproachable to her. Within a few years it would become necessary to begin anew, and to act within the same vicious circle.

But what will happen if Russia is not victorious from want of allies, whether official or non-official? The Eastern Question will be solved in the sense of the negotiations of 1863, which removed the Austrian frontier to the Balkans, and gave up the Danube to its very mouth into German or Hungarian hands (which comes to the same thing in reality), and the consequence of which will be at no distant future the con-

version of the Black Sea into a Germano-Turkish lake until it shall have become entirely German. The war on the Eastern Question will inevitably be fought out (except on the sea-coast) on the western frontier of Russia. If Russia be not victorious, the question of the Turkish, as well as that of the Polish borders, will be solved in a sense unfavourable to Russia, *i. e.* Russia will be thrown a century back.

CHAPTER IX.

WHAT SHOULD BE THE POLICY OF RUSSIA?

WHILE the dispute between France and Prussia continues, Russia can dispose of a certain measure of free action. When that dispute cools down or is settled, she will be compelled to take even the slightest difficulty by assault. Then, in all probability, will be realized that Anglo-Austro-Prussian alliance which is vastly more dangerous to Russia than an alliance of the Western Powers. As yet this consummation is only impeded by personal tendencies, the chivalrous character of the old King, and the indelible recollections of the House of Austria.

Russia's chief enemy is by no means Western Europe, but the German race with its enormous pretensions. The victory will be on the side of him who first gets the upper hand in that disputed ground,—Slavonic by race and German by political geography,—which divides two powerful nations. When the unity of the German race is completed in the bounds it has proudly assigned to itself, and when it begins to Germanize the Slavonians by Prussian measures, it will be too late to go to law. The Slaves outside of the boundaries of Russia will be its sacrifice. At the same

time the fate of the last great Aryan race will be sealed, with all that it promises for humanity, together with the fate of those political fragments of the orthodox world still preserved outside of Russia, and the import of Russia's history, with which no nation can part with impunity.

I shall speak my mind frankly: contemporary Russia has already grown out of the limits of race which give legality and firmness to the existence of a State, but has not yet attained that higher legality, of being the centre of her own special Slavonic and orthodox world. Russia cannot be consolidated in her present state; political, like natural, history, does not eternize undefined, unfinished phases. All depends now on the way in which the Slave Question is decided. Russia must either extend her pre-eminence to the Adriatic or withdraw again beyond the Dnieper. She has hitherto steadily advanced towards the solution of the historic problem which is before her.

At the time when the Slavonian and orthodox world began to be threatened with thraldom, the Muscovite Empire grew out of a Norman Principality and gathered round it the kindred Great-Russian race, and, later, all the branches of the Russian people, receiving in that process of absorption the legacy of the moral inheritance of the expiring Empire of the East, until at last it crossed the confines of a Slavonian world of alien origin. It is now either too early or too late to stop. Russia might have remained a great Power, without leaving in the West the boundaries of her race, and without taking

upon herself the mission, now converted into a duty, of regenerating the Christian East; but she has done it, and it may be confidently asserted that she could not have done otherwise. As the head of a great race, gradually reasserting itself in her person, and as a refuge of all the orthodox, Russia has never enclosed herself within strictly defined boundaries, and has indeed been compelled to step beyond them. Russian Tsars have always borne and still bear a stamp of a peculiar character, which has not permitted them since the days of Ivan III. to confine themselves, exclusively, within the borders of their own Empire—the stamp of the only truly Slave and orthodox Tsars who lived amidst the ruins of the Slavonian or orthodox East of Europe. The idea of the community of the Slave race has always existed in Russia, in the form of a tendency to union with kindred by blood—first with the people of Great Russia, next with the Russian race in general, including all its transitional forms; and it is therefore natural that that idea should have at last grown to its present significance. A similar tendency has never been manifested in Poland, which has always regarded herself in the light of a State, not a people, and she has therefore never been of importance to her kindred neighbours. Russia now stands amidst a Slavonian world that is not Russian, and that is divided by an arbitrary line between her own dominion and that of Germany. At the same time, the consciousness of the identity of race on either side of that line, and a comprehension of the community of material and moral requirements, are rapidly

ripening. This is the decisive hour that can never return, and that admits of no long hesitation. One of two courses must be adopted. Russia must either acknowledge herself to be a State in the sense of old Poland, and nothing more than a State, alien in her heart to everything outside the boundaries which have been accidentally given to her, and proceed in a decisive manner to root out every independent feature of the races of which she is composed or which are still to enter into her composition; she must in such a case sincerely and openly renounce all thought of Slavism or of the orthodox East, and that community with them which envenoms her relations with Europe, casting them away from her and regarding them in the same manner as Prussia or France; in fact, shutting herself up at home and maintaining her borders by force, until in the course of centuries they become merged with the body of the Empire; or, leaving to the Russian people their inalienable pre-eminence in the Slavonian world, and to the Russian language its undoubted right to be the political and connecting tongue of that world, Russia must open her arms to all those who are nearer akin to her than to Europe, receiving them as younger but independent members of the same great family.

The *first* of these two decisions would be opposed to history—a dangerous road! But that is not all. Although such a decision might have been possible under the reign of Catherine II., it is at present almost impossible. We have gone too far: tribal affinities have been aroused, the Eastern Question has been

raised, divided Poland has become an apple of discord between the Germanic and Russian races; the general connection of all these difficulties has visibly asserted itself, and bears a well-defined name. The relations between Russia and Europe cannot be restored to a character of sincerity until the storm has burst and been dispelled. Russia will not be believed if she does not make use of all the means at her disposal, direct and indirect, in order to solve in her own favour questions that cannot be laid aside, and which will be decided to her disadvantage if taken up by any other Power. The *first* consequence of such a course will be that the Black Sea will be entirely taken away from Russia, and that a hostile predominance will be established on it. The *second* will be the hatred of the forty millions of Slaves and Orthodox whom Russia will have repelled, and who will certainly in such a case join the ranks of the enemy—a course which they will not be able to avoid. The *third* will be the excessive and crushing power of the German race, neighbouring Russia. The *fourth* will be a dispute about Poland, with all its possible results; the united Germans will not voluntarily present their flank to Russia when they might protect it, nor make a present to Russia of a soil so well adapted to receive the seeds of Germanism in the future; they will not let slip an opportunity of keeping Russia constantly on the alert; they will have an account to settle with us on the shores of the Baltic. The *fifth* consequence will be "additional articles" relative to Finland, Livonia, Bessarabia, the Crimea. By renouncing

her historical destiny, Russia at the same time renounces the only allies on whom she can ever depend. We may gain a battle by our own efforts, and in our own name, but we cannot attain any objects. And at the same time we shall have to carry on a fight with the same obstacles and with the same enemies—a defensive, not an offensive struggle, not in order to terminate that struggle with a triumph, but merely to neutralize as much as possible its unfavourable issue. The historical move of Russia from the Dnieper to the Vistula, was a declaration of war to Europe, which had broken into a part of the Continent that did not belong to her. Russia now stands in the midst of the enemy's lines—such a condition is only temporary: she must either drive back the enemy or abandon her position.

But besides the two lines of action which have just been passed in review, there is a third—a middle course. This is the worst of all. It consists in irritating the whole world against us without doing anything in reality, and without making positive preparations for anything. The Lord forbid that Russia should enter upon such a course.

A war for the independence of any people or State, can only have that independence in view; there is nothing to be said to the contrary. As far as Russia is concerned, there is no sensible reason, moral, politoeconomical, or military, for desiring new annexations in Europe; in the Russian mind there is no idea of converting kindred countries into subject provinces. Red Russia (Ruthenia) and Ismaïl are Russian by their nature. When the races allied to Russia by blood

shall have been completely liberated, the country watered by the Vistula becomes no longer ours. In the Slavonian and orthodox countries which surround Russia, there are six or eight principal centres of gravitation (this has not yet become sufficiently clear); and it is around these that the national units must collect.

If Russia continues to pursue her historical path, her peaceful efforts in favour of those who are nearest to her should not be indiscriminate, but in strict conformity with the peculiar conditions and requirements of each centre, taken separately. In addition to these natural groups, there is yet another place on the earth immeasurably important to Russia, having no national character, but from its exceptionable position too important to belong to any small people — Constantinople, with the surrounding suburbs, country, and straits. The most positive interests of Russia render it desirable that that city, far more eternal than Rome, should become the free city of a tribal union.

If there be any sense in history and the liberation of the Slaves be effected, their mutual relations towards each other and towards Russia will be determined by the force of things. The independence of each member of the liberated family in his internal affairs, a separate Ruler and separate political institutions, as may be most convenient to each,—all this is already settled by history. But independence in an international and military point of view is quite a different question. It is not enough to be freed, it is neces-

sary to remain free. In the present state of Europe there is no room for a heap of small nations, disposing of their own small armies, declaring war, making peace and alliances—each in its own person. And where?—Between the Russian and the future German Empire. And what, we ask, are those nations? Rejected races, not recognized by Europe, whose masters of yesterday will long continue to regard them as rebel subjects, and await a fitting opportunity for enslaving them anew.

To create such a condition of chaos, pregnant as it would be with quarrels, disorders, and internecine strife —a condition of which even to-morrow's existence would be uncertain, and which would be burdensome to all, and to the liberators in particular—would be taking upon oneself not the restoration, but the destruction of legitimate rights and of order in Europe, and holding up to derision one of the greatest of all questions in which the world is concerned. Affairs would, moreover, soon return to the same issueless condition. The liberated East of Europe, if it be liberated at all, will require: a durable bond of union, a common head with a common council, the transaction of international affairs and the military command in the hands of that head, the Tsar of Russia, the natural Chief of all the Slaves and Orthodox.

It is necessary that the citizens of each nation in the Union should have the full rights of a citizen of the entire Union. There is no necessity to place all the military forces of the confederate nations under the banner of Russia, after the model of the North Ger-

manic Confederation; it will be sufficient if the active army, whether on a peace or a war footing, and whether at home or abroad, according to circumstances, should, together with the federal fortresses and the entrances into the Black Sea, be at the entire disposal and under the sole government of the head of the Union. The great confederate family, independent in each of its separate parts, will thus form but one State as regards the rest of the world.

Having determined to speak the whole of my mind, I must add the following. Although the personal relations between reigning families are of less importance now than formerly, yet some degree of importance attaches to them still. At the same time, in a Union of people of the same race, subjection to one head, the introduction of a variety of dynastic traditions, connections, and claims, might shake the foundations and perhaps destroy the newly-created unity. When the great Eastern family shall have arisen, its union can only be consolidated by a community of family thrones in one dynasty. Every Russian, as well as every Slave and every orthodox Christian, should desire to see chiefly the Russian reigning House cover the liberated soil of Eastern Europe with its branches, under the supremacy and lead of the Tsar of Russia, long recognized, in the expectation of the people, as the direct heir of Constantine the Great. The isolation of the Eastern world of Europe, of which the foundations were laid in days of antiquity, is only now bearing fruit, after the lapse of fifteen hundred years. There was a time when the unification of which

I now speak began to be called into existence by the House of the Jagellons, but it was purely in dynastic, not popular, interests. Russia grew up apart from the Union, which therefore remained fruitless.

I know that many will consider my conclusions mere poesy. But I have already expressed my conviction, based on a sufficient series of proofs; should my poesy not be realized, notwithstanding that the history of a thousand years leads irresistibly to its realization, Russia will scarcely remain, as a State, within its present limits. Nationalities have now begun to form into groups; ill-defined boundaries have become unstable; revolutions are effected with an astounding rapidity. The spirit of the age, in conjunction with the actual sense of the position of Russia, admits but of two solutions: either Russia as a local empire of the Russian race, or Russia as a concentration of the Slave and Orthodox world.

As regards the present, those two solutions may be expressed by two verbs: to await or to act.

At first the action of Russia can only be moral. The open recognition of her right to be the representative of a kindred world, and the bringing back under the parental roof, at the first opportunity, of the last enslaved remnants of the Russian race, and an unanimous impulse on both sides towards the common object — these should precede political unification. There will then be no lack of favourable opportunities; the nineteenth century is not an age of peace and tranquil prosperity in Europe.

But however great may be the unanimity, and how-

ever favourable the opportunity, this great question can only be settled by force, and at first by Russian force alone. Now, more than ever, Russia requires an army commensurate in its numbers and its quality with the magnitude of the task which she has before her—an army that shall be Russian, not in an abstract sense, but an army that shall be educated by military commanders, who understand the spirit of Russian soldiers and Russian regiments. With half-a-million such troops on the western frontier (which may be easily realized without exceeding the present expenditure), with unity and sole responsibility in command, according to the regulations of 1812, the task can be fulfilled. This can be as easily proved as that twice two make four.

It is this view of the political requirements of the age, and of the nature of the efforts which they demand, that I have made the foundation of my inquiries into "the Armed Forces of Russia."*

It does not, however, follow, from the political exposition of the question, that my calculations will be incorrect if the objects above described are not contemplated. Expectation demands exactly the same development of force as action. Events cannot be averted by expectation; it is only the hour that will be chosen, not by Russia, nor for her convenience; the rest will remain unchanged. Russia will come into collision with the same adversaries, Prussia not excepted, and with the same number of soldiers and

* A pamphlet to which the present work is, as it were, the political key.—TRANS.

guns, on the subject of the inaccessible Eastern Question and its inevitable supplement—the insoluble Polish Question, as well as in respect to the accessible Pan-Slavist Question, with this difference only, that in the first case success will be as barren to Russia as Novara was to Austria; it would remove the danger to a distance; whereas, in the second case, even defeat would be as fruitful as the same Novara was to Piedmont, by drawing tighter the bonds between Russia and kindred races, and fortifying her, morally, for the future.

Many will, doubtless, find my sincerity indiscreet. I have more than once been blamed for it, but I nevertheless retain my conviction that a Russian should speak as openly of the affairs of his country as foreigners speak of them. Language is, in the present day, a weapon, and the unarmed cannot fight with the armed. I apprehend that the States and nations of which I speak are quite indifferent to my personal opinions on the Eastern Question. When, however, the idea of Pan-Slavism becomes a State idea, it will dazzle all like lightning; there will then also be no need for secrecy. Russian affairs will be in a fair way, only when the peasant women on the banks of the Moldau or on the slopes of the Balkans shall hush their children to sleep, saying, "Don't cry, the Russians are coming soon to help us, and they will bring you lollipops."

I have exposed my opinion on the Eastern Question. That opinion may be concentrated in a few words. The state of affairs is such, that the Eastern Question,

in the narrow sense in which it is generally understood, represents, as far as Russia is concerned, the problem of squaring the circle, which cannot be solved by any means in the present, and which leaves her no hope in the future. That question is a phantom, against which nothing can be undertaken, because it is a phantom, and the dependent half of another more important question. The Eastern Question, in its wide sense, *i.e.* the Question of the East of Europe, is a reality not easily attainable, because it contains a cosmical, historical problem, but still a reality, a live adversary with whom it is possible to struggle, and who may be overcome, with trust in Providence and confidence in self.

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